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This paper provides in-depth information on the multiple realities and time-dependencies 
during droughts over different sub-groups of an affected society. Dynamics are analyzed 
based on categorization of impacts into human, social, financial and natural capital 
effects and using the theory of conservation of resources for the behavioral explanation 
of selected coping strategies. A qualitative field study based on this approach was 
conducted in a village in southern Iran. It was found that droughts can cause waves of 
negative effects on various capital dimensions to farmers, especially the poor. The 
dimensions are very much interrelated and can multiply negative effects, decreasing 
resilience to drought to very low levels that can eventually lead to poverty trap-like 
situations. Furthermore, it was found that government aid interventions unintendedly 
worsened the situation of the poor. To avoid such situations it is suggested to shift from 
relief or ex-post interventions to a proactive risk management approach. 
 









Drought is a recurring climatic event that can happen in all parts of the world. In 
terms of people affected, it is the number one risk of all natural hazards, with more than 1 
billion people affected in the last decade (World Disaster Report 2010). This situation is 
likely to worsen in the future, with an already observed increase in droughts and 
predicted increases in extreme droughts in the future due to climate change (Schneider et 
al. 2007). For example, the frequency of exceptionally hot years has significantly 
increased in Australia and this trend is projected to continue (Hennessy et al. 2008). Iran, 
the study region in this paper, expects negative climate change impacts, especially in the 
agriculture sector, e.g. significant reduction in rainfed wheat yield (Nasiri et al. 2006). 
However, the effects of droughts to human society depend not only on the severity of the 
event (such as lack of rainfall) but also on the resources the society and its members have 
to cope with this shock. Such resources can include formal market mechanisms as well as 
informal/traditional ones, e.g. from crop insurance to kinship arrangements (see Skoufias 
2003 for a comprehensive list). Consequently, dependent on the coping strategies 
available, the short and long term effects may differ greatly among sub-groups within the 
affected population. Additionally, the action taken by one sub-group to cope with the 
event may have important implications for other groups as well. Furthermore, the actions 
of one group and the implications for another group may not be necessarily on the same 
dimension (e.g., financial or social) and can cause devastating negative feedback loops. It 
is the primary goal in this paper to shed more light on these interrelationships and 
negative feedback loops during a drought.   
While it is recognized in the literature that droughts and strategies to lessen the 
impacts have to be analyzed from a broad based perspective, i.e., including 
psychological, economic, sociological and institutional dimensions (see Campbell et al. 
2011; Easdale and Rosso 2010; Gilbert and McLeman 2010; Edwards et al. 2009; Eriksen 
and Silva 2009; Wilhite 2002; McKee et al. 2002; Paul 1998), most existing research 
tends to focus only on certain dimensions. Sometimes the focal point is on economic 
consequences (Edwards et al. 2009; Horridge et al. 2005; Mahul et al. 2005; Paul 1998), 
whereas others focus on environmental effects (Speranza et al. 2008) or agricultural 
adjustments within sustainability frameworks (Ha et al. 2007), with only a few addressing 
detailed social (see Gilbert and McLeman 2010; McAllister et al. 2008) or psychological 
adjustments (Coelho et al. 2004). However, interrelated and dynamic (time-dependent) 
effects among those dimensions (and within sub-groups of the affected population) may 
play a more important role than assumed in the past and therefore should not be 
neglected, as they can be long lasting. For example, school dropouts due to a drought 
(Eriksen et al. 2005) can cause serious negative long term consequences as education is 
now recognized as an important element for development (Crespo and Lutz 2007; Lutz et 
al. 2007, 2008). The possibility of dropping out of school, as well as other socio-
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economic dynamics during a drought may differ greatly among household groups 
(Hochrainer et al. 2009; Mechler et al. 2009). Furthermore, attitudes of farmers toward 
drought and drought management are closely linked with their behavioral management 
and experience with past events (Zarafshani et al. 2005; Zarafshani et al. 2007; Lindell 
and Perry 2004). Hence, attitude and past experience can affect the assessment of coping 
strategies in the future, which is especially important from a preventive action point of 
view (see Krömker and Mosler 2002). From a (quantitative) modelling perspective, 
knowledge of time-dependencies over different dimensions and sub-groups is important 
and should be explicitly incorporated to determine suitable coping and risk management 
strategies, especially for the poor (Barrett et al. 2007).  
Generally speaking, while detailed large scale analyses of social and economic 
impacts of drought on farmers (and households) in regional, rural, and urban areas are 
necessary (see for example Edwards et al. 2008), there is also a need to better understand 
the dynamics during the drought.  If this is neglected, not only is the “disaster landscape” 
of the drought incomplete, but policy solutions may be inadequate or even exacerbate the 
problem for some sub-groups. However, to assess these dynamics and interactions 
between human, economic and social dimensions, qualitative rather than quantitative 
approaches seem to be appropriate. Hence, a qualitative study was conducted to find in-
depth information on the multiple realities and dynamics during droughts including 
social, economic and human/psychological related consequences over different sub-
groups of the effected population. The chosen study site is a village in southern Iran 
where drought has been a recurring phenomenon in the past and farmers continually cope 
with high rainfall variability (Foltz 2002). The paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents the theoretical framework used for the case study. Afterwards, in section 
3 the case study site is introduced. Section 4 presents the detailed results and section 5 




Household level effects due to droughts can be multidimensional and are dependent 
on the availability of relevant coping strategies (Zarafshani et al. 2005; Zarafshani et al. 
2007; Ingram et al. 2002). Important variables in that regard include dimensions such as 
household structure, gender, education, property features, condition and size of farm, 
educational level of household members, as well as financial and economic conditions 
(Speranza et al. 2008; McIntire 1991). The combination of these and related variables 
will make some people more vulnerable than others in the face of extreme events (Paul 
1998). The poor especially tend to be exposed to environmental risk more than the 
wealthy, as the latter are better able to take protective measures and can avoid some 
environmental risks completely—e.g., health or psychological related risk (Brouwer et al. 
2007).  
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To avoid confusion between the different interrelated effects, we separate them into 
different kinds of “capital”. In more detail, we use the “four capitals” framework 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002) to define 
household and community resilience due to droughts. Such frameworks (and as a part of 
larger frameworks such as the sustainable livelihood approach, see DFID 1999) proved 
successful in a number of past studies in identifying conditions that either promote or 
hinder resilience and therefore should also serve well here. Consequently, household 
resilience and its dynamics are assessed and investigated in relation to levels of various 
stocks within the four available capitals and their changes over time (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2004; McIntosh 2008). The definitions for each type of capital are given 
below. 
 
• Human Capital: Refers to the knowledge, skills, competencies and general capacities 
of individuals. The focus here is on capacities of individuals. 
• Social Capital: Refers to networks, features of social organization, such as norms, 
values, trust and understanding that facilitate co-operation. Here, the focus is on 
capacities of groups. 
• Built and Financial Capital: Refers to the built environment and anything that has 
been made by human hands, including the physical assets of the private and public 
sector. Financial capital refers to the funds (money) that are available to individuals 
and groups. 
• Natural Capital: Refers to renewable and non-renewable resources of the bio-physical 
systems of a region or community, which enter the production process and satisfy 
consumption needs. 
 
To explain the dynamics of resilience due to the “actions” of different kinds of risk 
bearers to cope with the drought, we use the so-called “Conservation of Resources 
Theory”(COR—Hobfoll 1988, 2001). COR provides a behavioral explanation of the 
decisions made during the drought. It is a motivational stress theory based on the 
hypothesis that people have a desire to conserve their resources and to limit any state that 
may jeopardize the security of these resources. Accordingly, if resources are threatened, 
lost or one fails to gain resources after investments, this will lead to mental or physical 
stress outcomes. Three premises can be outlined in COR relevant in our study. First, 
(acute) resource loss is central to the stress process. Second, people invest in resources to 
protect themselves against resource loss, to recover from loss, and to gain resources. 
Third, those who lack resources are more vulnerable to resource loss (eventually leading 
to loss spirals). 
Several studies on the household, community, and national level can be found in the 
literature using similar kinds of approaches (for a literature review on droughts see 
Zamani et al. 2006). However, explanation of time-dependent interactions between 
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household sub-groups as well as the community level over time is lacking. This paper 
should fill part of this gap by analyzing the process in detail. Furthermore, direct and 
interrelated effects are distinguished, so that the dynamics can be separated into the 
different capitals (Figure 1). We excluded natural capital as this is assumed to be constant 
in our analysis, i.e., the same environmental conditions (droughts are not spatial limited 
events and happen over large regions). Note that this may not hold true in the context of 
climate change. 
 
Figure 1: Framework for the Analysis of Household Effects 
 
 
As Figure 1 shows, in our approach drought effects are dependent on the hazard 
severity (e.g., lack of rainfall) and the resilience of the household to this shock. 
Resilience is determined by the level of available capital stock to cope with the event. 
This will have direct effects on the capital stocks and over time there are additional 
interrelated effects (possible feedback loops) between those forms of capitals. 
Furthermore, government interventions can come into play, additionally changing the 






The Shahnia village in the Boushehr province in southern Iran (Figure 2) was chosen 
as the study site. Geographically, it is near the Persian Gulf (about 20 km away) and a 
river (the Mond) is about 2 km north to the village. The total number of households is 
around 236 with a total population of about 1,300 people. The village is very susceptible 
to rainfall shortages and has experienced several droughts in the past. The major soil type 
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in this area is sandy loam, which has soil moisture inadequate to meet the needs of any 
particular crop. Wheat and tomato are the main crops cultivated there. Specific varieties 
of rainfed wheat are selected at the beginning of the season dependent on actual 
precipitation. Farmers cultivate Chamran wheat in normal times, but they use Zagros or 
Koohdasht wheat if there is less precipitation at the beginning of the season (for a 
drought tolerance comparison of this kind of wheat varieties see Azimzadeh and 
Azimzadeh 2011).  
 
Figure 2: Location of the Study Site in Iran 
Only owners of agricultural land (irrigated or rainfed) were selected as potential 
candidates to be included in the study. The interviews were conducted during the drought 
in 2009. The interviewer was from this area and therefore was very experienced in the 
language, religion, culture and customs of the farmers there. This was seen as an 
important advantage for interpreting the responses, as there were no language barriers 
and a better understanding of feelings and emotions beyond words was obtained, which is 
essential for capturing multiple realities and emic perspectives (Fetterman 1989). Audio 
tapes were not used, as it was known via pre-tests that the respondents were not 
comfortable with this method of data collection and would have very likely resulted in 
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In-depth unstructured interviews and participatory observations were applied to 
gather the data. In that way, a comprehensive discussion between the two sides happened 
naturally over the course of the interview, allowing for the collection of valuable 




In contrast to quantitative research sampling approaches, qualitative sampling is a 
selective and, thus non-probability, sampling approach (Popay et al. 1998). Hence, the 
sample size is deliberate and based on the research goal. We selected our cases using two 
different methods. At the beginning, we utilized key informants (i.e., persons who knew 
best what was going on in their communities). These people included community leaders 
(elected leaders), professionals (agriculture officers), and those who had firsthand 
knowledge about the community (Berg 2007). We asked the local informants to introduce 
us to some rich, moderate, and poor farmers in the drought-affected region. Additionally, 
we used a snowball sampling method (chain referral sampling in which current 
informants used their social networks to refer the researcher to others who might 
contribute to the study). Snowball sampling is often used to find and recruit ‘hidden 
populations”, that is, groups that are not easily accessible to researchers through other 
sampling strategies (Stahler and Cohen 2000). Finally, we selected 36 cases that were 
most frequently mentioned within both methods. We included a larger number of very 
poor farmers as they were expected to experience the most varied of effects. Hence, we 
selected 7 rich, 11 moderate, and 18 poor farmers and investigated their coping strategies 




Three to four interviews in various places were performed for each case. The first 
interview was always performed in the participant’s house when he was alone, the second 
took place at his farm, the third in other places where he worked (shops, farms of wealthy 
farmers), and last in a group of friends. Although this method is very time-consuming, it 
has the advantage of assuring that the interviewer receives true information. For example, 
it was found that it’s very likely that initially, the interviewed person mistrusted the 
interviewer—assuming that he/she was from a government agency—and as a result, may 
not have accurately responded to some questions. To overcome this barrier, more 
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interviews were carried out, potentially resulting in an increase in trust and enabling the 




Table 1 shows some of the socio-demographic variables for each of the three wealth 
classes. 
 
Table 1. Socio-demographic Information of the Sample Cases:  
Mean Values, Standard Deviation in Brackets. 
 Poor farmers 
(N = 18) 
Moderate farmers 
(N = 11) 
Rich farmers 
(N = 7) 
Age  59 (7.1) 48 (6.5) 63 (5.8) 
Education1 2.44 7 7 
Family members  7.88 (2.8) 7.18 (2.1) 9.57 (3.2) 
Rain land ( in ha)  36 (15.6) 157.3 (214.1) 212.9 (54.9) 
Irrigated land (in ha) 0.08 (0.19) 4.63 (4.17) 45.71 (28.2) 
Garden (ha) 0 0.18 (0.34) 1.78 (1.72) 
Agricultural tools used  No Few needed assets All assets needed 
Main Second jobs Wage Shops, Taxi driver Trade 
1 Number of years in School: 5 years= Primary School, 9 years= Secondary school, 12 years= 
High School 
 
Next, we separate our analysis into the three types of capitals as shown in Figure 1—
human capital, social capital, and built/financial capital. We always explicitly refer to the 
respondent’s wealth class if there are differences compared to other wealth classes. The 
observations are explained using the COR theory introduced in section 2 and are 
summarized again at the end of the paper. 
 
Built/Financial Capital Effects 
 
All farmers believed that droughts severely affected their financial status. However, 
poor farmers suffered the most, as they had no crop yields in the last three years due to 
precipitation shortages. Hence, resilience was already very low. Crop diversification as 
one agricultural adjustment strategy (which can be seen as part of the resource investment 
premise within the COR theory) served well for some wealthier farmers. For example, 
two rich farmers and one moderate farmer believed that during a drought they were able 
to produce more tomatoes with better quality from their lands than in normal times. One 
farmer stated: 
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When we have less rain, tomato products will be better because rain 
increases the probability of diseases. Also precipitation itself causes 
damages to plants. 
 
Job opportunities, especially farm wage income, decreased during the drought. This 
affected the poor the most, as this was their main additional second income source. 
Hence, the decrease in financial capital of poor households during the drought was 
affected due to at least two reasons: Firstly, many poor farmers could not farm for 
themselves any longer as there was no available water for irrigation. Secondly, while in 
“normal” times poor farmers simultaneously worked on both their own plots and those of 
rich farmers (to earn additional money), during droughts they lost this alternative income 
source as well. A poor farmer stated: 
 
Good old years; when there was lots of rain; I worked on my own farm. 
My sons and I were busy working for other, too. Now I can’t work for 
myself and only my elder son was lucky enough to catch a job in others’ 
tomato farm. 
 
Interestingly, government aid interventions worsened the situation of the poor in the 
long run. Basically, the Iranian government is concerned about its rural farmers during 
droughts and its intention is to manage drought and vulnerability in rural areas through 
economical and infrastructural aid such as offering loans, retrofitting canals, watershed 
management projects, establishing local dams and other supports for modern watering 
methods. However, only the rich and moderate farmers usually benefit from this kind of 
governmental emergency assistance (see also Brouwer et al. 2007; Paul 1998). Reasons 
for that include lack of knowledge and/or capacities to apply for loans, reflected in the 
following statements of poor farmers: 
 
I don’t know anything about these loans. Even if I knew, it wouldn’t 
matter; because loans are for the rich. 
 
Another poor farmer said 
 
I don’t have any official document of my own land nor a bailsman, I had 
been asked for it whenever I demanded to take a loan…I have none 
  
One other noted that 
 
My lands are under dry farming. Loans are for the rich who owns a bore 
hole or sprinkle irrigation system. 






My lands are far from rivers, so I can't retrieve water to irrigate. These 
loans don’t suit me. 
 
As could be expected, rich and moderate farmers were satisfied with governmental 
assistance. Some even believed to have benefited due to the drought. Their replies 
reflected satisfaction. For example,  
 
I took two kinds of loans. A thousand Rialls (Iranian currency) went to 
increase the depth of my well (2 meters) and with the other I became able 
to establish drip irrigation systems on my tomato farm. All that caused me 
to put some more hectare of land under tomato cultivation 
 
Another rich farmer believed that the loans were very beneficial: 
 
I could equip my tomato farm with modern irrigation systems, save some 
water and put at least 30% more under cultivation. I also was able to level 




By receiving loans I became able to buy some equipments and plumbs, 
sprinkle irrigation system near my bore hole to provide better condition 
for wheat lands to earn as much as it costs, no profit, no loss! By 
increasing the depth of my bore-hole, there will be no problem for years. 
 
According to COR (premise two) these people invested in resources not only to 
protect themselves against resource loss but also to gain resources. This is not possible 
for poor farmers and therefore increase (according to premise one) their stress level and 
vulnerability to resource losses (premise three of COR). The next statement indicates 
problems for poor farmers inherent in governmental disaster emergency assistance. A 
rich farmer claimed: 
 
With traditional irrigation systems, I planted 20 hectare and needed 20 
farmhands. Now I plant 35 hectare with the help of 12 farmhands and drip 
irrigation system. Costs and weeding activities have been cut. By well-
ordered irrigation, productivity booms up and I hired fewer workers. 
 
 Yazdanpanah et al.: Drought Effects 
116 
 
Hence, government interventions, although beneficial (for resource investment, 
premise two of COR theory) for some parts of the rural population, namely the moderate 
and rich farmers, have detrimental effects for the poor due to the decrease of job 
opportunities. That is, rich farmers needed fewer laborers as they had equipped their 
farms with modern technology (such as sprinkler or drip irrigation systems). Water 
efficiency also increased, while demands for labor went down; subsequently some 
workers were fired. As Figure 1 illustrates, government intervention changed the built 
and financial capital and therefore the future resilience of households, but the effects 
differ between household groups and are especially negative for the poor, who needed 
help the most. Another consequence due to increasing unemployment during drought 
(Paul, 1998) is the increase in labour supply which subsequently decrease wages as well 
(according to the law of supply and demand).  
The moderate farmers’ situation lies between those two extremes. Not surprisingly, 
they lost many things, but not at the same magnitude as the poor, especially as they still 
had some financial and built capital to cope with the situation (although not on the same 
scale as the rich farmers). One moderate farmer said: 
 
I didn’t had any yields from my rain feed lands but I can manage it. I 
could borrow from my friends and I get some loans from the Bank as they 
are sure I can pay it back. 
 
Another moderate farmer said 
 
Yes, I lost many things but I had some savings and I used it. Also the 
government helps me. Although I believed they can do it better. There was 
some delay but I was able to borrow and will pay it back in the future. 
 
Remittances seemed to play a crucial role, especially for the moderate farmers. One said: 
 
Drought affected my farming, my shop and many things but it couldn’t 
affect my relatives and family in city. They helped me a lot. 
 
Another coping strategy (typically the evidence of resource loss cycles) is economic 
adjustments related to asset management (Zamani et al. 2006) and this was also found 
here, however, only for poor farmers. This included decreases of livelihood assets, 
 
My refrigerator broke down, but I couldn’t repair it or bought a new one. 
In this hot and humid weather we don’t have an essential thing. 
 
or the farmer’s personal resources 




I sell the gold of my wife. She is very sad but we had to do it.  
 
as well as activities 
 
In normal years we have a lot of hobbies, like swimming, camping, 
fishing, but in droughts we couldn’t do them. It upsets me. 
 
Summarizing, built and financial capital are severely affected during droughts and 
resource investment seems beneficial only for moderate and rich farmers, as they have 
access to additional help from the government and enough built and financial capital. 
This, in turn, has long lasting effects on the poor as they have less financial capital in the 
future due to the decrease in both job opportunities and wages. Furthermore, only in this 
group are economic adjustments found to be taking place, eventually leading to poverty 
trap like situations (see Carter et al. 2007; Barrett et al. 2007). The decrease in this form 
of capital has important consequences on the human and social capital as well.  
 
Human Capital Effects 
 
The majority of poor farmers stated that drought greatly affected their food 
consumption and resulted in a decrease in educational and health standards. The situation 
of having no or inadequate food supplies directly affected the health of household 
members. Since physical activity is the only way they can produce income, an 
insufficient amount of food reduces their ability to work in the future, exacerbating the 
negative consequences. Probably most important in the long run is the finding that all of 
the poor farmers stated that they could not meet the needs of their children’s schooling, 
with two of them expressing that they have been forced to stop their daughters from 
studying. They also remarked that if they were able to find money to buy clothes or other 
basic needs, it would go to family members in the following order: father, sons, mother 
and daughters. Most of the time, nothing is left for the mother and daughters. One said: 
 
First me, second my sons who work, than the wife and at last daughters. 
 
These findings show that droughts can cause additional negative effects on poor women 
and that gender discrimination increases during such times. On the other hand, such 
affects were not observed for moderate and rich farmers. In this regard one moderate 
farmer said: 
 
My economic situation has been weaker than past, but I can provide food 
and educational facilities for my family. 




Education seemed to be very important for all groups. Regarding coping strategies one 
moderate farmer stated: 
 
We reduced some extra and not necessary cost. But honestly I couldn’t see 
my children leaving school. Maybe we would reduce our food 
consumption, buy cheap clothes or even sell some things such as my 
wife’s gold but the real gold is my children and their education.  
 
and a rich farmer said: 
 
We don’t have any problem in these issues (food and education) 
 
Education is now seen as an important element for development (Crespo and Lutz 
2007; Lutz et al. 2007, 2008) and goes along with increasing standards of health. Due to 
school dropouts, drought is likely to cause negative development effects for as long as 
decades, especially for the very poor and within this group especially for women. This 
decrease in human capital is alarming and should be taken seriously as a development 
problem. The next focus is on psychological issues. 
The first premise of COR theory states that the “acute” loss of resources will lead to 
stress outcomes, especially for less resilient households. In line with that, farmers 
believed that the very first effect of droughts is a psychological one due to waiting for 
rain and constantly searching the sky for a sign of rain or clouds. They reported that when 
rain doesn’t come in time, it results in stress and pressure, and they believed this 
psychological effect caused health problems. Typical statements of poor farmers were: 
 
When rainfall is delayed, I feel pressure and stress. Over the night I dream 
to see clouds or rain but, when I wake up and don’t see it, I feel bad. I am 
sad and this feeling rises up some gastrointestinal disease and blood 
pressure to me. 
 
Poor farmers also indicated that they lose hope and are very upset during droughts. For 
relaxation some smoke drugs and cigarettes. One of them said: 
 
I am very upset and don’t have any hope. I lost my self-confidence and I 
cannot do any things just go close to drug 
 
This behavior could be interpreted as a form of psychological coping strategy (additional 
to agricultural and economic adjustments) to decrease stress levels.  
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Summarizing, all the poor farmers said that the situation—encompassing a lack of 
crop production, debts, school dropout, unsatisfying wages for women and children, 
emigration, and unemployment—led them to depression and a loss of self confidence. 
Most of these effects were not found for the medium and rich farmers due to their ability 
to cope with the event (due to their higher resilience). In other words, using COR theory, 
there was not an “acute” resource loss situation imminent for them; resource investment, 
as well as expected gains, protected their current capital stocks and increased their future 
financial resilience. The very poor, who lacked resources (small resilience or less human 
and built/financial capital), experienced “acute” resource losses, anticipated limited 
diversification possibilities (like job opportunities) and had to rely on economic 
adjustments resulting in negative psychological and health related effects. This seems to 
support the third premise of COR theory, which states that those who lack resources are 
more vulnerable to resource losses, which could eventually lead to loss spirals.  
 
Social Capital Effects 
 
One important social capital effect due to drought is youth migration (see for example 
for Australia the large scale analysis by Edwards et al. 2009). However, this should be 
considered within the broader context of other household coping strategies (usually 
migration is not the first choice, see Gilbert and McLeman 2010). In our study, we found 
that most poor families sent at least two of their children to industrial regions to work 
during droughts (specifically to the southern Pars, an area with large oil and gas 
industries). Although youth migration also occurred for moderate farmers, poor farmers 
sent their children to work the whole year, while moderate farmers sent their children to 
work only during the school holidays. It was already noted that education is important for 
all wealth groups and therefore long term migration can be seen as one of the last 
economic adjustment options chosen by the households. It can also be mentioned that 
migration can shatter personal (human) resource capital, such as self-esteem and status 
(Bosch 2003). Rich farmers did not experience migration or school dropouts. Hence, it 
should be emphasized that migration and dropout rates among the poor are most likely 
during droughts and have long-lasting effects on their socioeconomic status. Abandoning 
education results in the family staying in low educational levels and losing potential 
human (working) capital as those who migrate do not come back to their village. 
Therefore, poor households cannot increase/improve their human capital resources, and 
agrarian families will eventually stay in a retrograde cycle, perhaps leading to a 
breakdown of community structures. Drought also causes loss of trust among farmers, or 
in other words, reduces social capital (support networks, social participation, community 
engagement, social cohesion, see Figure 1). Poor farmers believe that during a drought 
they are in a weak position and exploited by rich farmers.  One of the poor farmers said: 
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They (rich farmers) borrow money, we use the document as a guarantee 
hold and eventually the owner will be them. 
 
and another adds, 
 
Drought is an opportunity to take our lands out of our hands. 
 
A poor farmer said:  
 
Rich farmers pay our wives and kids low wages, instead of helping us. 
And if there is a nag, they dismiss us and hire another one quickly. 
 
From the other (rich farmers) point of view, it is believed that drought worsens the 
situation of the poor, who therefore try to rob the assets of the rich. A rich farmer stated: 
 
Robbing is booming up. Thieves are mostly the kids of whom their farms 
suffered from drought badly.  
 
Also the (unintended) uneven distribution of government aid causes tensions. A poor 
farmer stated: 
 
I myself had not received any kind of loans, so governmental exemptions 
did not have anything to do with me. Everything went to the rich. 
 
Taking loans seemed useless to others as they thought that only the rich were able to take 
loans, as they had an extended network of relationships. 
 
The rich have money, friends, relations and they bribe to receive loans and 
take financial aid out of turn. If I wanted to get a financial aid, I would be 
told to bring bailsmen or documents for deposit. Well… I do not have any. 
 
Related to this topic a poor farmer reported: 
Mr.… had a huge amount of money as a loan for drip irrigation systems. 
He equipped his farm in a new way and bought some pieces of my 
brother’s dry land next to him. 
 
Such perceptions can lead to social disruption and disloyalty in rural areas. The poor see 
themselves as isolated and being discriminated against by the government.  
As was already indicated, poor farmers use different activities to survive during an 
extreme situation. Some of these include illegal activities such as robbing or smuggling 
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drugs, guns, and alcohol, causing additional social problems, such as distrust between 
different social groups. In the response to our question: “who is doing all these things? 
And who is responsible for burgling?” a majority of the moderate and rich accused the 
poor and landless rustics. 
 
Who can do all these bad things? Just poor and beggars! They destroy 
social safety. They don’t let us have peace. We want security to farm. 
 
On the one hand, the poor farmers feel disloyalty towards the rich ones and accuse them 
of favoritism and exploitation whereas the rich farmers consider their poor neighbors as 
addicts, thieves, smugglers and vandals. They also don’t trust them and use other 
methods to cope with this situation. 
 
We hire Afghan workers and make them guard during nights. Afghan’s 
payment is lower than Iranian. 
 
This situation (the poor against the rich) eventually puts the community in a retrograde 
cycle of sustainability. Social capital decreases and therefore the resilience of all 
households drop as well. However, the poor will be affected the most, as all other forms 
of capital are decreasing too.  Taking credits is sometimes one of the last options for the 
poor but can have serious consequences in the long run. One farmer said: 
 
Many farmers are indebted. When drought happened they cannot pay back 




In a drought period local creditors easily confiscate our land and property 
and it is a reason for conflict. 
 
Furthermore, all the poor and moderate farmers mentioned that in the past, they could 
participate in feasts, religious ceremonies, and help relatives or friends when they were in 
need. It has been assumed such activities left them brimming with confidence. But as 
social interactions are reduced, farmers cannot do any of these things, so they turn to 
solitude and they are instead burdened with depression. In this regard one poor farmer 
said: 
 
In normal years I could present some things (money or gifts) for religious 
and cultural ceremonies. But in a drought period I couldn’t. So I shy and 
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don’t like to participate in these social events. It made me sad and 
unhappy. 
 
Social support seeking is an important strategy (within the COR theory) to mitigate the 
effects of drought. However, such coping strategies, which could play an important role 
in conserving human capital (personal resources), are no longer available. This increases 
drug consumption (as a psychological adjustment) causing additional problems within the 
dimension of social capital.   
Summarizing, effects and interrelationships between the built/financial, human and 
social, capital during droughts—(unintentionally) exacerbated due to government 
intervention—were discussed. Resilience increased (for both short and long terms) for 
some subparts of the farmers' population, mainly the moderate and rich farmers, and 
decreased for those who need the help the most, i.e., the poor farmers. Ending this 
section, Table 2 summarizes our results from the qualitative study and shows the capital 
effects of drought on the three different wealth classes of farmers, as well as severity of 
the effects—severe, moderate, minimal, and none found). 
It should be noted that the increase in productive/built capital will also have 
consequences on other capital dimensions in the future, such as an increase in economic 
and financial capital as well as education and community engagement. The same is also 
true on the negative side. Built capital resources are often used in developing countries as 
kind of insurance in case of economic stress situations, which is especially problematic if 
resources are low (Delacote 2009), eventually leading to poverty trap like situations (see 
Carter and Barrett 2006) that are even more likely if other kind of stresses (and reduced 




Drought is a natural and recurrent phenomenon in Iran and causes different effects on 
different wealth groups of farmers. These effects are very complex and cannot easily be 
separated from each other, as they are interrelated and can impact farmers in many ways. 
As it was shown, the related economic, social, psychological and health consequences 
can differ widely among farmers. Furthermore, government ex-post interventions can 
have unintended negative side effects for sub-groups of the rural population. The poorer 
farmers especially are less resilient as they have only limited resources from various 
forms of capitals—e.g., no savings, no possibilities to take out (cheap) loans, few 
livelihood assets (all of which are parts of built/financial capital), no reliable job 
opportunities, negative health effects due to stress, increased school dropout rates (all of 
which are parts of human capital), and no social networks to be supported during a 
drought (all of which are parts of social capital). 
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Table 2. Summary of Drought Effects Differentiated Into Different Wealth Classes. 
 Poor Farmers Moderate Farmers Rich Farmers 
Community 
engagement 
Severe  Moderate Moderate 








Cohesion Severe  Severe Severe 
Quality of life Severe  Minimal No effect 
Happiness Severe  Minimal Minimal 
Depression Severe  Minimal No effect 
Self-confidence Severe  Minimal No effect 
Well-being Severe  Minimal Moderate 
Education Dropouts 
Can’t afford to buy 
everything needed for 
school 
No effect 
Health Severe (blood pressure, 
heart disease) Influence Moderate 








Unemployment Severe  Minimal No effect 
Economic Losses below 
subsistence level 
Losses large, but not 
below subsistence 
Loss in Profits 













Built Decrease Small increase Increase 
 
We explained the effects of droughts on the individual level via the Conservation of 
Resources theory, which explained the different coping strategies used by the different 
households via the premise of resource investment. From a time-dependent perspective, 
in the very beginning (first phase) of a drought (i.e., when it does not rain in time) the 
farmers are faced with psychological effects (due to stress), eventually leading to 
illnesses, such as blood pressure, heart disease, gastrointestinal disease and digestive 
system disease, headache, inaction and narcosis. In a later stage (second phase), during 
and shortly after the drought, financial, economic and social effects begin to emerge. For 
poor farmers, two effects simultaneously materialize. First, as they are subsistence 
farmers, reduction in crop yields directly affect their consumption patterns and 
productivity. Second, additional income sources (mostly job opportunities for wealthier 
farmers) decrease or are less well paid, due to an increase in the labor force. Hence, poor 
farmers frequently have to use illegal income sources, resulting in an increase of conflicts 
between rich and poor farmers, and a decrease in social capital. The need for nutrition 
puts pressure on poor farmers to take children out of school (reduction of happiness not 
only for children, but also for parents, as well as an increase in stress levels), which leads 
to a decrease of human capital within the family. This can have long-term consequences, 
especially for women due to gender discrimination, as human capital is now seen as an 
important driver for development (Crespo and Lutz 2007; Lutz et al. 2007, 2008). Also, 
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migration of young family members to work abroad reduces the family workforce and 
can cause some negative psychological effects. In the third phase, conflicts among 
farmers reduce social capital (including trust) in rural areas, further exacerbated by 
government intervention, which has diametrically opposite effects for rich and poor 
farmers. Furthermore, sales of assets and land, as well as increasing debt, add to farmers’ 
stress level and reduce their self-confidence and happiness. That puts the farmer, and 
eventually society, in a progressive low-cycle stage, or even into a poverty trap like 
situation. If such situations cannot be prevented, they could result in mass migrations 
from rural to urban areas and an increasing dependency on food imports (Foltz 2002; 
Balali et al. 2009). While these very extreme negative effects are most notable for the 
poor, the moderate farmers are also severely affected. However, it seems that they are 
resilient enough—via the use of savings, job diversification, government help, or selling 
some of their non productive assets—to limit the negative effects to the short run. 
However, such coping strategies will likely fail in the case of recurrent severe droughts 
and may cause the same effects as observed for the poor farmers. 
As it was shown, government interventions could cause additional problems via the 
false assumption that all farmers are in the same socio-economic condition. It was found 
that the rich and moderate farmers are able to utilize government assistance, and these 
programs result in unintended negative side effects for the very poor farmers over time. 
That is, higher productivity results in fewer job opportunities for poor farmers after the 
drought. Specifically, because of the assumption of homogeneity of farmers, the 
government treats the drought as a crisis and therefore uses crisis management for 
solving the problem (for more detail sees Wilhite 2002). Crisis management focuses on 
relief, and within the relief process it was found that this strategy results in unintended 
negative side effects, including a decrease in social capital, an increase in poverty and 
increase in conflicts eventually leading to an unstable situation within the society.  
One alternative to avoid such problems would be the shift from relief or ex-post 
interventions to “proactive” risk management (Lindell and Perry 2004), like in the case of 
Australia (for an extensive discussion see Botterill and Wilhite 2005). Here, all aspects of 
society, sub-groups and individuals are incorporated in a systematic manner. It seems that 
early warning systems and preparedness strategies are key elements. Undoubtedly, in the 
Iranian situation where drought happens frequently, risk management could be a suitable 
alternative. The government, as a key actor in this process, should increase its efforts to 
target the very poor, not only in the immediate aftermath or emergency phase of the 
event, but also in the disaster recovery phase (Lindell and Perry 2004) by focusing on 
decreasing the likelihood of possible negative long term effects such as dropouts and 
gender discrimination.  
From a modeling perspective, the analysis showed (see also Nelson et al. 2010) that 
adequate sustainable development modelling approaches need to incorporate 
interdependencies among different population groups at various spatial scales—from the 
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individual to the national level—as well as the economic, human and social dimensions 
of capital. Furthermore, the different factors can be closely linked and thus 
interdependencies need to be explicitly incorporated. Otherwise, government intervention 
could result in a biased output, eventually leading to the wrong crisis or risk management 
strategies—at least for some sub-groups. It should be noted that empirical information on 
interrelated effects (flow effects) over different sub-groups are difficult to gather within 
quantitative based approaches and in this case, qualitative approaches may be the 




Part of the research reported has been funded through the European Community’s 
Seventh Framework Programe [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n° 265138. The 
funding body had no role in the study design, the collection, analysis and interpretation of 
the data. It also had no role in writing the manuscript and the decision to submit the 




Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2001. "Measuring Wellbeing: Framework for Australian 
Social Statistics". Cat.No. 4160.0, ABS, Canberra. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2002. "Measuring  Australia’s Progress." Cat.No. 1370.0, 
ABS, Canberra. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2004. "Measuring Social Capital: An Australian 
Framework and Indicators". Cat.No. 1378.0, ABS, Canberra. 
Azimzadeh, S.M. and S.J. Azimzadeh. 2011. "Study on Drought Tolerance of 12 
Varieties of Bread Wheat in East part of Iran. Advances." Advances in Environmental 
Biology 5(10): 3256-2362. 
Balali, M.R. J. Keulartz and M. Korthals. 2009. "Reflexive water management in arid 
regions: the case of Iran." Environmental Values 18(1): 91-112. 
Barrett, C., B.J. Barnett, M.R. Carter, S. Chantarat, J.W. Hansen, A.G. Mude, D. Osgood, 
J.R. Skees, C.G. Turvey and N.M. Ward. 2007. Poverty Traps and Climate Risk: 
Limitations and Opportunities of  Index-Based Risk Financing. IRI Technical Report 
07-03. Columbia University, New York: The International Research Institute for 
Climate and Society. 
Berg, B. 2007. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. 6th ed. Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon. 
Botterill, L. and D. Wilhite. 2005. From Disaster Response to Risk Management: 
Australia’s National Drought Policy. Dordrecht: Springer. 
 Yazdanpanah et al.: Drought Effects 
126 
 
Bosch, K., L. Boeckner and C. Johnston. 2003. Coping in Stressful Times During 
Drought. University of Nebraska: NebGuide G1525.  
Brouwer, S., S. Akter, L. Brander and E. Haqu. 2007. "Socioeconomic vulnerability and 
adaptation to environmental risk: A case study of climate change and flooding in 
Bangladesh." Risk Analysis 27(2): 214-225. 
Campbell, D., D. Barker and D. McGregor. 2011. "Dealing with Drought: Small farmers 
and environmental hazards in southern St. Elizabeth, Jamaica." Applied Geography 
31:146-158 
Carter, M. and C. Barrett. 2006. "The Economics of Poverty Traps and Persistent 
Poverty: An Asset-Based Approach." Journal of Development Studies 42(2): 178-
199. 
Coelho, A.E.L., J.G. Adair and J.S.P. Mocellin. 2004. "Psychological Responses to 
Drought in North-eastern Brazil." Revist Interamericana de Psicologia 38(4):95-103 
Crespo, C.J. and W. Lutz. 2007. Human capital, age structure and economic growth: 
Evidence from a new dataset. IIASA Interim Report IR-07-011, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Available at: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-07-011.pdf. Accessed 
on August 1, 2010. 
Delacote, P. 2009. “Commons as insurance: Safety nets or poverty traps?” Environment 
and Development Economics 14 (3): 305-322. 
Department for International Development (DFID). 1999. Sustainable Livelihood 
Guidance Sheets. London: DFID. 
Easdale, M.H. and H. Rosso. 2010. "Dealing with drought: social implications of 
different smallholder survival strategies in semi-arid rangelands of Northern 
Patagonia, Argentinia." The Rangeland Journal 32: 247-255. 
Edwards, B., M. Gray and B. Hunter. 2009. "A sunburnt Country: The Economic and 
Financial Impact of Drought on Rural and Regional Families in Australia in an Era of 
Climate Change." Australian Journal of Labour Economics 12(1): 109-131. 
-----. 2008. Social and economic impacts of drought on farm families and rural 
communities: Submission to the Drought Policy Review Expert Social Panel. 
Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies. 
Eriksen, S. and J.A. Silva. 2009. "The vulnerability context of savanna area in 
Mozambique: Household drought coping strategies and responses to economic 
change." Environmental Science and Policy 12:33-52 
Eriksen, S., K. Brown and P. Kelly. 2005. "The dynamics of vulnerability: locating 
coping strategies in Kenya and Tanzania." The Geographical Journal 171(4): 287-305. 
Fetterman, D. 1989. Ethnography.  Step by Step. Applied Social Research Methods 
Series, vol.17, Sage Publications: Newbury Park.  
Foltz, R.C. 2002. "Iran's water crisis; Cultural, political, and ethical dimensions." Journal 
of agricultural and environmental ethics 15(4): 357-380 
 Yazdanpanah et al.: Drought Effects 
127 
 
Gilbert, G. and R. McLeman. 2010. "Household access to capital and its effects on 
drought adaptation and migration: a case study of rural Alberta in the 1930s." 
Population and Environment 32:3-26. 
Ha, A., G. Stoneham, J. Harris, B. Fisher and L. Strappazzon. 2007. "Squeaky wheel gets 
the oil: Incentives, information and drought policy." The Australian economic review, 
40(2): 129-148. 
Hennessy, K., R. Fawcett, D. Kironoa, F. Mpelasokaa, D. Jones and J. Bathols. 2008. An 
Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change on the Nature and Frequency of 
Exceptional Climatic Events. A Consultancy Report by CSIRO and the Australian  
Bureau of Meteorology for the Australiean Buerau of Rural Sciences, Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra. 
Hobfoll, S.E. 1998. Stress, Culture, and Community: The Psychology and Philosophy of 
Stress. Plenum: New York. 
-----. 2001. "The Influence of Culture, Community and the Nested-self in the Stress 
Process: Advancing Conservation of Resources Theory." Journal of Applied 
Psychology 50: 337–396. 
Hochrainer, S., R. Mechler, D. Kull, P. Singh, S. Chopde and S. Wajih. 2009. 
"Combining Innovative Strategies for Effective Drought Risk Management: Costs and 
Benefits of Insurance and Irrigation in Uttar Pradesh, India". In: Moench M, Fajber E, 
Dixit A, Caspari E and Pokhrel A (eds.): Catalyzing Climate and Disaster Resilience. 
Kathmandu, ISET: 223-250. 
Horridge, M., J. Madden and G. Wittwer. 2005. "The impact of the 2002-2003 drought in 
Australia." Journal of Policy Modeling 27: 285-308. 
Ingram, K.T., M.C. Roncoli and P.H. Kirshen. 2002. "Opportunities and constraints for 
farmers of West Africa to use seasonal precipitation forecasts with Burkina Faso as a 
case study." Agricultural Systems 74(3): 331–349. 
Krömker, D. and H.J. Mosler. 2002. Environment and security: Coping strategies in the 
face of environmental scarcities. (2002). Available at: 
http://wwwap.wu.ac.at/esee2000/html/frameset.html. Accessed on August 1, 2010 
Lindell, M.K. and R.W. Perry. 2004. Communicating Environmental Risk in Multiethnic 
Communities. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Lutz, W., J.C. Crespo and W. Sanderson. 2008. "The Demography of Educational 
Attainment and Economic Growth." Science, 319(5866): 1047-1048. 
Lutz, W., A. Goujon, K.C. Samir and W. Sanderson. 2007. "Reconstruction of 
populations by age, sex and level of educational attainment for 120 countries for 
1970–2000." Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 1(1): 193-235. 
Mahul, Olivier, Ian Noble, Kseniya Lvovsky, et al.. 2005. Drought in Andhra Pradesh: 
Long term impacts and adaptation strategies. Final Report.South Asia Environment 
and Social Development Department. World Bank. 




I.pdf. Accessed August 1, 2010 
McAllister, R.R.J., B. Cheers, T. Darbas, J. Davies, C. Richards, C.J. Robinson, M. 
Ashley, D. Fernando and Y.T. Maru. 2008. "Social networks in arid Australia." The 
Rangeland Journal 30(1): 167-176. 
McIntire, J. 1991. Managing risk in African pastoralist. In: Holden D, et al. (eds.): Risk 
in agriculture. Proceedings of the Tenth Agriculture Sector Symposium. 1991. The 
World Bank, Washington DC: pp. 129–142. 
McIntosh, A., R. Stayner, K. Carrington, F. Rolley, J. Scott and T. Sorensen. 2008. 
Resilience in Rural Communities: Literature Review.  Centre for Applied Research in 
Social Science, UNE. ISBN 9780980388244 
Mckee, T., N. Doesken and J. Kleist. 2000. "A history of drought in Colorado: lessons 
learned and what lies ahead". Water in the Balance. Colorado Water Resources 
Research Institue, No. 9, 2002; February, 19 pp. 
Mechler, R., S. Hochrainer, D. Kull, P. Singh, S. Chopde and S.A. Wajih. 2009. Uttar 
Pradesh drought cost-benefit analysis. ProVention Working Paper No.5, Geneva: 
ProVention. 
Nasiri, M., A. Koocheki, G.A. Kamali and H. Shahandeh. 2006. "Potential impact of 
climate change on rainfed wheat production in Iran." Archives of Agronomy and Soil 
Science 52(1): 113-124. 
Nelson, R., P. Kokic, S. Crimp, H. Meinke and S.M. Howden. 2010. "The vulnerability 
of Australian rural communities to climate variability and change: Part I – 
Conceptualising and measuring vulnerability."  Environmental Science and Policy 13: 
8-17. 
Paul, B.K. 1998. "Coping mechanisms practiced by drought victims (1994/5) in North 
Bengal, Bangladesh." Applied Geography 18(4): 355-373. 
Popay, J., A. Rogers and G. Williams. 1998. "Rationale and standards for the systematic 
review of qualitative literature in health services research." Qualitative Health 
Research 8: 341–351. 
Schneider, S.H., S. Semenov, A. Patwardhan, I. Burton, C.H.D Magadza, M. 
Oppenheimer, A.B. Pittock, A. Rahman, J.B. Smith, A. Suarez, et al. 2007.  Assessing 
key vulnerability and the risk from climate change. In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, 
Adaptation and vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Parry, ML, 
Canzianai, OF, Palutikof, JP, van der Linden, PJ, and Hanson, CE (eds.). Cambridge 
University Press. 2007: 779-810. 
Speranza, C.I., B. Kiteme and U. Wiesmanna. 2008. "Droughts and famines: The 
underlying factors and the causal links among agro-pastoral households in semi-arid 
Makueni district, Kenya." Global Environmental Change 18(1): 220-233.  
 Yazdanpanah et al.: Drought Effects 
129 
 
Stahler, J. and E. Cohen. 2000. "Using Ethnographic Methodology in Substance Abuse 
Treatment Outcome Research." Journal of substance abuse treatment 18(1):1-8. 
Skoufias, E. 2003. "Economic Crises and Natural Disasters: Coping Strategies and Policy 
Implications." World Development 31(7): 1087-1102. 
Varjas, K., B. Nastasi, R. Moore and A. Jayasena. 2005. "Using Ethnographic methods 
for development of culture – specific interventions." Journal of School Psychology 43: 
241-258. 
Wilhite, D.A. 2002. "Combating drought through preparedness." Natural Resources 
Forum 26(4): 275-285. 
World Disaster Report. 2010. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies. 2010, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Zamani, G.H., Marjan J. Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn and Kiumars Zarafshani. 2006. "Coping 
with Drought: Towards a Multilevel Understanding Based on Conservation of 
Resources Theory." Human Ecology 34: 677-692. 
Zarafshani K, M.J. Gorgievski and G.H Zamani. 2007. "Dealing with drought: A 
comparison of perceptions and coping strategies of Iranian farmers from regions with 
different drought intensities." Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 12(1): 
69-80. 
Zarafshani K, G.H. Zamani and M.J. Gorgievski. 2005. "Perception and psychological 
coping strategies of farmers towards drought: Implication for extension professionals." 
Journal of Extension System 21(1): 58-71.  
 
 Lassa: Disaster Policy Change 
130 
 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 
August 2013, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 130–159. 
 
 
Disaster Policy Change in Indonesia 1930-2010: 
From Government to Governance? 
 
Jonatan A. Lassa 
Institute of Catastrophe and Risk Management 
Nanyang Technological University 
 and 





Scientific study on what actually drives disaster policy reform in the developing world is 
extremely limited. As pioneering research for Indonesia, this paper questions what are 
the forms of disaster risk governance in Indonesia through time and what are the main 
reasons for such changes over time. Disaster reduction policy reform in Indonesia today 
takes place amid global disaster risk governance initiatives under the auspicious Hyogo 
Framework for Action. The author observes that changes in disaster reduction policy in 
Indonesia over the last 80 years have been less attributed to domestic responses to the 
large scale natural catastrophes than to co-production of and interaction of local and 
disaster reduction actors and institutions. The paper highlights how new forms of risk 
governance have emerged from government as a dominant actor during the 20th century 
to more polycentric governance in first decade of the 21st century in Indonesia. 
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Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, with at least 17,000 islands, of 
which more than 7,500 have already been named and about 6,000 are inhabited (Ministry 
of Home Affairs 2009).1 Its unique position on the Pacific Ring of Fire leads to high 
exposure to recurrent natural hazards, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic 
eruptions. Indeed, about 10% of the world’s volcanoes are situated in Indonesia. 
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Indonesia has a total population of 234 million (BPS 2009) and nearly half of these 
inhabitants are now living in coastal cities, which have high exposure to coastal hazards 
such as tsunamis and floods, including coastal floods and storm surges.  
The increased disaster risks triggered by both geological and hydro-meteorological 
hazards, coupled with anthropogenic drivers throughout the Indonesian archipelago 
during the last 50 years, have caused a total monetary loss at about US$24 billion, and at 
least 95% of the total loss occurred in 1996-2009. The highest losses were due to the 
1997 forest fire and drought, for which direct economic losses reported almost doubled 
those of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 in Aceh (Lassa 2011).   The year 2007 marked 
the start of Indonesian disaster policy reform era because there were dramatic shifts in the 
form of regulation, benchmarked by the new disaster management law (Law 24/2007). 
The government started to set a clearer vision of disaster risk management as it claimed 
to depart from reactive response to be more proactive in reducing risks ex ante disaster 
emergency events (Pujiono 2005).  
This paper asks two interrelated questions: First, what has driven changes in disaster 
reduction policy since the end of colonial period? Or, what are the main reasons behind 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) policy change in Indonesia during the last 80 years? 
Second, what forms of disaster governance have taken place over time?  
“Disaster risk governance” or “disaster governance” are used interchangeably in the 
following discussion. The definition of the terms is provided in the next section (Section 
2). Section 3 provides the research methods. Section 4 discusses the forms and the phases 
of disaster governance in Indonesia during 1930-2010. Section 5 discusses the findings. 
Section 6 reflects and concludes and asks new research questions.  
 
Defining Disaster Risk Governance Framework 
 
Combining disaster risk and governance together as a concept is a rather new 
academic exercise (Lassa 2010a). Governance refers to steering privileges that are no 
longer the monopoly of (the still relevant) “governmental agencies, but [are] de facto 
(and in many cases also de jure) the common responsibility of a variety of agencies, 
representing governmental bodies, market agencies, and civil society organizations” (Arts 
and Leroy 2006:13). Governance is about being mindful of a multifaceted, multi-level, 
multi-stakeholder approach and cross-scale dynamics (Cash et al. 2006).  
Renate Mayntz argues that governance theory began by “being concerned with the 
steering actions of political authorities as they deliberately attempt to shape socio-
economic structures and processes.” However, recently, “governance” has been used in 
ways that differ from political steering. First, it is used as an alternative mode of 
governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model, namely, “a more 
cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public/private 
networks.” Second, it is used to mean different models of coordinating individual actions 
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or basic forms of social order (Mayntz 2003:27). Mayntz (2003) further claims that 
modern governance after World War II arose from the growing aspiration of governments 
to steer their nations towards better defined goals of social and economic development. 
The first phases of this development are as follows: First, in the late 1960s, the trend 
began with a boom of theory of planning for (and how to steer) economic development. 
Second, in the 1970s, as the planning euphoria declined, empirical analysis became 
preferable for policy development; this directed attention to contextual factors 
influencing policy development, in particular executive government organization. 
Different policy instruments were discussed, in particular the rule of law. Finally, in the 
second half of the 1970s, policy implementation became a new research focus. As 
Mayntz (2003:29) noted, “the first paradigm of governance concept was thus concerned 
with policy development and policy implementation and it adopted a top-down or 
legislators’ perspective.” 
Adopted from McGinnis (1999), Lassa (2010a) defines disaster risk governance 
(DRG) as the way society as a whole manages its full array of disaster risks that may be 
triggered by geological hazards such as earthquakes; climate change and hydro-
meteorological hazards (such as floods and cyclones); conflict and war in order to sustain 
development, human welfare, and dignity. It promotes the notion that there are many 
overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority for decision making and responsibility for 
disaster risk reduction. DRG acknowledges new alternative forms of policy and 
regulation that are distinct from traditional hierarchical government activity and implies 
an alternative form of governance that is more inclusive to diverse actors and diverse 
knowledge. It does not mean that government no longer has a role because, in fact, 
governments are expected to steer the conditions of inclusive governance. In other words, 
any form of governance of disaster reduction may be subject to government “approval”.  
It calls for consideration of balancing both contextual formal institutions (laws, 
regulations, policy) and informal institutions (norms, culture, customs) and the inclusion 
of agencies and actors (local-national-global with consideration of gender, age, and 
class), as well as different perceptions and types of knowledge of disaster risk reduction. 
At operational levels, from the global level to the national level down to the village level, 
there is a range of actors involved in reducing risk—state actors (executive and 
legislative agencies), United Nations agencies, Red Cross, local and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), grassroots organizations, professional associations, 
and private businesses (Lassa 2011). 
The established concept “disaster risk management” (DRM) is embedded in the 
disaster risk governance concept. In comparison to DRM, the DRG concept offers a 
greater emphasis on the decision-making process regarding disaster reduction policy and 
regulations with greater acknowledgement of the complexity, conflicts, and interests of 
actors, multi-dimensionality and interplay of various institutions and actors at multiple 
levels as well as the polycentric nature of decision making regarding disaster risk 
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reduction. DRG, in other words, provides the institutional and governance framework 




To answer the research questions, the author uses mixed methods such as literature 
reviews, participant observation, and unstructured interviews of key actors at the national 
level, and literature reviews (DRM policy documents produced during 1930-2010). The 
literature reviews and ethnographic research guide the author to investigate the history of 
disaster management policy during the past 80 years. It is widely accepted by social 
science researchers that documents are sources of data for many different types of 
analysis such as discourse analysis, content analysis (Briman 2004), or policy change 
analysis (Marston 2004). The documents can be personal documents, official documents 
from government and/or non-governmental organizations, private organizations, mass 
media, and the internet (Briman 2004), and can be in the form of manuals and guidelines. 
What are defined as “documents as sources of data” are the materials that can be read, 
have not been produced specifically for the purpose of social research, and are preserved 
so that they become available and are relevant to the concerns of the social researcher 
(Briman 2004:381).   
Participant observation and unstructured interviews were used at the targeted 
“communities” that were mainly disaster management professional and policy 
communities. The author employed participant observation and unstructured interviews 
to collect information from relevant disaster management stakeholders such as 
Indonesian Disaster Management Society and National Disaster Management Office. 
This research benefited much from the author’s existing links and networks in Indonesia, 
such as the Indonesian Disaster Management Society and DRR-related civil society 
organizations, which were advantageous, especially during data collection. 
 
Indonesia Disaster Management Institutional Change: From 1930-2010 
 
Indonesia has been experiencing different government and political regimes. The first 
was the Dutch colonial government regimes that formally ended in 1949. De facto, the 
Dutch colonial government had exercised no power during the Japanese occupation from 
1942-1945. The Sukarno regime, which was the first authoritarian regime that ruled the 
country (1945-1966), was replaced by the “New Order”, the era of Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule that started in 1968 and collapsed in 1998 at the hands of mass 
reformists. Since 1999, reformation regimes have governed under three presidents—
Burhanudin Yusuf Habibi (1998-1999), Abdulrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). Since 2004, Indonesia has been ruled under the post-
reformation regime of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (that is expected to rule till 2014).   
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Indonesia rejects federalism because of its unitary state ideology rooted in the 1945 
Constitution. In contrast to the United States’ decentralized system that delegates powers 
to the state-government level (equivalent to provinces in Indonesia), Indonesia has taken 
a different path since 1999 by decentralizing central government power directly to 
cities/districts and not at the provincial level, except for the special case of Aceh 
province. More than 220 new cities/districts (municipalities/regencies) have been created 
since 1999. In 1998, the total number of cities/districts was 280 and in 2010 it was 500 
(Lassa 2011). Indonesia’s decentralization is characterized by multiple hierarchies of 
structure, function, funding, and areas of responsibility. There are “missing links” in 
vertical governance (Sudarmo and Sudjana 2009) that affect the steering power of central 
and provincial governments to enforce national policy at the city/district level. This paper 
limits its scope to only discuss macro level changes at the national levels. 
In contrast to the United States, Indonesian politics do not have real opposition power 
that may challenge any ruling regime to change policy direction. It may sound like an 
exaggeration to expect Indonesian legislators to play a critical role in the ruling 
government because the practice of political opposition is not yet fully developed, even 
though it is possible by law. In the words of experts, opposition practice in Indonesia 
“remains structurally weak and divided.” (Aspinall 2000) 
This introduction guides the readers to understand the phases of disaster risk 
management policy and different forms of disaster governance practice in Indonesia 
which is divided into six different eras (Table 1). The first era is the colonial emergency 
policy created at the end of the 1930s. The second era is demarcated from independence 
in 1945 until the early 1960s. The 1960s-1990 can be considered as the third period. The 
fourth era started in 1990, at the beginning of the formal period of International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). At the end of the IDNDR era, Indonesia 
entered its fifth phase of DRM policy during 2000-2007.  
 
Disaster Management Institutions in Colonial Period 
 
The colonial emergency management policy was also known as Regeling op de Staat 
van Oorlog en van Beleg (shorten as SOB) endorsed in 1939 (Hariyono 2008). It was an 
important piece of legislation that determined disaster management and emergency policy 
in Indonesia for the next 20 years after independence in 1945 and its influence can be 
tracked during the New Order period. The SOB 1939 regulated states of emergency that 
might arise from acts of external agents (mainly external siege by foreign forces at the 
beginning of World War II). SOB 1939 distinguished between two different situations: 
the Staat van Oorlog (SvO) declared an ordinary war situation and the Staat van Beleg 
was activated under extraordinary conditions of a war emergency2. 
For both conditions, the general governor had no obligation to seek permission from 
volksraad or legislative body in times of emergency (see fuller discussion in Hariyono 
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2008:24-34). The links between emergency and mitigation policy in the Netherlands and 
its colony of the Netherlands East Indies (i.e., Indonesia) will not be discussed; however, 
study of such links is well recommended for further scientific investigation. 
 
Table 1. Phases of Disaster Risk Management Policy and Regulation in Indonesia 




1930s – 1945 
Regeling op de Staat van Oorlog en van 
Beleg a.k.a. SOB 1939.	  This was later 
formally cancelled 12 years after 
independence through Law 74/1957 
This regulated war emergencies and 
extraordinary emergency wars. Officially, 
it co-existed with Emergency Law 6/1946 
for 11 years till 1957. 
1945-1960 
Law 6/1946 on Emergency Situation (or 
Bahaya), The amendment of Emergency 
Situation Law 1/1948, and Law 30/1948 
on Transfer of Full Sovereignty to the 
President during Danger Situation 
Regulated emergency situation due to war 
and natural disasters – the original law 
6/1946 acknowledged civil society actors 
as an alternative power to deal with 
emergency.   
1960-1990 
Keppres* 54/1961; 312/1965 regarding 
Central Committee for Natural Disaster 
Shelter; Keppress* 256/1966 and Cabinet 
Presidium Decision 14/U/Kep/1/1967 on 
Coordinating Team for Natural Disaster 
Management Implementation; Advisory 
Agency on Natural Disaster Management 
Keppres 256/1966; Keppres 28/1979 - 
National Coordinating Agency for DM 
Ad hoc emergency response committees 
for natural disasters – government-centric. 
Three revisions of DM regulation during 
1965-1967 due to large-scale and nation-
wide impact of El Nino-driven drought as 
well as the eruption of a volcano  
1990-2000 
Keppres 43/1990 - National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management; 
Keppres 106/1999 - National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management 
A shift to re-acknowledge manmade 
disasters. It suggested considering both 
natural and manmade disasters. This 
coincided with the IDNDR period. 
2001-2007 
Perpres** 3/2007 on Amendment of 
Perpres** 83/2005 National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management; 
Perpres 83/2005 -­‐	  National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management; 
Keppres 111/2001 Amendment of 
Keppres 111/2001; Keppres 3/2001 - 
National Coordinating Council for Disaster 
Management and Internally Displaced 
People 
2001 amendments of Presidential Decree 
were made to accommodate the need for 
aid distribution to internally displaced 
people during 1998-2002. The 2007 
amendments were related to catastrophic 
events such as the Indian Ocean tsunami 
in 2004 and the devastating earthquake in 
Yogyakarta in 2006. 
2007 onwards 
 
Disaster Management Law 24/2007 
enforced at national level through 
Presidential Regulation 08/2008 regarding 
NDMA; PP*** 23/2008 regarding Roles of 
International Agency and INGOs in DM; 
PP*** 22/2008 on Budgeting and 
Management of Disaster Aid and PP 21-
2008 DM Implementation/Operational 
Long deliberative processes since 2005 
with hundreds of meetings/public 
debates/hearings/consultations. Drafts 
provided by many different sources, with 
local and international support behind the 
scenes. See section 6.5 for more detail 
explanation. 
Source: Author; *Keppres = President’s Decree; **Perpres = Presidential Regulation; ***PP = Government 
Regulation. 
 
In terms of investment in science, the colonial government was far more advanced in 
comparison with the later nw government of Indonesia, especially during the period from 
1945 to the 1960s. It was not simply the lack of human resources but also the radical 
change in the organizational and institutional “template” (e.g. leadership, bureaucracy’s 
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epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999)3, national institutions, etc.) that set back the young 
state for quite some time. 
Another obvious reason for the discontinuity of institutions dealing with geo-risks is 
the multiple displacements of the Geological Agency (including its Volcanological 
Survey) over a period of more than 30 years. The Geological Agency during 1945-1946 
was under the management of the Ministry of Public Works. During 1946-1947, it went 
under the management of the Wealth Minister. During 1949-1950, it went under the remit 
of the Wealth and Industrial Ministry. During 1952-1957, it went under the remit of the 
Ministry of Economy. During 1957-1959, it went under the remit of the Industrial 
Ministry and, in 1966-1974, it went under the remit of the Department of Ministry of 
Trade and Mining. It enjoyed stability during 1974-1992 as it was administered only by 
the Ministry of Mining. In 1992, the government changed this institution from the 
Ministry of Mining to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
The Krakatau eruption in 1883 was probably one of the largest emergency relief 
operations in the Dutch colonial government period. It would be incorrect to say that the 
Netherlands East Indies government disregarded the importance of dealing with natural 
disasters given the absence of specific notes in the SOB 1939 to cover natural disasters. 
In fact, the opposite might be the case in that the colonial government learned from the 
Krakatau eruption on 27 August 1883. One month after a catastrophic eruption and 
tsunami, while people were still dealing with emergency operations such as burying the 
dead and clearing wastes and ruins, rebellion actually took place in Serang, Banten 
Province. Such a rebellion reemerged at greater intensity five years later. Winchester 
(2003) asked the question of whether social change after the Krakatau disaster (e.g. the 
fading of the influence of the colonial government, the loss of its self-confidence after the 
Krakatau disaster, and the rise of the Banten peasants’ revolt backed up by Islamic 
teachers and hajjis) in Banten, which later propagated the spirit of anti-colonialism 
elsewhere, might have triggered movement in the rest of Java (see Winchester 2003:334-
445). The teachers and hajjis applied religious explanations about divine punishment to 
the colonial government as well as the Banten people who served this ‘non-believing’ 
government. Kartodirdjo (1966) stated that the revolts were due to the misery directly 
caused by exploitation through the colonial system and later severely amplified by the 
Krakatau tsunami in 1883 that swept through Banten’s coastal communities.   
 
Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1946-1960s 
 
In fact, in the United States during the 1960s, government-supported disaster 
sociologists tried to understand people’s behavior during disasters, which was to enable 
the government to understand how people would react to nuclear attack as well as natural 
hazards and technological disasters (Tierney 2007, p.504). The context of 1960s’ disaster 
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policy is often known as the pattern of war approach and military orientation of disaster 
inquiry during the Cold War period (Gilbert 2005).  
One year after independence in 1946, the young state started to regulate emergency 
management by taking natural disasters into account in addition to manmade emergencies 
through National Law 6/1946. There are important lessons from Law No 6/1946. Firstly, 
surprisingly, from early on and just before the nation experienced its first authoritarian 
regime, in the so-called Old Order period, the government acknowledged the power of 
civil society actors, especially the prominent Islamic organizations, as civil stakeholders 
to deal with emergencies. Furthermore, as another interpretation to the law, it accepted a 
great deal of influence of civil bureaucrats and early civil society organizations in the 
drafting of the law by bringing in other actors to tackle potential bahaya (a direct 
translation is danger but can mean emergency)  and there were demands not to hand all 
power to the military in emergencies (including those caused by natural disasters; see 
Hariyono 2008, p.39).  
Law 6/1946 marked government attention to considering natural disasters as the 
fourth external agent that might be a threat to the young nation (along with external 
attacks by foreign military, potential attacks by a latent enemy, and riots that might take 
place beyond the civilian government’s capacity to control). The law placed the authority 
of emergency management at the National Defense Council, which comprised the prime 
minister4 and relevant ministries, three civil society organization representatives (mainly 
faith-based), and the military commander. It stated that the president could declare a 
dangerous situation to the nation that may arise from natural disasters (Article 1-d, UU 
6/1946 about dangerous situations). However, Law No. 6/1946 was short-lived and soon 
became redundant, an example of ‘institutional mortality’, a term coined here to explain 
either abandoned laws produced by the government (hence, wasted investment) or the 
absence of law enforcement at all levels. When the first regime under President Sukarno 
became authoritarian, the law was amended by Law 1/1948 and later Law 30/1948 
regarding the transfer of full sovereignty to the president during states of national 
emergency.  
This can be considered the second form of disaster governance in Indonesia, when the 
design of emergency laws was driven by post-Second World War logic, and when 
emergency management heavily focused on attacks from either foreign powers and/or 
civil war. There was very little paradigm shift towards the need for natural hazard 
management (pre and post disasters) because, during this period, apart from a large-scale 
eruption of Kelud volcano in East Java in 1951, which only attracted scientists, there 
were no significant “focusing events” (Birkland 1996) that triggered a policy and political 
response towards the management of natural hazards.  
During the period of 1945-1959, the focus of the national governments was fully on 
building a nation state and most priorities were focused on the details of various sectoral 
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legislation developments and legislation products related to the formation of new 
administrative units throughout Indonesia (Lassa 2011). 
In the mid-1950s, the government produced the Five Year Development Plan 1956-
1960 document, one of the earliest development policy documents that revealed early 
recognition of disaster risk within a development context (Republic of Indonesia 1958) 
There are at least two important written messages: an awareness regarding the roles of 
forest ecosystem services to mitigate disaster risk (Republic of Indonesia 1958, p. 27)5 
and post-disaster policy mandated to the social service sector to provide assistance for 
people affected by natural disasters, conflicts, wildfire hazards, displaced persons, and 
the victims of attacks by dangerous animals and beasts (Republic of Indonesia 1958, p. 
143). 
Changes occurred in the 1960s when some regulatory tools related to disaster 
response were produced. At least five organizations related to disaster response were 
produced during this period, such as the Central Committee for Natural Disaster Shelter6, 
the Advisory Agency on Natural Disaster Management7, and the Coordinating Team for 
Natural Disaster Management Implementation.8 All these agencies were ad hoc in nature. 
However, in practice, things stayed the same because these agencies were merely reactive 
to disaster events; there is barely evidence that they comprised an ad hoc structure that 
could act prior to events (see also Department Sosial 1976). 
 
Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1960s-1990 
 
During the 1960s there were some natural hazards with catastrophic effects, such as 
the Mount Agung eruption in Bali, which killed about 1,600 people in February 1963; the 
El Nino drought-related events, which resulted in about 8,000 deaths in 1966; and the 
Mount Kelud eruption, which resulted in the deaths of about 200 people also in 19669, 
which was far less intense than the eruption in 1856 when lahars10 were emitted that 
killed 10,000 people. The different numbers of deaths are not because of better policy or 
better capacity in volcano preparedness in 1966, but simply different scales and 
characters of the eruptions; clearly, the magnitude and characteristics of hazards play 
roles in shaping the risks (Alexander 1993). 
There was a paradigm shift from war/conflict to “natural” disasters during the 1960s, 
which can be considered an achievement of institutional change, the main cause of which 
was probably an increase in the number of natural hazard events that drew attention from 
the government. However, in terms of manmade disasters, this was probably the worst 
period in the nation’s history. The second half of the 1960s was a bad time in Indonesian 
politics. With the fall of the Old Order regime under Sukarno’s presidency and the 
coming of the New Order regime under General Suharto, Indonesia experienced a high 
level of political instability during 1965-1970. During 1965-1966, many political 
scientists have asserted that political conflict caused a total of about 500,000 deaths 
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(McGregor 2009) especially among those associated with the Indonesian Communist 
Party. Such a catastrophic number is obviously greater than the result of any single 
natural hazard that has occurred in Indonesia, and even worse than the combination of all 
the total losses of life triggered by natural hazards during the past 50 years in the country. 
It is understandable that knowledge of disaster risk management during the 1960s was 
lacking as elsewhere in the world and more lacking in the developing world. Few 
scientific conferences took place during this period, but some international reports 
regarding geological expeditions in Indonesia during the 1960s are available. For 
instance, a volcanological mission from UNESCO studied volcano-associated risks in 
Indonesia (Tazieff, Marinelli, and Gorshkov 1966). At the national level, knowledge 
accumulation was achieved at a very low rate and one of the problems was that the 
government of the 1960s was not able to capitalize on all the knowledge produced by 
technical agencies such as the Geological Agency (established in the 1850s, which later 
created its volcanological research division (Volcanologisch Onderzoek), in 1922 as well 
as the meteorological office, established in 1866).  The Geological Agency emerged from 
the “Volcanological Survey of the Netherlands East Indies”(See www.bgl.esdm.go.id).  
In addition, these kinds of technical organization suffered the discontinuity of support 
from the Dutch Government, which occurred at the end of 1949 after the handover from 
the Dutch government following the decision to grant full independence.  
Natural events such as volcanic eruptions during the 1970s did not appear to be on the 
same scale (in terms of impacts such as loss of life and damage) as those in the 1960s. 
However, it was mainly that all large-scale natural hazards in the 1970s happened on 
remote islands or away from Java; the major event that was closest to the country’s 
administrative and population centers was in Bali, while others happened on Flores and in 
the West Papua region11. In the Flores region in 1973, there was a cyclone that killed 
about 1,600 people according to EMDAT 2006 (www.emdat.be). In 1976, there were 
modest earthquakes in Bali and West Papua, which caused over 1,000 casualties.  In July, 
1979, there was a large-scale event of a landslide-triggered tsunami on Lembata Island, 
Eastern Flores, which killed more than 500 people (Jeffery 1981). Five months before 
that, less than 100 kilometers away from Lembata in the Eastern Flores district, at least 
500 people died due to flash floods and lahars swept away 50% of Larantuka Town 
situated beneath the dormant Ile Mandiri volcano mount (Lassa 2009). 
Given the history of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Cooperation 
on Disaster Management, disaster policymaking in Indonesia during the 1970s was not 
completely isolated from regional and international processes. In 1971, disaster 
management experts in the ASEAN region formed the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster 
Management (AEGDM) and met every two years. In five years, the issue of regional 
cooperation in the field of disaster management was adopted as one of several ASEAN 
objectives and principles stipulated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord I. This was 
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further manifested as the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters 
in June, 197612.  
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I), adopted on 24 February, 1976, 
further stressed the need for cooperation in disaster management within ASEAN. One of 
its eight principles was: “natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace 
of development of member states; therefore, they shall extend, within their capabilities, 
assistance for relief of member states in distress.” The agreement was known as ASEAN 
Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters – signed in Manila on 26 June, 
1976. Looking at the driver behind these initiatives, it was partly in the United States’ 
interest to fund such kinds of declaration as soft mechanisms to control the influence of 
communism in the region in this Cold War period (Buszynski 1992).   
Indonesia’s approach to the structure of disaster risk management shared a similar 
history to that of other Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines. In the 
Philippines, following the earthquake of 1968, the Civil Defense Administration was 
pushed to create an ad hoc structure called the “National Committee on Disaster 
Operation” (based on the Administrative Order No. 151, 1968). This was later changed 
following the Sening typhoon that devastated the Bicol Region and inundated 
metropolitan Manila for almost three months, which placed great pressure on the 
government to create a National Disaster Control Center. The Civil Defense 
Administration era was superseded by the new Office of Civil Defense, which was to 
ensure protection of people during calamities. However, in 1978, a presidential decree 
(No. 1566) provided a new milestone for the establishment of a structure of disaster 
management, namely, the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) including 
regional and local structures. The NDCC under the presidential decree lasted for 32 years 
until the country changed its institutional structure (namely, the National Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Council) through the new Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act in February, 2010 (see http://ndcc.gov.ph/home/index.php). 
Returning to Indonesia in July, 1976, one of the first recorded national 
multidisciplinary workshops on disaster risk management was held in Jakarta, and was 
attended by stakeholders such as the National Development Planning Ministry, the Health 
Department, the Finance Minister, the Office of Meteorology and Geophysics, the 
Geological Survey, the Indonesian Red Cross, and international players such as the 
United Nations Development Program and USAID—one of the main sponsors of the 
ASEAN agreement. Only one multilateral agency, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), presented a paper related to “pre-disaster planning and relief 
instruction” and some national organizations started to argue about the need for disaster 
mitigation (Departement Sosial 1978:14)  
Table 1 suggests a shift of institutional focus from manmade disasters (such as 
war/conflict) to natural hazards in the earlier period in the 1960s lasted till 1990. This can 
be interpreted as a dramatic change of focus towards natural hazards, especially when a 
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presidential decree was finally issued in 1979. The 1979 disaster management regulation 
placed emphasis on natural disasters. Disaster risk management activities during this 
period were reactive emergency response and recovery as indicated by the decree. The 
structure was often activated after disasters (Pujiono 2005). The organizational format of 
the “National Coordination Agency” lasted for almost 30 years (with different names 
from time to time—“National Coordination Agency”, “natural disaster management”, 
“disaster management”, or “disaster management and internally displaced people”), but it 
was succeeded by the new format of the National Disaster Management Office in 2008 as 
stipulated in Disaster Management Law 24/2007, three years after the Hyogo 
Declaration.  
The national disaster management institutions were partially dormant because of 
either a lack of natural disaster events during the 1970s or the remoteness of the events 
from Jakarta that did occur. There was no significant institutional change from the second 
half of the 1960s until the end of the 1970s, when, in 1979, the government suddenly 
produced a presidential decree regarding the National Coordinating Body on Natural 
Disaster Management (a.k.a. Keppres 28/1979).  
From ignorance of the need to manage natural hazards before the 1960s, the 
government was now committed to more serious actions. This was an indirect product of 
a discursive change on the need to have a fixed structure to manage natural disasters, 
which had some roots in the ASEAN regional workshops on disaster management during 
the 1970s. The details of how this change happened are subject to further academic 
investigation, but the organizational change only happened at the surface with a shift 
from ad hoc committees to a coordinating body that could organize all disaster cycles (in 
accordance with Cuny and Abrams’s cycles of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, 
emergency, rehabilitation, and reconstruction—Cuny and Abrams 1983). Presidential 
Decree 28/1979 had the noble objective of taking natural hazard management more 
seriously than the Old Order regime by recognizing the need for systematic emergency 
management triggered by natural events. The departure from war/conflict towards a post-
natural disaster focus was not by chance. Nevertheless, enough evidence suggests that 
national-international interaction since the early 1970s had managed to place this agenda 
on the table of the government.  
 
Indonesian Disaster Management Policy in 1990s 
 
In the 1990, at the same time as the start of the IDNDR, the government corrected the 
1979 decree arguing that a focus on only natural disasters, with a purely humanitarian 
emergency and post-disaster response-oriented policy, was not enough. It suggested 
reconsideration of non-natural hazards and, for the first time, formal recognition of the 
need to work in accordance with disaster management cycles, the famous before-during-
after disaster management. In Presidential Decree 43/1990 on “National Coordinating 
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Council for Disaster Management,” it was argued that the country needed to manage 
disasters (both natural and manmade) in different phases, such as prevention, mitigation, 
emergency response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.  
The 1992 Flores disaster has been remembered as one the largest-scale disasters in 
Indonesia at the end of the 20th century; it taught important lessons to the central 
government, as stated by a former Minister of Finance that “Flores goes back to the pre-
development era before 1970” because the destruction of the development infrastructures 
and people’s assets invested over a quarter century had set the region back to poverty in 
only a few hours. This awareness is well recorded in a local newspaper (Ministry of 
Finance’s explanation in Tabloid Dian, January 1993). However, this national disaster 
was not translated into a nationwide transformation of disaster mitigation and 
preparedness, which did not happen for almost 15 years.  
The reason that the government declared the Flores tsunami in 1992 as a national 
disaster was that the tsunami had caused “suffering, loss of life, and enormous material 
losses to society. Considering the impact of such a disaster and the need for response 
efforts and recovery, it is deemed necessary to establish the national disaster status” 
(Presidential Decree No 66/1992 on Decision on Status of Flores Natural Disaster as 
National Disaster. Page 1 points a and b). This editorial text was exactly used again 
following the tsunami on 26 December, 2004, with additional text to give a National Day 
of Mourning (Presidential Decree 112/2004 signed on 27 December, 2004).    
At the end of the IDNDR period in 1999, a new presidential decree was issued to 
correct the one made in 1990, which was justified by stating that the National 
Coordinating Agency for Disaster Management had not been mandated to deal with 
disasters that arose from riots and mass violence. This change was partly a reactive 
response to the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, when violence suddenly spread in 
many parts of Indonesia, which was caused by many internally displacement persons 
(IDPs). However, the 1999 regulation (Keppres 106/1999—National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management ) did not regulate the IDPs even though it was 
coincident with the crisis in Timor Leste together with the East Timorese refugees’ influx 
to West Timor in 1999.  
 
Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 2000-2007 
 
The answer to the call for a more serious approach to IDPs (at least on paper) took 
place in 2001 with two sets of revisions: the first was the revision of the 1999 regulation 
to revise the name to the National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management and 
Internally Displaced People (Keppres 3/2001); this was revised again in a Presidential 
Decree (Keppres 111/2001) in the same year with the same title held until 2005. 
Based on personal observation, the nature of this revision was probably related to the 
introduction of the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” by United Nations 
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Commission of Human Rights. In Indonesia, this guideline was translated in early 2000 
by civil society organizations such as Oxfam. Furthermore, the issue of IDPs came to the 
fore in 2001 when prominent international and multilateral agencies dealing with the 
refugees from East Timor in West Timor were removed from their operation in the year 
2000 owing to the killing of three staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in August, 2000. With the dearth of resources to meet the basic 
needs of the refugees (for the East Timorese who resided in Indonesia) and IDPs (e.g., 
East Timor-born Indonesians and other IDPs throughout Indonesia produced by conflicts 
in several regions), the national government needed a new justification for financing 
humanitarian responses. This partly forced the government to create new rules to be 
legally and politically appropriate for dealing with both IDPs and refugees. Therefore, 
Law 3/2001 on “National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management and IDPs” was 
signed. For the first time, the Minister of Transmigration was included in the structure of 
national disaster management (i.e., Bakornas) in Presidential Decree 3/2001.  
The 2000-2007 period was noted for a willingness to increase the legitimacy of the 
Bakornas by giving power to the vice president in terms of direct responsibility to 
command the system of disaster management in all four versions of Presidential Decree 
(Keppres) 3/2001, Keppress 111/2001, Perpres 83/2005, and Perpres 3/2007. The notion 
of carrying out disaster reduction beyond the government, namely, governance, emerged 
notably after the fall of the Suharto regime. In 2003, in the opening remarks of the 
International Seminar and Workshop on Tsunami: In Memoriam 120 Years of Krakatau 
Eruption—Tsunami and Lessons Learned From Large Tsunamis, the former coordinating 
minster of social welfare (later a vice president in 2004-2009) noted the following: 
“Disaster is our responsibility. Not merely government responsibility but also that of the 
private sector and society.” This view of shared responsibility to manage risks of 
disasters is not new as it has existed in practice, notably since the 1990s. The speech was 
given exactly a year before the catastrophe of the Indian Ocean tsunami. As the Head of 
Bakornas, Mr. Kalla noted “it is difficult to predict when tsunamis will occur. Scientists 
have predicted that tsunamis can happen in a few minutes (5-20) after being triggered by 
earthquakes. Therefore, considering the limitation of time, there are steps that need to be 
taken, such as the identification of tsunami-prone areas by means of hazard and risk 
mapping, socialization of preventive measures for example to persuade people to stay 
away from risky areas, an increase in public awareness, and improvement and 
development of early warning systems for all kinds of hazards, especially earthquakes 
and tsunamis” (Kalla 2003:6).  
In one of the conference papers in August 2003 entitled “General Guidelines for 
Mitigation of Natural Disaster in Coastal Areas and Small Islands: Special Focus on 
Tsunami,” it was clearly noted that around 60% of cities/towns (290 out of 490 
cities/towns) are situated in earthquake-prone regions (page 195) and the vast majority of 
these cities are potential “targets” for tsunamis. It was added that, in order to mitigate 
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tsunami risks, there was a need for the integration of three approaches: integrated coastal 
zone management, integrated fisheries management, and integrated coastal hazard 
management.  
Responding to this, in the second last paragraph of his remarks, Mr. Kalla suggested 
that “On this occasion, I ask you to increase our attention to the efforts to undertake 
prevention and disaster mitigation, not only by talking, but also by doing. On the basis of 
all the experiences we have in this country and abroad, we can draw lessons for the 
future.” With this statement, it was clear that the political will was there for an idea that 
had not been translated into the existing structure of government during that period.   
How did local policymakers see the problems during this period? In a reflection on an 
earthquake event that scaled between VII-VIII MMI13 on 4th June, 2000, in Bengkulu 
Province (in Sumatra, Indonesia) and that killed 93 people and caused 3,339 
houses/buildings collapsed (not including a total of 13,756 houses heavily damaged and 
29,090 houses with medium-light damage), the Bengkulu governor asserted the root 
causes of the damage and losses: “The shifts from wooden and bamboo house structures 
to masonry, while the collapsed masonry was due to the quality of the materials, the 
quality of joint elements of house structures such as beam-columns; each element moved 
not according to a single mass acceleration, and there was no stiffness in the houses; most 
of the buildings are situated by the fault lines of earthquakes” (Hasan 2003: 241-249).. In 
the last reflection of the paper, especially on how provincial policy would respond to the 
situation, he maintained that mitigation and risk reduction measures could make 
structures earthquake-proof by going back to the previous building/housing patterns 
(wooden and bamboo structures including the use of aluminum roofs), as well as no 
longer building houses exactly at already recognized earthquake/fault lines or on unstable 
areas (hence the recognition of land use policy design, monitoring, and enforcement; in 
line with HFA Priority 4th); the need for new risk analysis and mapping of earthquake 
risks including seismic zoning in the whole province (Hyogo Priority 2nd); increasing the 
practical knowledge on post-disaster response to the whole society as well as recognition 
and greater appreciation of the embedded mitigation measures in the existing local 
knowledge and technology such as wooden and bamboo structures (Hyogo Priority 3rd). 
Such awareness and vision of risk management in many instances was unfortunately not 
often found in the regions where recent disasters took place. However, before Disaster 
Management Law 24/2007, there were hardly any policy instruments available that 
enabled actors with “good political will” to clearly change the knowledge into action. 
Figure 1 shows the network of regulation of disaster management and the 
organizational ties over the period 1979-2008. Every dot represents either a regulation or 
an organization. The analysis is based on six different regulations and the organizational 
ties required by each regulation. In this analysis, qualitative explanation of the graph is 
important because of the interest in looking at the actors and forms of governance utilized 
in each period. 
 Lassa: Disaster Policy Change 
145 
Apparently, the Ministry of Interior and the Military Commander have the highest 
connected node as they existed in all regimes of the Bakornas (National Coordinating 
Council) system from 1979-2007, as well as after the reform.  This obviously reflects the 
discourse in the public where the military are still seen as an important group even after 
the reform, given the limitation of logistical resources within civil organizations. The 
figure also suggests that the Ministry of Interior is always involved in the business of 
disaster risk management in Indonesia. In fact, the minister is key to successful adoption 
of national DRR regulation into local DRR regulation. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of DRM Regulatory and Organizational Network 1979-2007 
 
Source: Author. Data is coded from regulation on Bakornas 1979, 1990, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 
regulation on BNPB 2008.  
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry of Social Affairs as 
well as the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource are important in the disaster 
management system in Indonesia. The Ministry of Social Affairs used to be the long-term 
leader in the early form of Bakornas in 1979 and its membership in Bakornas was 
consistent; the Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare took over the leadership quite a 
few times before it was taken under the remit of the vice president’s office in 2001. The 
importance of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources was due to its control of the 
Geological Services and Volcanological Survey since the 1970s. The involvement of the 
Ministry of Forestry in the Bakornas system was notable since 1999 owing to the forest 
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contributes to the system through its dual roles in the disaster management system, such 
as providing logistical services for post-disaster intervention such as rehabilitation and 
reconstruction as well as its roles in mitigation and spatial planning. The Ministry of 
Finance has good ties to the system because of its roles in providing support to it. 
The involvement of the Indonesian Red Cross in the system started with the 
establishment of Bakornas in 1979. However, it disappeared in 1990-2001 regulation and 
re-appeared again in 2005. The inclusion of civil society in the structure formally started 
just after the reform in 2007. One of the recent surprises found during this research was 
that the current government tends to work outside the existing institutional pathways, and 
not always with good reason. For instance, in Figure 1, the Coordinating Ministry of 
Social Welfare can be seen to be involved during the last 28 years and was the host of 
Bakornas during the 1990s. However, in early 2010, suddenly Presidential Instruction 
No. 1 2010 was issued to accelerate the implementation of National Development 
Priority 2010. The instruction simply neglected the structure under reform by putting 
disaster risk reduction under the remit of the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(the acceleration of the implementation of National Development Priority 2010). This 
shift of policy went unnoticed among the public and the professional community. 
However, this needs further investigation, especially in terms of how such a change 
happened and whether the influence of politics may have outweighed the need for 
professionalism, especially in recruiting experts who have prescribed such ignorance in 
policy making. 
One may argue that, even without the Bakornas system in 1979, the response quality 
might have always been the same because somehow the government would always 
respond (significantly or not) to disaster events and because many people (including high 
level decision makers such as ministers) still subscribe to the perception of disasters and 
catastrophes as a form of divine intervention and punishment (see Haynes et. al. 2010), so 
the government would barely change its disaster management strategy in substance. 
 
Disaster Management Reform   
 
Many agreed, especially the reformists, that the main reason for reform, including 
establishment of a new disaster management law, is that the old structures that had been 
preserved since 1979, such as the National Disaster Management Council (Bakornas) and 
the Satkorlak (Provincial Council on Disaster Management), as well as city/district 
disaster management councils (Satlak), had been extremely ineffective in dealing with 
not only future disaster risks but also disaster responses in the past. These old structures 
almost always became active when emergencies took place and the government was 
always caught by surprise by natural hazards.  
One can rightly claim that the old structure added very little value to reduce disaster 
risk.  De facto, the Bakornas system made very limited efforts in mitigation, risk 
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reduction, and disaster management planning in systematic ways, a point that was clearly 
stated in the draft academic paper 2005 version that produced by the Indonesian Society 
for Disaster Management. 
The energy for change was finally generated by the disasters of 2004-2006. Some of 
the visions for disaster risk reduction stipulated in the Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo 
Framework for Action have been borrowed in the Disaster Management Law 24/2007. 
However, the term “Disaster Management”, which has been considered as “old” and 
often signals a reactive-oriented paradigm, is still in use after the reform to encompass 
the whole aspect of disaster risk reduction as stipulated by the HFA. Nonetheless, this 
was an achievement as some of the drafters and negotiators argued that “it was difficult 
for the legislators to opt for risk reduction-oriented terms, as suggested in one of the 
drafts, so instead they ended up keeping the term “disaster management.”14 
Figure 2 is the design of the disaster management system in Indonesia after the 
reform combining actual compliance with the Hyogo Framework for Action. The 
National Disaster Management Agency superseded the Bakornas secretariat. At the 
provincial and district levels, both Satkorlak and Satlak have been replaced by a Local 
Disaster Management Agency. At the national level, there is a National DRR platform, 
which is indeed a predecessor of a multi-stakeholder forum formed in 2005 with the 
purpose of advocacy for the drafting of the disaster management law legitimized by HFA.   
At all levels, the legislative agency should play roles for not only bill drafting and 
DRR budgeting but also for monitoring the implementation of the law. The national 
legislative body used its initiative rights for drafting the disaster management law, but it 
was merely as a response to the call from non-state actors to create the law in 2005. Such 
initiative rights have seldom been used by Indonesian legislators (Pujiono 2005). The 
legislative response to the call for reform was partly conditioned by large-scale disasters, 
which affected the national budget during 2005-2007.  
Control and monitoring of the quality of disaster risk reduction may come from civil 
society organizations (as recognized in Figure 2) and the media. At the local level, 
especially at the provincial level, a similar structure is used. A provincial platform is seen 
as the key to sustain the efforts in risk reduction. The very idea of such a platform is 
rooted in the Hyogo Framework for Action (Priority 1.4) and this is an ideal structure 
that, when it is expected to materialize in 33 provinces, needs a very large policy demand. 
In fact, the DRR National Platform has not been really functioning regularly as it is 
designed. In the provinces, the DRR platform can only be active where there are extra-
government initiatives from either international NGOs or a United Nations agencies 
actively working in DRR. 
At the district level, a similar structure (in practice) is utilized without requiring a 
DRR platform. The disaster risk management structure recognized the roles of civil 
society organizations as well as the need for a strong partnership with private 
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organizations.  The next sections will show how such an “ideal” structure is made 
operational in the real world. 
The National Disaster Management Agency (or BNPB - see its structure in Annex 2) 
reports directly to the President of Indonesia, but is not (yet) a member of the cabinet. 
There are also discussions whether the agency needs to be part of the cabinet in order to 
give greater power as Indonesian has experienced many more disasters occur during the 
past six years15. However, there has been no study of whether it should be part of the 
cabinet to increase its legitimacy and power, as is the case in some countries where 
disaster risks are very high and persistent, such as Sri Lanka16, New Zealand17, and 
Bangladesh18. 
 





From the 1930s till the 1970s, there had been very little progress made in disaster risk 
management policy. Even though civil society organizations have been recognized since 
1946, such recognition had been barely implemented for political reasons. Thus, politics 
matters because Indonesia experienced three historical phases of authoritarian regimes. 
During these periods, military power either was superior or was considered to be superior 
to civil governmental organizations, such as disaster management committees in the 
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1960s-1970s, because disaster may have been seen as an agent that could create 
instability in the territory.   
However, de facto, the emerging roles of multilateral actors since the 1970s-1990s 
brought new insights into the practice of disaster management in Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, there is barely any study of the roles of United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator (UNDRO) during the 1970s. In the second half of the 1980s, UNDRO 
supported “institution building” for disaster management systems in Indonesia. Bakornas 
failed to perform following the eruption of the Galungung stratovolcano in West Java in 
1982. Because of this, UNDRO later joined with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and other international agencies, creating the Indonesian Disaster 
Management Center. Creative investment in human resource development on mitigation 
and preparedness was undertaken. This was achieved by investing in human resources for 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (the host of Bakornas secretariat 1979-1990), including for 
some relevant ministry staff seconded to the center, and conducting selected hazard 
research led by national experts in 1986. The output from the multidisciplinary research 
on disaster mitigation was planned to be integrated with the Medium-Term National 
Development Plan (also known as Pelita) 1987-1992 (Wong 1986). Such processes took 
place in 1986-1987, the same year in which the IDNDR was formally declared to begin. 
However, the technically sound approach in capacity building had been 
disadvantaged by the unexpected change in the macro structure, especially when the 
president changed the host of Bakornas from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the 
Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare in 1990. There is a lack of information 
regarding what happened with the trained individuals and their career building in the 
field. Nevertheless, it was clear that a change in policy, even with a good reason to shift 
from “natural disaster” stipulated in 1979 towards “disaster” in general (to regain 
command over the non-natural ones) in 1990, and to place such a mandate under a 
coordinating minister, in theory, might promote multi-agency efforts. Such a change was 
mainly a response to the IDNDR movement. However, unexpected organizational (or 
leadership) change from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Coordinating Ministry of 
Social Affairs had encouraged discontinuity of human resources, organizational and 
institutional building, as the new ministerial host started human resource development 
from scratch, which caused the 1980s’ Indonesian Disaster Management Center to 
become irrelevant. 
The “sudden” change of disaster management policy in Indonesia in 1979 is best 
explained as the impact of discursive change made through national-international 
interactions. The persistence of the old disaster management policy before 1979 was due 
to the previous fatalistic paradigm on disaster going unchallenged. However, in principle, 
disaster management institutions in Indonesia did not change significantly from the 1960s 
until 1990. This was a long period when the disaster management discourse was 
embedded in ad hoc structures and the actions were reactive responses. 
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The legacy of the Dutch colonial government can be traced until the recent past. 
Another explanation could be that the DRR discourse during 1970s-1990 simply took 
place in the context where information, communication and telecommunication (ICT) 
infrastructures were not as advanced as they are today. Neither superficial nor substantive 
change occurs in isolation. Instead, it occurs as a result of national-international 
interactions facilitated by the context of when and where (the level of) such interactions 
take place. Recent changes in Indonesia in 2007 disaster management policy were due to 
discursive changes at the global level coupled with large-scale disasters in Indonesia 
during the last ten years. Therefore, the disaster management policy reform in Indonesia 
has been the result of a dual process: the dynamic context in which recurrent catastrophes 
provide opportunities for the (domestic actors inside and outside of) government to 
review its existing policy combined by international processes and platforms such as the 
bilateral and multilateral aid institutions that encourage the government and the non-state 
actors in general to change.  
The New Order of Indonesia brought political stability during the period from the 
1970s to 1990. Thus, later on, manmade disasters such as conflict and civil war were not 
considered major issues because the New Order regime was coercive in silencing sources 
of civil society power and rebellions that might challenge the government’s authority. 
The only factor that could not be fully controlled was the element of surprise of natural 
disasters. This was one explanation for the New Order regime simply correcting the 
1960s disaster management policy by making the ad hoc committees into a single more 
stable entity, namely, the National Coordinating Council for Natural Disaster 
Management, in 1979, which lasted until 1990. 
Catastrophes during the 1990s did not bring change to the national disaster 
management system. One example was the first declaration of national disaster status 
after the Flores tsunami in 1992—which, for the first time (at least based on all accessible 
formal documents) since the formation of the National Coordinating Council in 1979—
did not actually trigger any disaster management policy change at either a local or 
national level.   
Disaster management policy reform that occurred in 2007 was not fully initiated by 
the formal institutions and policymakers. The reform itself has actually been a result of 
complex processes involving quite diverse actors within civil society and non-stakeholder 
actors’ (see BNPB-UNDPa,c 2009) initiatives to call for the legislative agency to 
exercise power. The reform arose from a complex set of networks that transacted new 
ideas, information, and knowledge back and forth from local to international levels 
(Lassa 2011). This is well documented in some publications. Pujiono (2005), for instance, 
documented 39 meetings, many of them at the national level, from only 11 Feb-16 June, 
2005, which involved international actors, civil society, the media, and individuals from 
non-governmental organizations (Parlan, Suratman, and Astuti 2007).  
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Figure 3 shows that civil society organizations and other non state actors now enjoy 
co-steering roles in the disaster risk reduction. The National Action Plan 2006-2009 was 
formally endorsed by the Ministry of Development Planning (Bappenas) with the support 
of the UNDP, and provides some interesting insights. The document provides important 
information regarding the involvement of multi-stakeholder efforts such as United 
Nations organizations, INGOs, international donors, university/research institutes, media 
as well as government institutions such as the transitional Bakornas, Ministry of Public 
Work, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Interior.  
 
Figure 3: Trends in Indonesian DRR Stakeholders 
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UN agencies and INGOs supported civil society advocacy under the lead of MPBI 
(see also BNPB-UNDPa 2009:12-13) to carry out “exhaustive” (see Pujiono 2005) 
consultation processes with international partners, politicians, national legislators, and 
government, especially Bakornas and civil society at large. Consultation processes with 
international actors were known as the Convergence Group, which was later supported by 
UNDP to form a working group for a background academic paper for law drafting. The 
Working Group members were all international organizations such as the UNICEF 
(United Nations Children’s Fund), CARDI (Consortium for Assistance and Recovery 
towards Development in Indonesia), ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid 
department), OCHA (Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), and IFRC (International 
Federation of the Red Cross). International aid interests have been successfully 
accommodated in the law, which was later enforced through a specific regulation, 
namely, Government Regulation 21/2008 on International Cooperation in Disaster 
Management (see BNPB-UNDPa 2009, p.13). 
Some positive outcomes of the international and non-state actors’ involvement in the 
drafting of the law lie in the details of the DM Law document. The law recognizes the 
government’s responsibility to: (a) reduce disaster risks and integrate risk reduction in 
development programs; (b) protect people from disasters; (c) guarantee provision of 
rights of people affected and displaced by disasters according to minimum standards; (d) 
support recovery from the impact of disasters; (e) allocate budgets for disaster 
management in the country’s Annual Development Budget; (f) allocate contingency 
funds for disaster response, and (g) provide authentic and credible documentation of 
hazards and impact of disasters. 
 
Reflection and Conclusion 
 
In regards to the question of how DRR policy changed, from the anthropological 
perspective, Hoffman (1999:304) argues that the variables for change are the size 
(magnitude of disaster, population mass, and amount of damage), time, and the 
thicknesses of structures of cultural institutions (such as norms, customs, traditions). 
Large disasters such as the Flores tsunami in 1992 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 
could be seen by ordinary people, including politicians and policymakers, as events 
beyond their comprehension, which could contradict Hoffman’s (1999) idea because the 
dramatic effects of the events can convey the wrong messages to the people in power. 
Such catastrophes are simply beyond their imagination and control. The only factors that 
could help them cope with such a situation are the institutions closest to them, such as 
religion and culture.  
Repeated large catastrophic events may reinforce the belief that disasters arise from 
God’s punishment because “immorality causes disasters,” as the Minister of Information 
and Communication recently explained to the people of Padang (West Sumatra Province) 
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following the devastating earthquake there on 30 September, 2009.19 The ministry held a 
position on the National Coordination Body for Disaster Management (Bakornas) in 2005 
and 2007 (see Figure 1).   
The historical overview in Section 3 regarding anti-colonialism in Banten following 
the Krakatau eruption and its associated tsunami (Winchester 2003:334) was fueled by 
reasoning regarding divine punishment to the non-believing (colonial) government. 
Recent national disaster events such as the Merapi Volcanic eruption (26 October-19 
November 2010) caused more than 200 casualties and more than 350,000 displaced 
people (Forum PRB 2010). Cultural explanation from Javanese cosmology has been a 
‘coping mechanism’ for the local people in Yogyakarta. Dove (2010, p.122) describes the 
local communities’ views on the cause of the Yogyakarta earthquake, which was “seen as 
a divine judgment on those holding the reins of political power”. Schlehe (2010, p.116) 
also noted that the earthquake in 2006 in Yogyakarta has put pressure on the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta and the President of the Republic, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, because “the 
leaders were seen as lacks blessing and legitimization from divine power”.  
The bigger the scale of an event that goes beyond the people’s understanding of the 
natural processes, the more difficult for disaster risk reduction reform, especially when 
the local institutions are weak (e.g. endemic corruption). This causes difficulties in 
encouraging rational and science driven policy measures (Lavigne et al. 2008) for 
volcano mitigation and post disaster management and this leads to the “pull” and “push” 
factor in disaster risk reduction policy reform. The pull factors can be considered as 
constraints in the present reform as competing informal institutions, which are also 
legitimate stakeholders in disaster risk reduction that may facilitate enabling or disabling 
conditions for actual risk reduction. The push factors can be seen as initiatives from 
outside government and informal institutions (such as traditional institutions).   
The disaster risk management reform process in Indonesia is not unique in the sense 
that similar efforts have occurred in other Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka (see 
www.srilankanparliamentonnaturaldisasters.org) in 2005, as well as India in 2005 
(www.nidm.gov.in/). One of the driving forces behind the reform was a form of global 
disaster risk governance, such as national compliance with the Hyogo Declaration as 
voluntarily endorsed by Indonesia together with 168 countries. As the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (HFA) suggested, disaster legislation is seen as the foundation that provides a 
strong basis for planning and directing of the whole spectrum of disaster risk reduction. 
The BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency) admitted that the process of reform 
is “based on international policy direction” (BNPB-UNDP 2009a, p.9). 
Therefore, the change in the disaster management policy is shaped by a dual process. 
First is the risk context where catastrophes either provide legitimacy for or push the 
government to evaluate its disaster risk management strategy with some sort of 
“anticipated initiatives” coming from outside government at the national level. Second, 
the international processes such as the IDNDR in the 1990s and later the International 
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Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) era, which started in 2000, have facilitated 
discursive change. For example, in the Asian context, the disaster management policy 
discourse has been formally channeled through the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre 
(ADRC), which was established in 1998 and Indonesia has been a member state together 
with 28 countries (http://www.adrc.asia). The ADRC’s annual conference has served as a 
regional platform where the member states report their progress of disaster risk reduction 
on an annual basis since 1998. The IDNDR was considered a success in its pioneering 
roles at the international level to facilitate the establishment of 130 national level disaster 
management committees/focal points (van Niekerk 2005).  
It is an empirical fact that IDNDR itself emerged as a soft institution that encouraged 
countries to move to reduce their disaster risks. The HFA 2005–2015 demands for new 
institutional arrangements including attempts at institutional reforms in its 168 member 
states to be able to reduce their overall disaster risk. HFA in fact turned out to be a global 
disaster risk governance mechanism that encourages political interest in reducing disaster 
risk. Recent data indicates that during 2009–2011, at least 82 countries or territories were 
willing to provide interim report concerning progress of disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 
2011). 
This paper concludes that there is enough evidence that DRR policy change in 
Indonesia is a dual process of local and international interaction. There is a shift from 
government as the dominant governing power for DRR towards more hybrid actors 
comprising government, civil society, international organizations, multilateral 
organizations, private firms and academia that collectively form disaster risk governance 
structure with less structural hierarchy. In this context, what is needed is “a more 
cooperative state” (Mayntz 2003) to acknowledge the power of non-state actors. The 
evidence of a cooperative state is also demonstrated in the endorsement of Government 
Regulation 23/2008 regarding Roles of International Agency and INGOs in disaster risk 
reduction in Indonesia.  
There should be an in-depth investigation concerning the roles of the macro political 
situation in the (lack of) change of DRR policy over time. Will the future disaster policy 
reform be driven by domestic and home grown demands for change without external 
drivers? What would happen if the evolution of Indonesia politics required strong 
opposition parties that act as catalyst for policy change? Further investigation should be 
done, especially a detailed analysis of how disaster risk policy making processes during 
2005-2007—including contestations of ideas and how different actors build their own 
legitimacy. What does that mean in the actual risk reduction during the first five years of 
reform at both the national level and local level, especially in the complexity of 
decentralization Indonesia today? What can be learnt from local level DRR reform 
processes? In addition, further investigation in other developing countries is necessary.  
 




1. See Indonesian Map via CIA Websites: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/id.html. Accessed on Jan 24, 2012.   
2. The original term was bahaya, which means danger. However, in today’s language, 
“emergency” is used instead of “danger”. 
3. See Epistemic Cultures are “cultures that create and warrant knowledge” and 
according to Knorr-Cetina (1999). “the premier knowledge institution throughout the 
world is, still, science.” This means that science only one out of many the knowledge 
institutions available. Traditions and religion can partially be other type of knowledge 
institutions. To the author’s knowledge, no study available regarding the epistemic 
culture within the Geological Agency during and after the colonial era. But it can be 
said that epistemic culture in both colonial and post colonial era must be very 
different.  
4. In its early period, Indonesia had a prime minster, but this system has no longer been 
in use for 60 years.  
5. It does not mention flood mitigation but simply disaster.  
6. See Presidential Decree - hereafter Kepress - No 54/1961 and 312/1965 and also 
Presidential Decree 256/1966. 
7. Based on Keppres 256/1966. 
8. The Cabinet Presidium Decision 14/U/Kep/1/1967. 
9. In CRED database (www.emdat.be), it claims that there were about 1,000 deaths from 
the 1966 eruption. However, this figure cannot be confirmed by some sources related 
to volcano studies.  
10. Lahar is an Indonesian term for a volcanic mudflow, which has become an 
internationally recognized term. Please consult 
http://www.geology.sdsu.edu/how_volcanoes_work/Lahars.html. Accessed on 
August 18, 2010. 
11. During 1979, West Papua and Papua regions were in the same administrative unit of 
West Papua. 
12.  http://www.disaster.go.th/html/ricb/foreign/2006/acdm/background/acdm_tor.html. 
Accessed on June 2009. 
13. MMI is known as the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, ranged I-XII, The lower 
scale is measured by the situation in which the earthquake is felt by people while the 
higher scale are based on observed damage of structures caused by an earthquake.   
Scale VII means “Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; 
slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly 
built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken” while Scale VIII means 
“Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary 
substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. 
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Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture 
overturned.” See for more detail explanation is available from 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/mercalli.php. Accessed on March 10, 2011. 
14. Recurrent communication with Dr. Eko Paripurno and Mrs. Hening Parlan, some of 
the key experts behind the scenes who are part of the Indonesian Disaster 
Management Society. 
15. See http://www.tribunnews.com/2010/11/07/komisi-viii-dpr-usulkan-bnpb-jadi-
kementerian. Accessed on Nov 10, 2010. 
16. Please consult http://www.dmhr.gov.lk/english/index.php Last accessed 15 June 
2010. 
17.  Ministry of Defense and Emergency Management at 
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf. Accessed on June 15, 2010. 
18. Please consult http://www.dmb.gov.bd/. Accessed on June 15, 2010. 
19. See the English version from the BBC:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
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Community-based disaster risk assessment yields the best results and most trustworthy 
primary data in understanding the disaster risk that communities face. Yet, most of the 
disaster risk assessments undertaken within South Africa exhibit very little evidence of 
community-based and participatory approaches. Participatory research techniques and 
capacity development interventions were used in a community-based disaster risk 
assessment project covering 22 communities in the North-West Province of South Africa. 
This article describes the methodology developed, as well as the resulting findings of one 
of these at-risk communities. The robust research approach proved to be reliable, valid, 
and trustworthy—and, at the same time, ensured direct community participation. A 
number of participatory research techniques such as transect walks, community 
workshops, and participatory GIS were employed. The research found that the knowledge 
in local communities is extremely reliable in the development of their disaster risk 
profile, and can mostly be unlocked through participatory methods. 
 
Keywords: Community based disaster risk assessment, transect walk, participatory GIS, 





Utilising participatory techniques for community engagement and development is not 
new (Gaillard et al. 2007; Mercer et al. 2008; Pelling 2007). Holloway et al. (2008) as 
well as McCall and Peters-Guarin (in Wisner et al. 2012), are of the opinion that, since 
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the 1980s, a range of methodologies have evolved that propose participatory approaches. 
Although these techniques have been known by various names such as Participatory 
Action Research (PAR), Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(PRA), or even Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation (PHAST), they all 
use similar research tools. Each of the above has its own aims, objectives, practical 
implementation, and outcomes. Mercer et al. (2008) note that participatory research 
techniques for disaster risk assessment, have evolved out of the ‘radical’ paradigm (see 
the work of Cardona 2003, 2004, Hewitt 1983; Lewis 1999; Wisner et al. 2004) of 
disaster studies, which views disasters as complex socio-economic and political 
problems—as opposed to the ‘dominant’ view which places hazards at the centre of 
understanding people’s behaviour (Gaillard et al. 2007). There has furthermore been a 
drive in the field of disaster risk reduction to move away from ‘top-down’ approaches 
driven by donors, non-governmental players and governments, to ‘bottom-up’ planning 
through community engagement (GNDR 2009; Hilhorst and Heijmans in Wisner et al. 
2012; Van Niekerk and Coetzee in Shaw 2012; Wisner et al 2004). This does not, 
however mean that governments and other outside actors have no role to play in 
participatory community actions aimed at disaster risk reduction. On the contrary, it is 
mostly the ‘outside’ actors who are responsible for driving the participatory research 
process, due to the lack of skills and knowledge on the methodological implementation 
within many communities. 
In early 2003, the South African Government promulgated the Disaster Management 
Act No. 57 of 2002 (DMA). As one of the very first ‘new generation’ laws on disaster 
risk management in Africa, the DMA decentralised the responsibility for managing 
disasters and their risks to the local government sphere. One of the most significant 
elements of the DMA is the emphasis on community engagement and participation in 
disaster risk management activities. To this end, the DMA calls for the establishment of 
various administrative structures in government, and the integration of disaster risk 
management into development planning. This profound new focus of government, 
however, is not uniformly applied (Botha et al. 2011). Lack of local municipality 
capacities, skills and understanding of disaster risk reduction necessitate many 
municipalities to outsource their disaster risk management responsibilities. In particular, 
one such responsibility is the assessment of the disaster risk within communities. Van 
Riet (2009), in his investigation of the methodologies applied in these consultancy 
projects, concludes that very little evidence of community-based approaches exists. The 
lack of local participation raised some very valid questions around the trustworthiness of 
these assessments. 
This article investigates the methodology developed and applied in a disaster risk 
assessment project for the Dr. Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality (KKDM) in the 
North-West Province of South Africa. Twenty-two different at-risk communities were 
identified within the four local municipalities that constitute the KKDM. In particular, 
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this article will focus on one of these communities, namely Extension 7 in Ikageng 
Township which falls within the local municipality of Tlokwe. The next sections of this 
paper will create a theoretical basis for participatory research techniques and community-
based disaster risk assessment and emphasise the existing body of literature in this regard. 
Next, to explain the context of the research site, a brief background study on Ikageng and 
Extention 7 will be provided. The research methodology will be described, highlighting 
the most salient issues. The findings of the research will be discussed, and in doing so the 
value of community-based approaches will be highlighted.  
 
Participatory Research Techniques 
 
Participatory research techniques, and in particular action research, are robust and 
versatile research and development strategies. They can be utilised to understand 
complex community structures and interaction, determine various types of vulnerability, 
assist in community capacity building and skills transfer, ensure community participation, 
and allow for the strengthening of livelihoods (Van Niekerk and Van Niekerk 2009). 
“Sixty years after Kurt Lewin proposed the concept of action research, this framework 
has evolved to encompass a range of applied research methodologies that promote change 
and empowerment at the group, organisational, and societal levels” (Gershon et al. 2008). 
The aim of participatory research is to merge traditional scientific knowledge and local 
and traditional knowledge to produce what McCall and Peters-Guarin (in Wisner et al. 
2012) call ‘hybrid’ knowledge. Kindon et al. (2007) emphasise the fact that researchers, 
practitioners, and communities work together to identify problems and the actions 
towards its solution. McCall and Peters-Guarin (in Wisner et al. 2012) notes that 
participatory research, specifically PAR, is grounded in the philosophical writing of the 
Brazilian adult educator, Paulo Freire. Creighton (2005) in turn, provides compelling 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of participatory research and citizen involvement. 
PAR, according to Kindon et al. (2007), have evolved out of RRA and PRA. Chambers 
(2007) also mentions the contributions of participatory technology development (PTA) 
and participatory learning and action (PLA) to the PAR approach.  
McCall and Peters-Guarin (in Wisner et al. 2012) says that the PAR approach 
represents a higher intensity of participation compared to RRA and PRA. They have 
developed what they call ‘ladders of participation’ which are depicted in Figure 1 below. 
This figure gives a fair indication of the value of PAR as a method to ensure participation 
in research. It is thus safe to argue that by utilising PAR as a means of conducting 
community based disaster risk assessment, it would yield the much needed community 
involvement, engagement, participation and ownership of the research results. Van Riet 
and Van Niekerk (2012) show that community based and/or participatory techniques for 
disaster risk assessment produces the best results and the most trustworthy primary data 
in understanding communities’ disaster risk profiles. 
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Figure 1. Intensities of Participation in Research 
Overlap of research 
approaches Intensities/types of 
participation 
Actors – Local insiders 
(community members, 
local technicians) and 
outsiders (researchers, 
government, NGO’s) 





research. Invite outsiders to 




Community’s recognition of 
research needs. Community 
invitation to research 
      
Collaboration 
in decision-making re. 
methodology 
All actors decide on all 
issues including methods, 
‘at all stages’. Interactive 
   
Participatory research 
design. Joint scenario 
settings. Joint assessment 
      
Consultation 
on results and (interim) 
findings 
Locals refine and prioritise 
external ideas on findings 
   
Citizen juries/feedback/ 
validation workshops 
      
Consultation 
on topics and issues 
Locals refine and prioritise 
external ideas on topics and 
on information source 
   
Pre-research workshop/ 
joint reconnaissance 
      
Information Sharing 
Two-way communication 
after the results, between 
insiders and outsiders 
   
Presentations/reporting of 
results session 
      
Exploitation 
‘Acquire information and 
leave’ = no participation 
(very common) 
One-way collection of 
information. Outsiders 
‘return’ some edited 
information to local people 
   
Standard questionnaires/  
censuses/ observation 
      
(Source: McCall and Peters-Guatin in Wisner et al. 2012) 
 
Community Based Disaster Risk Assessment 
 
Evidence suggests that community based disaster risk assessment (CBDRA) yields 
the best results and most trustworthy primary data in understanding the disaster risk of 
communities (Abarquez and Murshed 2004; Holloway et al. 2008; Pelling and Wisner 
2009; Wold and Shriver 1997). Since 2000, the participatory assessment of hazards, risks, 
poverty and vulnerability, has enjoyed growing interest throughout the world (DiMP 
2007; GNDR 2009; Morrisey 2005; Pelling 2007). 
It is commonly accepted that disasters have the greatest impact on the poor and most 
vulnerable, and its consequences contribute to maintaining states of poverty (World Bank 
2001). Community-Based Disaster Risk Assessment (CBDRA) is thus most effective if 
focussed at grassroots level.  The aim of a CBDRA is to have a transformative effect on a 
community (Pelling 2007) and to identify, assess, and monitor risks at a community level. 
This aim is similar to that of PAR (Mecer et al. 2008; Pelling 2007). The objective of 
CBDRA is to “foster participatory local adaptation to climate change that is focused on 
people’s vulnerability, livelihoods, coping and adaptive capacity” (Van Aalst et al. 2008, 
p. 166). According to Morrisey (2005) participatory assessment is conducted in order to 
examine the wellbeing of local livelihoods and how they might respond should a disaster 
or other change (in the social, economic, political or environmental domains) take place. 
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An assessment of available literature indicates that there is general agreement that 
disaster risk reduction can be accomplished by enhancing the skills, knowledge and 
capacities of local communities (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010; GNDR 2009; 
Hagelsteen 2009; Holloway et al. 2008; Wisner et al. 2004). At the Kobe World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction in January 2005, one of the pivotal decisions was to 
acknowledge that the different actors involved in disaster risk reduction need to engage 
more methodically with risk assessment, project application, and advocacy (DiMP 2007) 
especially within communities. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (a global 
agreement emanating from the above-mentioned conference and signed by over 180 
countries) calls on governments to enhance and support disaster risk assessment and 
related processes (Pelling 2007; UN/ISDR 2005). The viewpoint of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action, supported by research undertaken by a global civil society 
network (Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Risk Reduction—
GNDR 2009) is that communities should benefit from the decisions taken at a strategic 
level.  The argument can therefore be made that it defies the point of striving towards 
disaster risk reduction, if good policy, legislation and strategies regarding disaster risk are 
promulgated, yet it is not implemented with the direct aim of reducing communities’ 
vulnerabilities. Participation and local ownership of the disaster risk assessment process 
is therefore necessary. However, Pelling (2007) questions the difference between 
participatory assessment and other kinds of assessment. The complexity of answering this 
question is further hindered by the fact that every attempt to determine the difference 
between the diverse kinds of assessments includes the words participatory, community-
based or local, and each one of these approaches is notably difficult to determine.   
At present, there is no single definition for Community Based Disaster Risk 
Assessment, also called Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA) by Pelling 
(2007). The absence of an agreed definition is not negative for it typifies the multi-
faceted nature of disaster risk.  Disaster risk encompasses various disciplines and can 
therefore, like defining ‘development’, not be bound to one single definition. Similarly, 
Pelling (2007) makes the point that a rigid policy focus on CBDRA issues might 
undermine the importance thereof. Regardless of the difficulty to define CBDRA, Wisner 
(2005) says that CBDRA is a method or process of self-assessment to determine coping 
and capacity against the impact of hazards (natural and anthropogenic).  
Wisner’s definition of CBDRA indicates that the process of CBDRA is about 
evaluating the coping capacity of a community in the face of specific disasters or hazards.  
When a community’s coping capacity is determined, it is possible to develop tools that 
will enable that community to be more resilient towards those hazards and/or disasters. 
UN/ISDR Africa (2005, p. 5) defines disaster risk assessment as “the process of 
collecting and analyzing information about the nature, likelihood and severity of disaster 
risks. The process includes making decisions on the need to prevent or reduce disaster 
risks, what risks to address, and the optimal approach to tackling those risks found to be 
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unacceptable to the target groups and communities.” Community risk assessment is 
critical in identifying, assessing and monitoring risk at a local level—with the purposes of 
informing the design of locally appropriate risk reduction programmes and development 
interventions, as well as assisting in the monitoring and tracking of risk at a community 
level. Chen, Liu and Chan (2006) say that, through a community-based participatory 
approach, community members would learn how to analyse vulnerable conditions, find 
ways to solve problems, develop strategies for risk reduction, and establish an 
organisation to implement disaster risk management tasks. Such an approach also 
facilitates the collection of views and ideas from the community residents about disaster 
experiences, hazard problems, and potential solutions through an informal, flexible and 
relaxing atmosphere. 
For the purpose of this article, CBDRA is defined as direct participatory action by at-
risk communities with the aim of applying local knowledge and experience to analyse 
their own coping capacities (including local resource mobilisation), elements of 
vulnerability, and hazard problems, in order to develop tools and strategies for disaster 
risk reduction and to find potential solutions to the identified problems in a relaxed and 
flexible atmosphere (Van Riet and Van Niekerk 2012). 
Besides the definition of CBDRA above, it is crucial to realise that CBDRA can take 
on various formats linked to various focuses, within various disciplinary arenas (similar 
to that of PAR). Community as a concept is ambiguous and should be clearly defined 
from the start. Simply sharing a place of residence does not mean that there are any social 
relations between the community members.  According to Pelling (2007, p. 378), one of 
the concerns about community as a unit of analysis and intervention is that in “the focus 
on majority rule in community processes, minority groups may lose out”.  A number of 
local role-players and stakeholders are involved in CBDRA. It would therefore be foolish 
to assume that there is only one correct way in which to conduct disaster risk assessment. 
CBDRA must empower a community. CBDRA stretches from the creation of awareness 
of disaster risks, to the empowering potential of participatory methodologies and a more 
instrumental use of local qualitative data. Pelling (2007) further discusses three different 
types of participatory disaster risk assessments: procedural, methodological and 
ideological. These types identified by Pelling are similar to the analysis of ‘ladders of 
participation’ as described by McCall and Peters-Guarin in Figure 1 above.  
The procedural assessment distinguishes participatory assessments according to the 
arrangement of power and ownership in the assessment process. “At one extreme are 
approaches that are initiated, planned and conducted by local actors at risk, who might 
also be the audience for and owners of the results. At the other extreme are assessments 
that include local actors only as subjects for study, or as sources of data or future project 
inputs” (Pelling 2007, p. 376). The methodological approach differentiates between 
whether the methods of data collection are quantitative or qualitative.  In this range of 
participatory assessment, the at-risk people are only seen as sources of data. CBDRA is 
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used here because it is thought of as more economical or faster than social survey-type 
data collection. Ideological assessments differentiate between emancipatory and 
extractive approaches.  The emancipatory approach sees CBDRA as a long-term process 
that, in the end, influences the distribution of vulnerability and subsequent coping 
capacity development.  Extractive approaches are mostly concerned with the collection of 
data that is to be used by external actors.  When choosing which approach to use, one 
needs to consider its strategic use, its conceptual orientation, and also the position of the 
observer (Van Riet and Van Niekerk 2012). As the following section will show, the 
CBDRA approach followed in the community of Extension 7 is aimed at being 
emancipatory in nature.  
 
Background on Ikageng and Extension 7 
 
Ikageng and Potchefstroom (now part of the Tlokwe Local Municipality) have a very 
rich history. Du Pisani (2010) indicates that during the 19th century, the Voortrekkers 
moved inland and occupied various pieces of land in the vicinity of the town of 
Potchefstroom. Landowners and labourers resided on the same property. However, 
complaints arose by the government of the time regarding this communal living 
arrangement. Regulations were formulated in Potchefstroom, which subsequently stated 
that the surplus Bantu community be moved to a separate location. Houses were built on 
an identified site between Potchefstroom and Viljoenskroon and the first township, 
Makweteng (meaning “The Location” in Tswana), was developed.  
In the late 19th to early 20th century, two groups of immigrants from Indian decent 
immigrated to South Africa. The one group was labourers who worked on the sugarcane 
farms of Natal and the other group was retailers who made a living by selling various 
produce and products. These Indian communities came to resided in an area that was then 
known as the Asiatic Bazaar, a neighbourhood in Potchefstroom.   
In 1951, the town council of Potchefstroom changed the name of Makweteng to 
Willem Klopperville, which was mostly due to the existing political climate in South 
Africa at the time. In 1950 the Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950 announced that the four 
races—Indian, Coloured, Black Africans and White—must live and develop separated. 
As a result, the Bantu community was moved to the township that is now known as 
Ikageng in 1955, and Willem Klopperville, was zoned as a residential area for Whites. 
Two other neighbourhoods were established—Mohadin for the Indian community and 
Promosa for the Coloured community. After South Africa’s first democratic election in 
1994, Ikageng expanded rapidly. 
After significant spatial development since the 1990s, Ikageng is located next to the 
town of Potchefstroom, whilst Extension 7, the community under investigation in this 
research, is located another 10 km further from the main settlement of Ikageng (see 
Figure 2). It is also one of the last settlements before reaching the neighbouring town of 
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Klerksdorp, and thus fairly isolated from Tlokwe’s main economic activities. The 
combination of the legacy of Apartheid, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, poor spatial 
planning, and lack of local economic development and market planning has severely 
hampered the community’s economic and social progress. 
 
Figure 2. Location of Extension 7, Ikageng 
 
 
Extension 7 is home to approximately 26500 people constituting approximately 5300 
households (Mahlabe 2011, Sehurutshe 2011, Taoleng 2011). The community lacks 
proper town planning and the necessary infrastructure for sustainable development. The 
widespread occurrence of soil pollution, water pollution and air pollution, pose a health 
threat as well as an environmental hazard. The community of Extension 7 was selected 
out of the 22 surveyed communities as the focus for this article because it possessed all of 
the variables in terms of prevalent hazards, vulnerability and varied capacities that 
provide an ideal research environment to illustrate the application of a CBDRA approach. 
 
 




This research intervention formed part of a larger research project commissioned by 
the Dr. Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality (KKDM—see the work of Van Riet and 
Van Niekerk 2012 as well as Van Riet et al. 2009, for a detailed account of this 
intervention). Twenty-two at-risk communities were identified in which three-day 
research interventions were implemented. The 22 communities were identified using 
baseline data sourced from WeatherSA, the GeoScience Council of South Africa, data 
from the emergency services of the Tlokwe Local Municipality, historical studies on the 
KKDM, reports and government documents, as well as the experiences from the disaster 
risk management staff of the KKDM and Tlokwe Local Municipality Disaster Risk 
Management Centres. Extension 7 was identified as an at-risk community due to its 
adherence to the broader selection criteria of all sites (Van Riet et al. 2009). 
 
• Where are the communities frequently affected by hazards? 
• Who is frequently affected by hazards? 
• How are they affected? 
• Why are they affected?  
• When are they affected? 
• What happens when they are affected? (what are the outcomes) and  
• How do they currently cope with these hazards?  
 
Before data collection could start in any of the sites, a facilitator’s training workshop 
was held with the research teams. The researchers, government officials from the local 
and district municipality’s disaster risk management centres, and community members 
formed part of the research teams. The research teams were trained in the methodology to 
be implemented in each of the 22 sites. A pilot study with all of the research teams was 
firstly undertaken to test the research methodology and determine whether the study was 
executable, true and reliable, and whether any revisions to the methodology were 
required. Subsequently each of the research teams was responsible for the data gathering 
in the various research sites. 
Data for Extension 7 were gathered during one such three-day participatory workshop 
held from 29-31 July 2009 that included a transect walk through the area under 
investigation. Thirty community members were selected based on their knowledge of the 
area (years of living in Extension 7) and availability to assist the researchers. These 
community members were identified by government officials and the local elected 
community representative—who acted as the local gatekeeper to the community, NGOs 
and church organisations. Guidance in terms of the composition of the participants of the 
participatory workshop were given, which were a) an even distribution by gender and 
ethnicity; b) preference to be given to older people who have lived in the area for more 
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than 10 years, and c) representation of other groupings (such as the youth and people with 
special needs) should also be achieved where possible. 
An even distribution of male and females for the intervention in Extension 7 was 
achieved. However, due to the timing of the workshop (during school hours), it was not 
possible to obtain adequate youth representation.  
The participants of workshops were requested to identify a route for a transect walk, 
which should cover a cross-section of the community and would enable the research team 
to talk to various community members and observe the most salient hazard and 
vulnerability features. All the workshop participants accompanied the research team on 
the transect walk. The technique of participatory geo-referencing (Dunn 2007; Elwood 
2006) was used during the transect walk as a source from which other relevant data was 
gained. Participatory geo-referencing is a geographical information management 
technique that utilised local and indigenous knowledge to empower communities and to 
explore and capture this knowledge through visual means, such as transferring their local 
knowledge to a map. Geographical Information System base maps were utilised to 
indicate basic topography, land use, and land cover, as well as socio-economic and 




As mentioned previously, the community based risk assessment spanned a period of 
three-days (Van Riet and Van Niekerk 2012). On the first day, a historical community 
timeline was drawn up and an understanding of the notion of disaster risk and disaster 
risk assessment was created. The participants also identified and prioritised local hazards 
that regularly occurred. The most prevalent hazards identified by the study were floods, 
fires, windstorms and the mishandling of sewerage.  
Floods don’t only have devastating effects on infrastructure, but can also lead to the 
breeding of mosquitoes and subsequent diseases that, in turn, heighten health risks. The 
effects of floods are exacerbated by a lack of drainage infrastructure and there have been 
cases where children have drowned.  
Fires are mostly caused by alternative heating techniques such as the burning of coal, 
wood, or paraffin in the residents’ dwellings. Interestingly, alcohol abuse was named as 
one of the leading causes of fires in dwellings. These fires result when candles or paraffin 
lamps are knocked over accidentally because one of the dwelling residents is intoxicated. 
This fact was also confirmed by the incident reports of the local fire station. The residents 
also indicated that fires occur due to a lack of knowledge, with incorrect use and storage 
of paraffin and matches being listed as the main contributors in this regard. 
Another hazard, windstorms, has caused major damage to the community. Reportedly 
it happens quite often that roofs of houses and shacks are blown off and that the debris 
injures people. There are also cases of car accidents due to poor visibility when 
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windstorms occur. This is particularly relevant when one considers the geographical 
location of Extension 7 next to a national highway (the N12).  
The incorrect disposal and treatment of sewerage poses another significant health risk 
for the community as it leads to a breeding ground for biological hazards. Following the 
hazard identification exercise, the participants documented the causes and effects of local 
hazards and created an understanding of the monthly and annual cycles of hazards. 
During the first day of the workshop the residents drew up a seasonal calendar for the 
prioritised risks. An example of this calendar is shown in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. Seasonal Calendar for Prioritised Hazards 
Hazard Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Floods             
Fires             
Windstorms             
Sewerage             
 
On the second day of the workshop, the facilitators presented a summary of the first 
day. Thereafter, an understanding of the settlements’ disaster risk history was facilitated. 
The participants identified key stakeholders who might aid in mitigating hazards. During 
the day the participants were asked to indicate on a map which areas are most prone to 
the various hazards. These perceptions of the physical impact of hazards were recorded 
on a large geo-referenced aerial photograph (Van Riet and Van Niekerk 2012). Next, an 
understanding of the spatial distribution of risks and underlying vulnerability conditions 
were created. All workshop participants partook in a transect walk, utilising participatory 
geo-referencing, also referred to as participatory GIS (Dunn 2007; Elwood 2006). A 
transect walk is an exploratory technique in which the research team and community 
members walk through an agreed section of the community. This transect is agreed upon 
before the walk commences and should, as far as possible, be a representation of the 
livelihoods, activities and physical environment of the community.  
During the transect walk, community members used the base maps to refine and map 
various features needed to gain an understanding of their disaster risk profile. All 
physical features in the community, for example infrastructure, development, hazards, 
observable vulnerabilities and overall surroundings were captured on the maps and also 
on digital camera. Thereafter, the location of the recordings was mapped by using Global 
Positioning System (GPS) devices operated by the workshop facilitators. This was in turn 
transferred and processed in a Geographical Information System (GIS—see Van Riet et 
al. 2009). The findings and outcomes of the participatory GIS intervention of the fire risk 
(as one example) in Extension 7, linked to its seasonality (as per the seasonal hazard 
calendar explained above), is depicted in Figure 3 below.  
 
 
Van Niekerk & Annandale: Participatory Research 
171 
Figure 3. Example of Participatory GIS Output: Fire Risk Map 
 
During the transect walk participants were asked to assist the researchers in pointing 
out the various aspects of the prioritised hazards in the area highlighted in the workshops. 
Issues of vulnerability were also addressed through casual conversation with various 
community members. As appropriate, digital photographs were utilised in the disaster 
risk assessment process and report writing (Van Riet et al. 2009). This also led to an 
understanding of the spatial distribution of key resources to reduce priority risks. 
On the last day of the workshop, the participants were trained in an integrated 
understanding of the settlement’s risk profile. All of the elements (hazards, vulnerability 
and community capacities and development) identified during the first two days were 
utilised to explain the progression of vulnerability (as defined by Wisner et al. 2004). The 
participants were taught that the primary strategy of vulnerability reduction is to increase 
a community’s capacities, resources, and coping strategies. They paid special attention to 
the main factors that contributed to vulnerability to a specific hazard. An understanding 
of local disaster risk management and coping strategies for priority risks were thus 
created. This understanding in turn allowed the participants to make recommendations to 
the Disaster Risk Management Plan of the Tlokwe Local Municipality and the 
management of their specific risks (mostly through identifying adequate development 
interventions for Extension 7). 
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The research found that the community also suffers from significant economic 
vulnerability. Guillaumont (1999) describes economic vulnerability as the risk of being 
harmed, wounded (negatively affected) by unforeseen events, in general and in economic 
terms as well. 
The study also found that Extension 7 has extensive environmental vulnerabilities. 
According to the Pelling and Wisner (2009) key aspects of environmental vulnerability 
include the extent of natural resource depletion and the state of resource degradation. In 
the same vein, a lack of resilience within ecological systems and exposure to toxic and 
hazardous pollutants are important elements that shape environmental vulnerability. A 
reduced access to clean air (as is the case with windstorms, and excessive use of open 
fires and coal stoves), safe water and sanitation and inappropriate forms of waste 
management can deepen levels of socio-economic vulnerability. A polluted environment 
also increases people’s exposure to health risks. 
As natural resources become scarcer the range of options available to the Extension 7 
community becomes more limited. This reduces residents’ ability to develop coping 
solutions, which are needed for local hazard resilience and recovery following a disaster. 
Over a period of time, environmental factors can increase vulnerability further by 
creating new and undesirable patterns of social discord, economic destitution and 
eventually forced migration of entire communities (Holloway 1999, Wisner 2005). 
It is important for the community to build upon existing coping strategies in order to 
develop more resilient livelihoods (Holloway et al. 2008), reduce various forms of 
vulnerability, and mitigate the possible impact of the identified hazards. During the last 
session of the workshop, participants were encouraged to indicate gaps in the current 
disaster risk reduction measures. According to Annandale (2010) the participants 
developed the following disaster risk reduction recommendations:  
 
• A fence should be put around the local section of the water channel and the 
manhole covers should be policed in order to reduce the risk of drowning during a 
flood. 
• A bridge should be built over the channel so that people can cross the channel 
without having to enter the channel.  
• Education about flood risk should be provided.  
• Proper paraffin safety must be promoted through community actions and 
advocacy. 
• Hazard awareness campaigns should be provided at schools so children can be 
taught about the dangers of fires and how to swim.  
• More trees and grass should be planted in order to mitigate the effects of 
windstorms. 
• A better and adequate sewerage system must be implemented.  
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Following these recommendations, numerous strategies for action were discussed. 
Once an agreement among the participants was reached, the facilitators recorded 
strategies on site level reports (Van Riet and Van Niekerk 2012). These strategies 
included action steps, the actors involved, including the communities most at risk, as well 
as timeframes for action. Lastly, a clear understanding of follow-up actions and 
institutional arrangements by different role players was emphasised. All the 
recommendations and follow-up actions were subsequently included in the draft 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of the Tlokwe Local Municipality, as well as Disaster 
Risk Management Plans of the municipality and the district. At time of writing of this 
article the draft IDP of the municipality was still under development and it stands to be 
seen how many of the recommendations and projects identified by the community will 




A number of lessons can be learned from the implementation of this specific 
participatory research methodology. These lessons relate to the use of a CBDRA 
methodology, as well as the actual implementation of a CBDRA project. Utilising 
CBDRA is very time consuming and requires specific skills. Adequate time must be 
allocated for capacity development (researchers as well as community members), testing 
methods, data analysis, and interpretation. The process of CBDRA will fail unless it is 
owned by the community under investigation, Thus future research will do well in 
engaging communities directly rather than overly relying on a single gatekeeper. This 
does not, however, remove the importance of an appropriate gatekeeper.  
A number of lessons can be learned from the implementation of this project. Firstly, 
the timeframes allocated for the various community workshops were not adequate. This 
resulted in a bottleneck in which human resources and capacities to facilitate the 
workshops became strained. In planning such interventions, one should provide for at 
least double the amount of time of a workshop in its administrative planning, even though 
one might be replicating an established methodology, as was the case of this project. 
Secondly, an over-reliance on one set of researchers to facilitate the workshops led to a 
shortage of skilled facilitators. Provision must be made for unforeseen circumstances in 
which a key researcher might not be able to be present in the research field on the 
planned dates. A suggestion would thus be to always have a skilled secondary research 
team which can be called upon should the need arise. This is imperative, especially when 
one is dealing with a number of community members who commit their time to be part of 
a research project. Thirdly, representation at the workshop(s) was problematic because 
the gatekeeper to the community sometime identified individuals only from his/her 
politically affiliated organization—thus excluding minority groups. Where local NGOs 
and church organisations were involved in the identification of community members, as 
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was the case with Extension 7, much better representation was gained. Lastly, and most 
importantly, a period of reflection is necessary after such an intervention. The scope of 
the overall project (assessing 22 communities) did not allow for a critical reflection at site 
level. Such reflection would allow for the re-evaluation of the data and would also assist 
in gaining more in-depth knowledge on the disaster risk profile of the community, 





This research has found that participatory disaster risk assessment is a valid and 
reliable research tool. By implementing a robust methodology aimed at community level 
analysis, this research found that very good results are achieved by engaging the 
community because ownership of planning for disaster risk reduction and development 
are significantly increased at local level. Participatory research techniques involving 
community consultation through a structured workshop, a transect walk and participatory 
GIS techniques enhanced the depth and understanding of the disaster risk profile in 
Extension 7. The research showed that the local community already has a significant 
understanding of hazards and their consequences that enhances the understanding and 
analysis of disaster risk and development issues. It furthermore gives insight into what 
the communities see as important for them to protect and how they would like to achieve 
this goal through development interventions. The participatory process followed in this 
research showed that communities’ capacities to utilise their knowledge can be developed 
and also applied in order to influence activities aimed at risk reduction. The residents of 
Extension 7 were given the opportunity to directly influence their development path 
through this participatory research intervention. More so, this participatory intervention 
assisted in building local knowledge of disaster risk and enabled community members to 
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State governments play an important, but little understood, role in hazard mitigation 
through the use of a number of capacity building initiatives intended to assist 
communities develop hazard mitigation plans and policies. The passage of the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 more than 10 years ago provides a baseline from which to assess 
the degree to which states have developed and applied the tools, funding mechanisms, 
programs, and policies to help communities achieve this important objective. In this 
article, several state-level measures are analyzed and discussed relative to the degree to 
which they facilitate an enhanced local capacity to engage in hazard mitigation 
activities, including planning. The measures include: state hazard mitigation staffing; 
state hazard mitigation funding, policies, and programs; state cost-sharing of hazard 
mitigation programs; and state delivery of hazard mitigation technical assistance. The 
findings suggest that states maintain a wide variation in state capacity and commitment 
to support local hazard mitigation activities, including that which is influenced by 
disaster-based funding. They also tend to emphasize building local governments’ 
capacities to gain access to project funding rather than focusing on helping them identify 
and establish a comprehensive, proactive, and sustained risk reduction strategy grounded 
in land use policy.  In addition, state land use policies are not well integrated into state 
hazard mitigation plans and capacity building initiatives. Finally, state mitigation 
officials believe that most local governments do not possess the capacity or commitment 
necessary to develop sound hazard mitigation plans or administer hazard mitigation 
grants. 
 
Keywords: State hazard mitigation planning and policy, building local capacity and 
commitment, Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
States play a number of important roles in guiding and supporting local hazard 
mitigation actions that reduce long-term risk to people and property from hazards. State 
activities that advance local hazard mitigation include serving as a transmitter of 
information (e.g., new federal and state policies and rules), provider of data, creator of 
policy, intermediary between federal policies and local actions, evaluator of local hazard 
mitigation plans and hazard mitigation grant applications, and builder of local capacity 
and commitment to hazard risk reduction initiatives through state-level training and 
outreach programs (Godschalk et. al 1999; Smith 2011; Smith and Wenger 2006, p. 242- 
245; Waugh and Sylves 1996). State mitigation efforts can also foster intergovernmental 
coordination (Burby and May 1997, p. 141-142; Burby and May 2009), enhance local 
plan compliance with broader state goals (Godschalk, Brower, and Beatley 1989, p. 126-
127; Deyle and Smith 1998), and assist communities to resist or absorb and rapidly 
recover from disaster impacts (Beatley 2009; Peacock et al. 2009).  
Although several studies evaluated state hazard mitigation efforts in the 1990s (e.g., 
Burby and May 1997; Deyle and Smith 1998; Godschalk, Brower, and Beatley 1989; 
Godschalk et al. 1999), research on the state-local relationship in hazards mitigation has 
not been conducted since the passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA) 
(Smith 2011, p. 45; Smith and Wenger 2006, p. 242). As will be discussed, the DMA 
created a new intergovernmental policy framework for hazard mitigation that formalizes 
and strengthens states’ role as a coordinator between local and federal mitigation efforts.  
The overarching research question posed in this paper is—What activities have states 
undertaken to assist local governments to build the capacity needed to develop hazard 
mitigation plans and policies in light of the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 
2000? Specifically, how do states vary in terms of the staff available to carry out state 
hazard mitigation goals; how do states vary in terms of funding, policies, and programs to 
carry out state hazard mitigation goals; how strong are states’ local capacity and 
commitment building efforts to translate federal mitigation policy into local mitigation 
planning through the delivery of technical assistance; and to what degree are states 
encouraging local governments to integrate land use planning approaches into mitigation 
planning and how successful are these efforts? 
This article begins by reviewing the literature on state capacity and commitment to 
support local mitigation efforts and develops a conceptual framework to guide the study. 
The key provisions of the DMA are then described. Next, the research design, data 
collection, and analysis methods are reviewed. Findings on state mitigation programs are 
then presented and compared to findings from previous studies. Finally, the article offers 
conclusions about key findings and a series of policy recommendations. 
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Conceptual Framework for Assessing State Mitigation Programs 
 
State mitigation programs fill essential, multi-faceted roles in guiding and supporting 
local mitigation efforts to achieve national, state, and local risk reduction goals. Studies 
undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s before the passage of the DMA conceptualized the 
key capacity and commitment building dimensions of state mitigation programs (Burby 
and May 1997; Deyle and Smith 1998; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley 1989; Godschalk 
et al. 1999). These studies are used to identify the core conceptual dimensions in this 
study and more recent, post-DMA research are used to further specify the concepts. 
For this study, we conceptualize six dimensions of state-level activities that are 
focused on building local governments’ capacity and commitment to develop and 
implement hazard mitigation plans and policies. The first dimension, state hazard 
mitigation staffing, consists of the personnel that provide technical support, training, and 
assistance for local planning, as well as management and administration of mitigation 
programs (Godschalk et al. 1999). Second, state mitigation program funding, policies, 
and programs address whether a state employs a balanced, coordinated approach or a 
disjointed patchwork of support for local efforts (Burby and May 1997; May and Deyle 
1998). Third, state cost-sharing of hazard mitigation programs assesses the degree to 
which state or local financial resources are used to cover non-federal financial grant 
requirements. Fourth, state delivery of hazard mitigation technical assistance evaluates 
the degree to which states help local governments build their own capacity (Brody, 
Highfield and Kang 2011; Burby and May 1997). 
For the fifth and sixth dimensions, we conceptualize specific aspects of local 
mitigation efforts towards which state government agencies can target capacity and 
commitment building efforts. State encouragement of local awareness of mitigation is an 
important precondition that local governments have struggled to achieve (Mileti 1999; 
Godschalk, Brody, and Burby 2003). Sixth, state encouragement of applying land use 
approaches to mitigate hazards is widely recognized as a key to a proactive, sustainable 
mitigation strategy (Burby 1998; Godschalk et al. 1999; Mileti 1999; National Research 
Council 2006; Olshansky and Kartez 1998). 
 
Overview of the Disaster Mitigation Act 
 
Congress passed the DMA to spur states and local governments to develop better 
hazard mitigation plans that more effectively speed the expenditure of post-disaster 
mitigation funding and reduce rising disaster costs. The DMA requires states and local 
governments to develop hazard mitigation plans that comply with the standards 
established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to remain eligible 
for certain types of federal hazard mitigation assistance before and after presidentially-
declared disasters. 
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The DMA emphasizes grant administration, which dates back to the initial 
formulation of the Act. That emphasis was based, in part, on the idea that the 
development of state and local pre-disaster hazard mitigation plans would speed the 
implementation of post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds. At the 
time, FEMA was facing severe criticism from the Government Accountability Office and 
members of Congress due to large unspent balances in the HMGP following a number of 
federally-declared disasters and the slow speed at which funded projects were being 
implemented (Smith 2009a, p. 229). 
A second principal aim of the DMA was to reduce escalating disaster losses through a 
more proactive and comprehensive approach to risk reduction. Following major disasters, 
expenditures from the federal disaster relief fund and emergency supplemental 
appropriations can exceed billions of dollars. According to the Office of Management 
and Budget, federal assistance averaged $11.5 billon per year between 2001 and 2010 
(2011, p. 4). Growth in federal disaster declarations and their associated costs has led to 
funding more recent response operations while withholding hazard mitigation and 
disaster recovery funds from other federally declared disasters (Hodge, Fleisher, and 
Gershman 2011). 
In addition to the emphasis on post-disaster hazard mitigation grants, the DMA 
resulted in the creation of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program (PDM). Although the 
PDM represents a potentially important part of a federal emphasis on pre-event risk 
reduction (including the provision of funding to assist local governments develop hazard 
mitigation plans), it is a highly competitive grant program that tends to benefit those that 
have the resources required to develop viable applications (Association of State 
Floodplain Managers 2006, p. 3; Smith 2011, p. 65).1 Furthermore, funding is small 
relative to national demand (Association of State Floodplain Managers, 2006, p. 2; 
McCarthy and Keegan 2009, p. 13). 
Under the DMA, FEMA designates state hazard mitigation plans as enhanced or 
standard plans.2 The distinction between standard and enhanced plans is largely based on 
a state’s ability to show greater proficiency in grants administration, although states are 
also requested to “demonstrate a broad, programmatic mitigation approach” (FEMA 
2008, p. v), an ill-defined criterion (Government Accountability Office 2007; Smith 
2008a, p. 229).3 Enhanced plans, which enable states to receive additional post-disaster 
hazard mitigation funds, represent an effort by FEMA to encourage the development of 
higher quality plans. Recent research on the quality of state hazard mitigation plans 
indicates that enhanced plans (e.g., Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) did not exhibit 
high quality across multiple planning elements (Berke, Smith, and Lyles 2012). 
The issues surrounding the standard/enhanced classification system, increased 
spending on disaster relief, and the competitiveness of the PDM represent the latest 
evidence of long-standing problems in U.S. hazard mitigation policy. The nation 
struggles to provide an appropriate balance between post-disaster assistance and building 
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a partnership that includes federal, state, and local government stakeholders focused on 
reducing hazard vulnerability through pre-event hazard mitigation planning and policy 
making.  
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
To assess the state role in mitigation, we used multiple sources of evidence, including 
mail surveys, telephone interviews with State Hazard Mitigation Officers (SHMOs),4 
reviewed archived documents, and used previously conducted plan quality analyses. This 
allowed the study team to compare and analyze the results.  
 
Sample Selection Criteria 
 
The coastal state hazard mitigation program is the unit of analysis for this study. 
Coastal states were used because their local communities tend to experience high growth 
pressures and high vulnerability to hazards (Brower, Beatley, and Schwab 2002; NOAA 
2004). Six coastal states were included in the sample using criteria developed to ensure 
variation across the conceptual dimensions of capacity and commitment and enable 
comparisons of our findings with studies of pre-DMA state mitigation programs. 
The two criteria used, based on an analysis of 30 coastal state plans, were the strength 
of a state’s planning policy context, and the quality of the state’s hazard mitigation plan. 
Using Institute for Business and Home Safety/American Planning Association survey 
data, we defined state planning contexts as “strong” if the state had a comprehensive 
planning mandate that included a required hazards element, “moderate” if the state had a 
comprehensive planning mandate but no hazards element, and “weak” if there was no 
planning mandate (Schwab 2009). State plan quality was defined as “strong” if the plan 
score was in the top 20% of the 30 plans reviewed, “moderate” if it was in the middle 
60% and “weak” if it was in the bottom 20% (Berke, Smith, and Lyles 2012). The six 
states selected varied across the two criteria and included two Pacific coast states, two 
Gulf Coast states, and two Atlantic coast states. Florida and North Carolina were strong 
on both criteria, California had strong plan quality and moderate planning context, 
Washington was moderate on both criteria, Texas had moderate plan quality and weak 




Mail surveys were administered to the SHMOs in each of the six states in late 2010 
and 2011. The surveys included quantitative, qualitative, and open-ended questions 
addressing mitigation-relevant state legislation and programs, state staffing, funding 
support for local mitigation, and state technical assistance. Upon receiving and reviewing 
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the mail survey results, we conducted semi-structured phone interviews with the SHMOs 
and, in some cases their staff. Interviewees received the questions in advance, which 
focused on stakeholders engaged in mitigation, capacity to conduct state mitigation 
planning and to support local mitigation, linkage of mitigation with land use planning, 
and factors driving mitigation successes and setbacks. In addition, we reviewed multiple 
documents including mitigation studies, written policies and program guidance, and 





Following Yin (2009), we synthesized the data in the state case studies to enable 
cross-state comparisons. We focus on commonalities and divergences across the six 
states to identify patterns across the states. We tabulated the mail survey results, extracted 
themes and quotes from interview transcripts, and pulled relevant information about state 




The results are framed according to six dimensions—state hazard mitigation staffing; 
state hazard mitigation funding, policies, and programs; state cost-sharing of federal 
hazard mitigation programs; state delivery of hazard mitigation planning technical 
assistance; state encouragement of increased local awareness and commitment to hazard 
mitigation; and state encouragement of local land use planning.  
 
State Hazard Mitigation Staffing 
 
Staffing figures varied widely across the six states with Florida maintaining a staff 
that is more than twice as large as California’s (Table 1). Florida bolsters their existing 
staff with a summer intern program that draws master’s students from Florida State 
University’s Department of Urban and Regional Planning. Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Texas maintain similarly sized staffs, whereas Washington possesses the smallest staff. 
These numbers are substantially higher than the staffing levels found by Godschalk, et al. 
(1999, p. 472), who noted that—in the 39 states assessed—over three quarters of states 
had fewer than five hazard mitigation staff and approximately one half of states had one 
staff person or no one tasked with hazard mitigation activities. 
Assessing the total size of hazard mitigation staff (measured as those working in state 
emergency management agencies dedicated to hazard mitigation activities) does not fully 
characterize important fluctuations in the size of a state’s hazard mitigation workforce 
and changes to the makeup and experience of personnel over time. Contextual and 
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temporal issues affecting staff size include the presence, in states such as California, of a 
robust, multi-dimensional set of hazard mitigation policies administered by other state 
agencies. Since this study only assessed the number of state emergency management 
agency officials dedicated to hazard mitigation activities, recorded hazard mitigation 
staffing levels probably underestimated overall capacity. The degree to which state 
emergency management staff coordinated with other state officials to achieve broader 
hazard mitigation aims will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
Table 1. State Hazard Mitigation Staffing Patterns 
States California* Florida* Georgia* North Carolina Texas Washington* 
Agency       
Management/
Administration 
11 5 4 4 8 1 




0 15 0 0 0 2.5 
Planning 6 4 1 4 2 1.5 
Other 0 3 3 3 0 0 
Field Staff       
Management/
Administration 
0 2 0 0 3 0 
Technical 0 7 0 0 0 0 
Field Support/ 
Training 
0 9 2 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 19 48 11 12 13 5 
* Enhanced state hazard mitigation plan status (as defined by FEMA) requires meeting higher standards of 
practice than a standard plan (no asterisk). 
 
Georgia does not face the same degree of hazard vulnerability, extent of land area, or 
number of local governments as Texas, Florida, or California. Although Georgia reported 
that the ability to provide good pay and benefits has led to the development of a stable 
and experienced mitigation planning staff, the number of employees administering hazard 
mitigation grants who leave for other job opportunities remains high. Florida noted high 
staff turnover across the board, citing low pay for state government personnel, even 
though the state maintains 15 agency staff working directly with local governments—
which represents a significant commitment to local capacity building. Each state also 
supports a staff dedicated to hazard mitigation planning, with California possessing the 
largest number of positions focused on this task.  
The fluctuation in size and experience levels of state hazard mitigation staffs was 
cited by SHMOs as a major problem (see also Burby 1995; Burby and Patterson 1993). 
Following Hurricane Floyd in 1999, the North Carolina hired and maintained a staff of 50 
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hazard mitigation planners, grants managers, and risk assessment personnel for several 
years. Most of these positions were time-limited because they were paid by federal funds 
associated with the administration of post-disaster hazard mitigation grants.5  
The ability to hire and maintain adequate staff that can capture and transfer 
institutional knowledge gained over time remains an ongoing challenge. One SHMO 
noted that they had recently filled all of their positions for the first time in six years. 
Texas, like other states, has relied heavily on post-disaster administrative funds to carry 
out a number of hazard mitigation initiatives. Of the 13 hazard-mitigation positions in 
Texas, all but two (the SHMO and one Hazard Mitigation Planner) are paid from post-
disaster administrative funding.  
 
State Hazard Mitigation Funding, Policies, and Programs 
 
States exhibit a diverse set of funding, policies, and programs aimed at building the 
capacity needed to address hazard mitigation-related issues. In California, for instance, 
the Department of Water Resources California Levee Bond Funds total $500 million 
dollars and are used to rehabilitate state and federal levees that protect local communities 
and infrastructure. California also passed state law AB 2140, which provides an incentive 
to incorporate hazard mitigation into the safety element of local comprehensive plans 
through the provision of additional state funds following a federally declared disaster.  
State officials in Florida noted their emphasis on building and sustaining partnerships 
with the insurance industry, the state homebuilders association, water management 
districts, the Florida League of Cities, and the Florida Association of Counties, among 
others. These partnerships have led to a number of important state programs, including, 
for instance, the Residential Construction Mitigation Program, which sets aside $10 
million per year. Of this amount, $7 million is allocated for wind hazard retrofit projects, 
a mitigation outreach and education initiative, and building code-related efforts. Three 
million dollars is also allocated to retrofit state evacuation shelters. The Residential 
Construction Mitigation Program is funded through the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe 
Fund.  
North Carolina emphasizes pre- and post-disaster state hazard mitigation programs, 
both of which were initially triggered by special legislative appropriations following 
Hurricane Floyd, the worst disaster in the state’s history.6 The programs include the 
provision of a state match for HMGP, the creation of the State Acquisition and 
Relocation Fund (SARF), and $30 million to create the North Carolina Floodplain 
Mapping Program (NCFMP). The SARF provides up to $75,000 in state money to low-
income residents participating in the relocation of flood-prone housing under the HMGP 
because the federal program can only provide pre-disaster fair market value for the 
structure. The provision of additional state funds is intended to serve as an incentive for 
low-income residents to move out of the floodplain and into safer housing. Under the 
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North Carolina Floodplain Mapping Program, the state has assumed the traditional 
federal responsibility for the re-mapping and updating Flood Insurance Rate Maps. The 
state match and SARF are now codified in state law, and are part of a tiered disaster 
declaration process in North Carolina, whereas the NCFMP receives a mix of state and 
federal dollars to maintain the program.  
As part of the state’s tiered disaster declaration system, NC Senate Bill 300 requires 
the adoption of a local hazard mitigation plan in order for communities to remain eligible 
to receive state assistance following smaller events that do not meet federal disaster 
declaration criteria. North Carolina’s decision to link the presence of a hazard mitigation 
plan to grant eligibility predates a similar federal requirement later promulgated under the 
DMA.  
The state of Washington administers three programs, including the Disaster Response 
Account, the Flood Control Assistance Account, and Flood Damage Prevention Grants. 
The Disaster Response Account, administered through the Military Department (the State 
Emergency Management Division’s administrative location), amounts to $7 million. The 
purpose of the program, which is supported by state general funds, is to provide the state 
match for HMGP and Public Assistance for federally-declared disasters.7 The Flood 
Control Assistance Account Program, which is administered through the Department of 
Ecology, was $2 million for 2009-2011. No funds were appropriated for 2011-2013.  
Historically, the program provided $4 million per biennium to local governments. 
The purpose of the program is to pay for comprehensive flood management planning and 
flood damage reduction projects. The Flood Damage Prevention Grants, also 
administered through the Department of Ecology, represent a one-time appropriation 
through the state capital budget of $1.35 million during years 2009-2011. The program 
funded local projects designed to prevent flood damage.  
The General Land Office, which is responsible for managing 20.4 million acres of 
land and mineral rights in Texas, administers the Coastal Erosion Planning and Response 
Act (CEPRA) program. The goals of CERPA include protecting public infrastructure, 
valuable habitat, public and private property, and natural resources; mitigating storm 
damage; and partnering with local, state, and federal agencies to increase funding 
opportunities and resources. This program targets “critical coastal erosion areas” which 
are defined as coastal regions that have experienced historical erosion at a rate greater 
than two feet per year. Funding for CERPA is provided by the state but requires a local 
match for most projects, the amount of which varies based on the type of project. 
 
State Cost-Sharing of Federal Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs 
 
Another way to assess the commitment of each state to local hazard mitigation efforts 
is to review the amount of the non-federal match that is assumed by the state versus local 
governments for pre- and post-disaster hazard mitigation grant programs (Table 2). A 
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state’s willingness to shoulder some or all of the non-federal match requirements 
influences the actions of local governments in two important, but sometimes 
contradictory, ways. For instance, as states assume more of the non-federal cost share, 
this can help low-income communities with high levels of socially vulnerable populations 
to participate in hazard mitigation grant programs that they may not be able to afford 
otherwise. However, cost sharing arrangements can also create a disincentive for local 
communities and individuals to adopt proactive hazard mitigation measures funded by 
local revenues or personal savings (May and Deyle 1998; Sylves 2008, p. 96). 
 
Table 2. Grant Matching Characteristics by State 















25% Varies by 
Community 





















* Enhanced state hazard mitigation plan status (as defined by FEMA) requires meeting higher standards of 
practice than a standard plan (no asterisk). 
 
In California, local government is expected to assume the non-federal match 
requirement, whereas in North Carolina the state picks up the non-federal match for the 
HMGP but not other mitigation programs. Florida requires local governments and 
individual property owners to assume a percent share of the non-federal match on a case-
by-case basis, whereas Georgia pays 10 percent of the match for HMGP projects in any 
counties that has been declared a federal disaster area. Texas does not provide the non-
federal share, relying instead on local governments to pick up the match for the retrofit of 
critical facilities and the homeowner to cover the non-federal share of housing related 
projects. In Washington, non-federal match procedures differ depending on the nature of 
the sub-grantee and the source of mitigation funding. For instance, if a state agency 
receives HMGP funding, the entire non-federal match is paid out of a state disaster 
response account, whereas when local communities receive HMGP funds, the county or 
municipality may pay all or half of the match depending on the nature of the project. In 
the case of hazard mitigation projects involving homeowners, some jurisdictions require 
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the homeowner to pay for half or all the non-federal match. For all other mitigation grants 
in Washington, local governments pay the non-federal share.  
 
State Delivery of Hazard Mitigation Planning Technical Assistance 
 
States provide planning support in a number of ways (Table 3). For instance, all states 
but Texas reported that they created manuals and guidebooks as a way to help inform 
local communities about hazard mitigation planning. All states host workshops and 
conferences to provide information and to conduct training of local officials, review local 
plans before their submittal to FEMA for approval, and furnish data for use in local plans. 
California, which noted that they did not provide direct planning assistance when 
questioned in the SHMO survey, later responded that they did offer assistance through 
the use of phone calls, email, and a web portal. California’s decision to provide this type 
of help may be due to the strong pre-existing planning culture in the state. However, 
when questioned about this, the SHMO noted that this approach reflects the size of the 
state, which has 58 counties, 500 cities, and over 5,000 special districts, each of which 
could develop a local hazard mitigation plan. At the time of the survey, the state had 700 
approved local hazard mitigation plans.  
Other techniques, such as the identification of best practices and hazards analysis 
training, are provided by the states of California and Florida, with Washington offering 
help with the latter. Georgia developed the Georgia Mitigation Information System 
(GMIS), a GIS-based tool that allows local governments to map and assess the 
vulnerability of critical facilities. The California Emergency Management Agency, 
working with California Natural Resource Agency and California Polytechnic 
University’s Planning Department faculty, has developed My Plan and My Hazards. My 
Plan is a centralized, GIS-based catalogue of hazards data for use in the development and 
update of local plans and My Hazards is an easy to use website that allows users to plug 
in a street address, zip code or other pertinent identifiers and get basic information on the 
hazards found in that area and potential mitigation measures that an individual, family or 
business owner might consider.  
Texas does not provide direct planning assistance to individual communities, but 
instead relies on group training sessions because the state comprises 254 counties. Texas 
works closely with a number of universities that assist with state-wide risk assessments, 
including the University of Texas (earthquake hazard analysis), Texas A&M University 
(hurricane) and Texas Tech University (tornado). Funds are provided to the universities 
to conduct analyses and host the information on a website so communities have ready 
access to the data. North Carolina has worked closely with faculty at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Department of City and Regional Planning since 1996. 
Guidebooks have been prepared for use in training and informing local officials about the  
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Table 3. State Delivery of Hazard Mitigation Technical Assistance 
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* Enhanced state hazard mitigation plan status (as defined by FEMA) requires meeting higher standards of 
practice than a standard plan (no asterisk). 
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planning process, including the application of land use planning tools and techniques to 
reduce future losses.  
Two types of state support were less prevalent or nonexistent, including serving on 
local planning committees and connecting local government officials with consultants or 
regional planning agencies. SHMOs cited the time consuming nature of this task and the 
potential appearance of favoritism as principal reasons for not serving on local 
committees. Although most state agencies are precluded from recommending private 
sector contractors, SHMOs said that they did inform local officials about the potential use 
of regional planning organizations to help them develop and implement hazard mitigation 
plans. This response coincides with other research findings that describe regional 
planning organizations as key stakeholders involved in the writing of local and regional 
hazard mitigation plans and the administration of hazard mitigation and disaster recovery 
grant programs (Deyle 1995; May and Deyle 1998, p. 75-78; Smith 2011, 112, p. 83-85).  
 
State Encouragement of Local Awareness and Commitment to Hazard Mitigation 
 
Increasing awareness of hazard risk at the community level remains one of hazard 
mitigation planning’s greatest challenges (Mileti 1999). Even though most states in our 
study utilize workshops and conferences and, to a lesser extent, the development of case 
studies that highlight best practices, several SHMOs mentioned a lack of general 
awareness of hazard mitigation at the community level. One SHMO described the issue 
of awareness in the following manner “We don’t want to walk into a room of people, no 
matter who they are, and say “How many of you know what mitigation is? And only have 
a few hands go up. We want all of the hands to go up.” Another SHMO noted that “I 
talked to an Emergency Management Coordinator who had been on the job for eighteen 
months and he didn’t know that there was a hazard mitigation plan in place in his county 
until he found it in a box and he had to go find out what the plan was and what it was 
for.”  
Citing what he called an all too common occurrence associated with high job turnover 
at the local level, an interview respondent lamented “Assistant Fire Chief Bill calls me up 
and says, I’m supposed to do something called a hazard mitigation plan. What is it?” 
After responding that it expires in a month, the chief’s response is “Well, how do I get 
me one of those plans? We can’t hire a new person so we’re not doing a plan unless you 
got a cookie cutter thing [plan].” The SHMO further stated that some local officials do 
not take the planning process seriously until a disaster strikes, realizing that a plan is 
required to access post-disaster mitigation funds. “You think it [developing a plan] was 
hard before the flood hit? How hard is it going to be after you’re the responder, the 
recovery person, and the mitigation planner and you were too busy before? How busy are 
you now? So it’s harder to plan now isn’t it?” 
SHMOs also expressed great frustration with many local governments for failing to 
embrace a greater commitment to the implementation of hazard mitigation measures, 
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including the reluctance of communities to use the results of the risk assessment found in 
their plans to drive the selection of hazard mitigation projects and policies. The 
comments of the SHMOs are comparable to findings uncovered by a meta-analysis of 
plan quality evaluations, including those that addressed hazard mitigation, in which the 
vulnerability science and locally derived mitigation actions were weak (Berke and 
Godschalk 2009; Berke and Smith 2009, p. 7).  
Following Hurricane Ike, which struck Texas in 2008, the state received $406 million 
in HMGP funds. During the same event, a Congressional appropriation targeting hazard 
mitigation activities totaled over $3.3 billion. Yet when queried about the quality of pre-
Ike hazard mitigation plans in Texas, the SHMO noted that their quality was poor and did 
not serve as a useful tool to pre-identify eligible projects funded by these two programs.  
According to SHMOs, a number of factors have hindered the ability of states to 
increase awareness and commitment to hazard mitigation at the local level, including an 
overreliance on consultants, a lack of hazard mitigation awareness among citizens and 
elected officials, and the inability to identify a local advocate for hazard mitigation. 
Several SHMOs noted that the widespread use of consultants has hindered the planning 
process, often leading to a lower level of local investment in the development of a plan. 
Relying on a third party to do the plan has the potential to further distance local officials 
from the process, including the time required to garner public involvement and gain a 
deeper understanding of hazard vulnerability. Consultants can perpetuate mediocrity as 
they seek to do the minimum required to meet FEMA standards while still “breaking 
even” or garnering a profit from what often amount to low-cost planning grants. As one 
SHMO explained, “A contractor-driven plan [represents] the shortest distance between 
two points, achieving the minimum standards required by FEMA while ensuring they get 
paid. The result is a plan that has limited public involvement or clear connections 
between the risk assessment and the identification of local projects.”  
In Texas, 35% of the HMGP selection criteria are based on whether the project 
applied for can be found in the applicant’s hazard mitigation plan. Even though this 
requirement is widely advertised during state HMGP and local hazard mitigation 
planning training sessions, only 5% of applicants comply with this policy. Local flood 
control districts in Texas have consistently adhered to this state policy and as a result 
HMGP projects are disproportionately awarded to this group. SHMOs also described 
cases in which consultants, local emergency managers, or others tasked with the 
development of plans are told by elected officials not to identify specific hazard 
mitigation projects or propose new policies as this might require a community to take 
action or be held liable for failing to do so before a disaster.  
In an effort to increase awareness and commitment to hazard mitigation, California 
created the Statewide Mitigation Assessment Review Team (SMART). SMART 
comprises a group of state university faculty that conduct post-disaster assessments of 
completed hazard mitigation projects to document the losses that were avoided due to the 
  
Smith et al.: Mitigation Planning Capacity 
192 
implementation of the projects before the event in question. According to the California 
SHMO, the results of SMART serve as an important tool to help publicize the value of 
hazard mitigation to those that may be skeptical of participating in such planning efforts.  
North Carolina also developed a process to document losses avoided after two major 
hurricanes struck the eastern third of the state in the mid- and late-1990s, causing major 
flooding and the large-scale relocation of flood-prone housing. Two “success story” 
documents were created, one that qualitatively outlined the hazard mitigation programs 
and policies in place following the first disaster, and a second document that quantified 
the monetary savings achieved in those locations that were flooded for a second time 
where houses had since been elevated or relocated (State of North Carolina 1999, 2000). 
The two documents were intended to stimulate a dialogue among state and local 
government officials about the role of hazard mitigation framed within a larger 
conversation about sustainable development and convey the importance of integrating 
hazard mitigation into their day-to-day activities (1999, p. 5).  
When asked about what made states and local governments successful, SHMOs 
routinely cited the presence of an advocate that not only understood the technical nature 
of hazard mitigation planning and its connectivity to grants management and land use, 
but perhaps more importantly, how to build and maintain diverse coalitions. According to 
SHMOs, successful plans and the hazard mitigation strategies they contain tended to be 
the result of a long-term commitment to generating interest, garnering political support, 
identifying differing technical experts, delivering sound guidance, conducting training 
programs, and providing data that support local efforts.  
 
State Encouragement of Local Land Use Planning 
 
When asked about the connectivity between hazard mitigation and land use planning, 
SHMOs reported that they encouraged local governments to address the issue; indeed 
many states require some type of policy integration through hazards mapping and other 
agency policies (e.g., growth management, comprehensive land use planning, local safety 
element). Yet when pressed, all SHMOs noted that land use was not adequately 
addressed in local hazard mitigation plans, even in those states with strong “planning 
contexts” (e.g., Florida and North Carolina) or those states that maintain efforts to 
encourage multi-objective planning through training and outreach programs.  
According to SHMOs, most local governments sought to meet the minimum hazard 
mitigation planning criteria established by FEMA, which does not contain explicit land 
use requirements. The comments provided by SHMOs support research that has found 
that local hazard mitigation plans do not effectively confront land use issues (Burby and 
May 1997; Deyle Chapin and Baker 2008; National Research Council 2006; Olshansky 
and Kartez 1998). These findings have remained true over time, even as the quality of 
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local hazard plans has improved following the passage of the DMA (National Research 
Council  2006; Berke and Smith 2009).  
One SHMO noted that, although the state’s Growth Management Act requires the 
identification and mapping of flood and geological hazard areas, the development of 
regulations intended to limit growth in these locales is a politically charged decision that 
leads to a great deal of variability in the extent to which state regulations translate to 
action at the community level. Further, the SHMO noted that the degree to which this 
information is integrated into local hazard mitigation plans also varies. In part, this is due 
to the limited interaction between local land use planners involved in the implementation 
of the Growth Management Act and local emergency managers who typically lead hazard 
mitigation planning activities in their respective counties and communities. The lack of 
coordination between local emergency managers and land use planners was documented 
before the passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act (Kartez and Faupel 1994) and it 
remains a serious problem (Smith 2009b, p. 262-263). More recent research has argued 
that land use planners need to become more committed to hazard mitigation if land use 
measures are to be used for this purpose (Stevens 2010). 
In a disconcerting statement about the quality of hazard mitigation planning and the 
DMA more generally, one SHMO stated that, given the current condition of local plans 
(i.e., the poor connectivity between plans and mitigation projects and the limited 
application of land use), he wouldn’t be surprised if the program were discontinued given 
the large expenditures on planning and the poor results that have resulted. Although this 
comment reflects a highly pessimistic outlook regarding the future of the DMA and its 
associated policies, the broader findings of our research team have found that many 
indicators of plan quality and states’ efforts to build local capacity and commitment to 
hazard mitigation planning are improving, albeit slowly, given the span of time that the 
DMA has been in place. The degree to which national hazard mitigation policy continues 
to evolve, including the development of strategies aimed at the more effective integration 





This article has described the role that states play in building local capacity to develop 
and implement local hazard mitigation plans and policies. The findings suggest that states 
have made some progress since the last state-level analysis of hazard mitigation planning 
and capacity-building initiatives was conducted in 1999. However, more than 10 years 
after the passage of the DMA, several important issues continue to affect the ability of 
states to assist local governments in building robust hazard mitigation plans and 
integrated risk reduction policies. 
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The study findings indicate that states maintain a wide variation in state capacity and 
commitment to support local hazard mitigation activities, including that which is 
influenced by disaster-based funding. States also tend to emphasize building local 
governments’ capacities to gain access to project funding rather than focusing on helping 
them identify and establish a comprehensive, proactive, and sustained risk reduction 
strategy grounded in land use policy. In addition, state land use policies are not well 
integrated into state hazard mitigation plans and capacity building initiatives. Finally, 
state mitigation officials believe that most local governments do not possess the capacity 
or commitment necessary to develop sound hazard mitigation plans or administer hazard 
mitigation grants. These findings, which have important policy implications and merit 
attention from FEMA as well as state agencies tasked with hazard mitigation policy and 
local capacity building initiatives, are discussed next.  
The indicators of state capability, including staffing dedicated to grants management, 
planning, and outreach; funding of state programs and non-federal match requirements; 
and state-level policies and programs vary significantly among the states queried in this 
study. The high degree of variation is due to a number of factors, including fluctuations 
associated with the federal funding of staff positions following a major disaster; a state’s 
past history of disasters; and a state’s commitment to hazard mitigation as evidenced by 
their willingness to pay for non-federal match requirements, create permanent positions, 
and maintain state mitigation programs over time.  
The ability of states to translate federal hazard mitigation policy into local planning 
efforts is closely associated with the indicators of state capability described in the 
previous paragraph. These measures are supplemented by the more specific delivery of 
planning support, including the widespread use of planning manuals, the hosting of 
workshops and other training venues, and the provision of data. The ability of these 
measures and processes to build local capacity appears somewhat limited, as low levels 
of local capacity and commitment were regularly cited as a major problem, regardless of 
the state-level capacity-building efforts in place. When pressed during individual phone 
interviews, SHMOs also noted the magnitude of the task before them and cited the need 
for more staff to engage in expanded education and outreach efforts.  
SHMOs also noted that disjointed federal hazard mitigation policies, including state 
and local planning standards established by FEMA, strongly influence states’ actions. As 
a result, SHMOs tend to focus their technical assistance efforts on assisting local 
governments develop plans that enable access to hazard mitigation funds. Less emphasis 
is placed on a more systematic attempt to incorporate land use tools and techniques into 
local hazard mitigation plans. The SHMOs’ descriptions of local governments’ emphasis 
on the identification of hazard mitigation projects versus the application of land use 
planning measures is similarly reflected in the research literature. Factors affecting the 
reluctance of local governments to adopt preventative measures include challenges 
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associated with property rights, environmental management, and economic development 
pressures (National Research Council 2006).  
The SHMOs interviewed in this study all said that they encourage local governments 
to incorporate land use planning techniques into their hazard mitigation plans. This 
information is conveyed in training programs and found in manuals developed by states. 
SHMOs also noted that very few local hazard mitigation plans effectively linked land use 
and hazard risk reduction, even in those states that maintain strong land use laws or 
require the incorporation of hazard elements into local comprehensive plans. SHMOs 
cited a number of reasons for this outcome, including local officials striving to meet 
minimal federal standards (that do not require a land use component); local plans being 
predominantly led by emergency managers rather than land use planners; and state 
emergency management officials responsible for the development of State Hazard 
Mitigation Plans having failed to develop integrated policies in partnership with other 





A common thread binding the recommendations that follow is the need to enhance 
states’ capacity to better fulfill their critical role as the lynchpin in the larger national 
hazard mitigation planning and policy milieu.  
 
Improve States’ Ability to Carry Out State Mitigation Goals 
 
The variation in capabilities across states and over time has important policy 
implications that should be recognized and addressed through improved state and 
national hazard mitigation policy. Specific changes should focus on the sustained 
provision of pre-event resources to states to better carry out state hazard mitigation goals 
tied to improved capacity building delivery mechanisms and inter-agency coordination. 
This recommendation represents an important counterpoint to the current set of federal 
policies that have led to an overreliance on post-disaster assistance, including hazard 
mitigation (Smith 2011).  
The rise and fall of state capabilities, as evidenced by changing staff levels, does not 
allow for a consistent approach that emphasizes the importance of pre-event hazard 
mitigation planning, policy making, and local capacity building initiatives. Rather, the 
post-disaster influx of funds and associated positions encourages the adoption of reactive 
state tactics, driven in large part by the desire to obtain and process post-disaster hazard 
mitigation funds that are largely used to address mistakes made in the past, not 
necessarily adopt a forward looking, anticipatory, and long-term strategy that embraces 
land use as a central element (Berke and Smith 2009; Smith 2009a).  
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Although the DMA has placed greater requirements on state officials, the availability 
of federal funds to hire additional permanent staff has not kept pace, remaining 
essentially the same since the creation of the federally funded SHMO position following 
the passage of the Robert T. Stafford Act in 1988. To address identified shortfalls in state 
capacity, this should change. Although the number of state hazard mitigation staff have 
increased significantly since the Godschalk et al. (1999) study of hazard mitigation, much 
of this growth is found in states that have experienced repeated large-scale events that 
trigger post-disaster administrative funds used to hire staff on a temporary basis. States 
have also begun to fund permanent positions and this approach should be commended 
and pursued when possible. Federal assistance or funds derived from other relevant 
stakeholders, such as the insurance industry, should be used to leverage these state-led 
efforts.  
States have developed a range of hazard mitigation policies and programs, including 
those that provide local governments with needed data and training, target gaps in federal 
hazard mitigation assistance, and address land use. To improve their efficacy, avoid 
duplication, and leverage available resources, these policies should be better integrated 
into State Hazard Mitigation Plans. Through better state agency coordination across those 
agencies that manage hazard mitigation-related programs, the more effective delivery of 
training, education, and other forms of local capacity building should follow. This is 
particularly true in those cases where state agencies maintain land use planners and 
oversee programs that contain land use requirements. 
 
Increase the Emphasis States Place on Encouraging the Application of Land Use 
Policies, Tools, and Techniques in Local Hazard Mitigation Plans 
 
In the face of the contextual conditions described up to this point, both local and state 
government officials should better utilize available resources to advance a land use 
planning agenda that embraces hazard mitigation. Examples include the more active 
involvement of local land use planners in the hazard mitigation planning process and the 
more effective participation of state agencies tasked with land use policies and programs.  
Many local officials continue to believe that hazard mitigation planning is an 
emergency manager’s responsibility, whereas land use planners may not recognize the 
important role they have to play in this process (Smith 2009b, p. 262-263). Addressing 
these faulty assumptions requires actively soliciting the participation of land use 
planners; educating local elected officials about how a good hazard mitigation plan draws 
on the expertise of land use planners, emergency management officials, and others in a 
larger hazard mitigation network; and using widely accepted land use tools and 
techniques (e.g., site design, codes and standards, public investments, land suitability 
analyses, zoning, subdivision ordinances, etc.) to better address current and projected 
hazard vulnerabilities. Emphasizing a more balanced approach takes advantage of the fact 
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that local emergency managers often have a good understanding of areas prone to hazards 
(based on past experience), and tend to have a direct working relationship with state 
emergency management agencies (where SHMOs are located and hazard mitigation 
funds are administered). By contrast, land use planners are trained in plan making and the 
application of land use planning techniques to address community goals.  
A similar lack of coordination was found to exist at the state level. This condition 
should be rectified by improving the partnership between state emergency management 
agencies and those who manage state programs that contain a land use policy element. 
Tangible actions should include the development of more integrated state policy 
frameworks and the development of joint training programs conducted by SHMOs and 
other state agency officials.  
 
Foster State-Level Advocacy Tied to Embracing the Original Intent of the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000.  
 
State agencies responsible for hazard mitigation activities should take a more active 
role in advocating for changes in the DMA, as the current rules do not place a sufficient 
emphasis on policies and capacity building initiatives that empower responsible parties to 
achieve the original intent of the Act. For instance, current federal mitigation policy 
neither provides the pre-event resources needed to strengthen state and local capacity nor 
instills a sincere and sustained commitment to hazard mitigation beyond the minimal 
standards that have become an all too common criterion of mediocrity. As currently 
interpreted and administered, the DMA’s enabling rules continue to foster state and local 
dependence on post-disaster grant programs rather than building increased levels of self-
reliance achieved, in part, through good hazard mitigation practices grounded in proven 
land use planning techniques.  
Advocating higher standards should be linked to the reallocation of federal, state, and 
local resources that are required to build and sustain the capacity of local governments 
and the larger network of relevant stakeholders needed to meet this higher policy 
threshold. However, any attempt to increase standards without building greater federal, 
state, and local capacity and commitment to these proposed changes in policy will result 
in the overall weakening of a program that still has unrealized potential, even though it 
was created more than ten years ago. The ability to change the current trend of escalating 
disaster losses in the US requires that local governments take greater ownership of its 
responsibility to reduce hazard risks through land use planning, states recommit their 
efforts to deliver the capacity building resources needed to accomplish this aim, and the 
federal government establish a set of coordinated policies that facilitate this process. 
 
  




1. As this article was nearing submission, the funds normally allocated to the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program were assimilated into the National Preparedness Grant 
Program (NPGP), which is an amalgamation of several emergency management 
grants. While the intent of this effort is to streamline most FEMA-sponsored grants, 
many have expressed concern that the PDM program as it currently exists is slated 
for elimination and that future hazard mitigation grant applications sought through 
the NPGP may be harder to obtain, as they would now compete with other disaster 
response-oriented applications (American Planning Association 2012; National 
Hazard Mitigation Association 2012). 
2. An enhanced plan enables states to receive more HMGP funds than those states that 
maintain a standard hazard mitigation plan. In most cases, the amount of HMGP 
funds received by a state that maintains a standard mitigation plan are based on 15 
percent of total federal disaster costs whereas states that possess an enhanced plan 
receive an allocation of HMGP funds equal to 20 percent of total federal disaster 
costs. 
3. In 2013, FEMA created the National Hazard Mitigation Framework. The degree to 
which the framework addresses the issues noted in this paper, other research, and the 
input of state and local officials merits close attention. 
4. Each state maintains a federally-funded SHMO position that is responsible for the 
oversight and administration of state hazard mitigation planning and grants 
management activities as well as providing technical assistance to local governments.  
5. Following federally-declared disasters, states are provided, as part of HMGP 
administrative costs, funding to manage the grant program. These funds may be used 
to hire staff and contractors, conduct training, rent office space, travel to relevant 
events such as conferences and workshops, purchase equipment, or conduct other 
activities pursuant to an administrative plan that is agreed to by FEMA. 
6. In another study conducted by our research team, we found that that North Carolina’s 
incentive-based approach resulted in higher quality local hazard mitigation plans 
when compared to Florida’s more regulatory approach (Berke, Lyles and Smith 
2011). 
7. FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) program funds a number of post-disaster response 
and recovery efforts including state and local personnel costs associated with 
managing response and recovery programs, debris removal, and the repair of 
damaged infrastructure. The post-disaster application of the PA “406” program, 
which can be used to incorporate hazard mitigation measures into the repair or 
reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, varies significantly across states.  
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There has been renewed interest in radiological preparedness and countermeasures for 
nuclear power plant (NPP) emergencies in the United States as a result of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident in March 2011.  One such countermeasure, potassium iodide (KI), was 
voluntarily pre-distributed to households in a central North Carolina community living 
within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a NPP in 2010. The goal of this 
study was to evaluate household KI coverage among EPZ residents following this pre-
distribution campaign, as well as to assess knowledge and beliefs about KI. A guided 
interview and self-administered questionnaire was administered to a random sample of 
177 EPZ households.  Findings indicate four months post-distribution that this program 
resulted in low household KI coverage rates (< 5%) and low KI knowledge levels. 
Results demonstrate the need for improved KI pre-distribution and education strategies 
targeting households within the designated 10-mile EPZ.   
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The March 2011 Japan earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent nuclear crisis at the 
Fukushima Daiichi plant has resulted in renewed interest in radiological preparedness 
countermeasures for nuclear power plant (NPP) emergencies in the United States. 
Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) closely examined emergency planning measures to protect the public during an 
NPP emergency. Emergency actions recommended by the NRC include evacuation, 
sheltering, and the supplemental use of potassium iodide (KI) among populations living 
within a 10-mile radius of the NPP accident site (USNRC, 10 CFR 50.47(a) (1)). KI has 
been shown to lower the risk of thyroid cancer after radioactive iodine exposure 
especially among exposed children (National Research Council 2004; Verger et al. 
2001).1 Radioactive iodine (I-131) is one of several radioactive isotopes that may be 
released after an NPP emergency. Since the timing of the administration of KI is critical 
for its protective effect (prior to exposure), emergency officials in many communities 
have advocated for pre-event distribution (“pre-distribution”) to households that are near 
a NPP. Indeed, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) began encouraging states, 
in 2001, to distribute KI to populations within a 10-mile radius of NPPs as a protective 
measure intended to supplement more important response activities, such as sheltering 
and evacuation, in the unlikely event of a severe NPP accident. 
In the decade since the NRC rule became effective, states with NPPs have taken a 
variety of approaches to the distribution of KI within the 10-mile Emergency Planning 
Zone (EPZ). Although a few states predominantly rely upon post-incident distribution, 
most accompany their post-incident distribution plans with robust pre-distribution 
programs (National Research Council 2004). The states that choose to pre-distribute KI 
generally delegate responsibility for the pre-distribution program to state and local public 
health agencies that coordinate with other agencies in their jurisdictions to maximize KI 
pre-distribution. KI pre-distribution methods used by states vary and have included 
distribution by mail to EPZ households, one-time or rolling distribution at designated 
community sites and, rarely, door-to-door distribution (Blando et al. 2007a; Blando et al. 
2007b; Carney et al. 2003; Fowinkle et al. 1983). 
Pre-distribution methods have been used with varying levels of success. A review of 
KI pre-distribution campaigns demonstrated household KI coverage rates in the 10-mile 
EPZ ranging from 3% to 70% (National Research Council 2004), though most reported 
coverage rates were based on household receipt of KI and not whether it was retained in 
the household afterward. Few studies estimate actual KI household coverage rates 
through a household survey conducted months to years after a pre-distribution campaign. 
In one study, conducted in the United Kingdom, a 40% decrease in KI household 
coverage was found two years after distribution (Astbury et al. 1999). 
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In North Carolina, pre-distribution of KI is managed by the North Carolina Division 
of Public Health (NC DPH) and the eleven local health departments (LHDs) having 
populations in the 10-mile EPZ of the state’s four NPPs. Local and state health officials 
coordinate the pre-distribution of KI and develop public education campaigns to assure 
proper usage of KI in the event of a nuclear emergency. The LHDs actively pre-distribute 
KI for stockpiling to schools, daycare facilities, businesses and other institutions within 
the 10-mile EPZ. The pre-distribution of KI to EPZ households, however, is conducted 
through a voluntary method that asks residents to obtain KI at distribution centers on one 
or two designated days. A pre-distribution initiative that took place at one North Carolina 
(NC) EPZ in May 2010 offered an opportunity to evaluate the short-term success of this 
household distribution method and the accompanying educational campaign. 
In May 2010, KI tablets were made available at no charge to residents of four NC 
counties within the 10-mile EPZ on designated weekend days at distribution centers 
located at schools and fire departments. Informational literature on KI (e.g., fact sheets) 
that were developed by NC DPH and the LHD were provided to each EPZ resident that 
picked up KI tablets. Prior to the distribution days, each LHD issued a press release and 
advertised the location of the distribution centers in local newspapers and on their county 
government web sites. The tablets provided in May 2010 replaced tablets distributed to 
10-mile EPZ residents in 2002 and 2003, which were beyond the expected shelf life of 
five years.2 While LHD pre-distribution of KI to large institutions (e.g., schools, 
childcare facilities and businesses) in the 10-mile EPZ took place concurrently with the 
household distribution, this supply was not distributed through the distribution centers 
and was not assessed in this study. 
The goal of this study was to determine the KI pill household coverage rates for EPZ 
residents and assess their knowledge and beliefs related to KI use. The University of 
North Carolina Center for Public Health Preparedness (UNC CPHP) at the UNC Gillings 
School of Global Public Health partnered with NC DPH to conduct a household-level 




The EPZ study area is 330 square miles within four counties in central North Carolina 
(Figure 1). Based on the 2000 US Census, the population in the 10-mile EPZ was 58,524 
persons. However, the EPZ has experienced a 77% increase in population over the last 
decade with the current population estimated at 103,566 persons (2010 US Census). 
To assess KI coverage, a community population-based sample in the NC EPZ was 
selected using the 30 x 7 EPI cluster sampling method; 30 census blocks were randomly 
selected based on probability proportionate to population and seven households were 
randomly selected within each block for interviews (Malilay, Flanders, and Brogan 
1996). This method was first developed in the 1960s as a tool for LHDs to conduct rapid 
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assessments of immunization coverage (Serfling and Sherman 1965). The sampling 
method was adopted by the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Expanded Program 
on Immunization (EPI) and later by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) for use in responses to natural disasters (Henderson and Sundaresan 1982; Malilay 
et al. 1996). This efficient sampling scheme has been validated and used effectively for 
rapid assessment and estimation of a variety of population-level public health needs 
(Frerichs and Shaheen 2001; Henderson and Sundaresan 1982). The 30 x 7 sampling 
approach was used in this survey to allow accurate estimates of KI pill coverage within 
the entire EPZ. The selection process was automated using a Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS)-based survey site selection toolkit developed by NC DPH in ESRI 
ArcMap 9 (Redlands, CA). 
 
Figure 1. Map of the 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Study Site,  
North Carolina, 2010 
 
 
The sampling frame included census blocks whose centroid (geometric center) lies 
within the 10-mile EPZ. Households that were outside the 10-mile EPZ were excluded 
from the study. Census blocks with fewer than 10 households were excluded from the 
sampling frame in order to ensure that an adequate number of respondents could be 
reached in each block. Only individuals 18 years old or older who resided in the 
household and provided oral informed consent were eligible for inclusion in the study. 
Surveys were conducted between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. on Friday, 
September 17 and 24 and Saturday, September 18, 2010, via in-person interviews with 
one adult member of each selected household. Two-person interview teams, including 
student volunteers from UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health’s Team Epi-Aid 
program (MacDonald 2005), six UNC CPHP staff members, and one LHD representative 
received training on the use of the handheld computers for data collection and 
standardized data collection practices prior to deployment. 
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Prior to administration, survey materials were reviewed, piloted, and pre-tested by 
LHD officials, North Carolina regional public health preparedness team members, and 
members of a local-area task force (a preparedness committee composed of emergency 
management, law enforcement, public health and utility representatives). All survey 
materials were translated into Spanish for census blocks with large Hispanic populations 
(>25%) based on 2000 US Census data and Spanish-speaking team members were 
deployed to these census blocks. This research was reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Gillings 
School of Global Public Health (#10-1527). 
The survey assessment tool had two parts: a guided interview with a total of 20 
possible questions and a self-administered questionnaire with 14 questions. The data were 
collected electronically at the time the interview was conducted; responses were recorded 
on a handheld GPS unit by field team members. The questions were designed for three 
groups—households that received KI tablets during the May 2010 distribution, 
households that had received KI tablets prior to the May 2010 distribution, and 
households that had never received KI tablets. The guided interview portion of the survey 
incorporated skip patterns to facilitate interviewing these three groups. Other questions 
probed residents about their knowledge of the KI distribution in May 2010, as well as 
their sources of information about nuclear emergencies and preferred distribution 
methods for KI. 
All respondents were asked to complete a self-administered questionnaire evaluating 
residential household knowledge of KI and indications for its use. Administered on a note 
card, the questionnaire consisted of five general knowledge questions (three true/false 
and two multiple choice) adapted from a previous community survey of KI knowledge 
(Blando et al. 2007). Additional multiple choice questions assessed behavioral intentions, 
including multiple-choice response about where someone might find KI and what they 
would initially do following a radiological event. Residents were also asked to rate their 
concern for a NPP accident as well as other local hazards on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
no concern at all to 5 = very concerned). Limited demographic data, including year of 
birth, race, education, household size, and length of residency were also collected. To 
check awareness of the 10-mile EPZ, residents were asked to confirm that they lived in 
the 10-Mile EPZ of an NPP, i.e. “do you live in the 10-mile EPZ,” along with a response 
option of “don’t know”. Note cards were perforated, allowing interviewers to take the 
completed survey and respondents to retain information about KI, the study and contact 
information for the local health department liaison to obtain KI. Data from the note cards 
were recorded by the interview team on the handheld unit immediately after the interview 
to minimize data loss. 
Univariate and bivariate analyses were performed to identify associations between 
demographic and EPZ related effects, including length of residency, awareness of EPZ 
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residency, and receipt of KI. All statistical analyses were conducted in R (R Development 
Core Team 2010). 
Results 
 
A total of 475 households were visited in the population-based survey and contact 
was made with 240 eligible households (51%). Excluded or ineligible households 
included those who were not home or did not answer the door (n = 223) and those who 
either did not live in the residence or were under the age of 18 (n = 12). Of the 240 
eligible households, individuals from 177 households consented to the survey yielding a 
response rate of 74% (177/240). Among the households excluded were those who refused 
to participate (n = 61) or where there was a language barrier (n = 2). In addition, 172 of 
the 177 households who were interviewed completed the self-administered questionnaire. 
The demographic characteristics of the surveyed population were generally 
comparable to the demographic profile for this area as determined by the 2000 US 
Census (Table 1—Note: 2010 US Census demographic data was not available at the time 
of the study). However, the age of the study sample was older and the median household 
size was larger than would be expected based on 2000 US Census data. The median 
reported age of the study sample was 49, which ranged from 18 to 90 years. The racial 
composition of survey participants was similar to the distribution of 2000 Census data. 
More than half of the survey respondents reported they had a college degree. The median 
length of residency in the 10-mile EPZ for the study sample was eight years (range: 1-60 
years). 
 
KI Distribution and Education 
 
In all, nine respondents (5.1%) reported that they or someone in their household had 
received KI tablets during the May 2010 distribution, with an additional 18 respondents 
(10.2%) reporting having received KI at a prior time (Figure 2). Approximately 95% of 
respondents (168/177) said they had not received or did not know if their household had 
received KI during the May 2010 distribution. Of these, approximately 85% (150/168) 
reported never having received KI. Among the 27 respondents that received KI in May 
2010 or at another time, 17 indicated that they still were in possession of it in the 
household). This results in an actual KI household coverage rate of slightly less than 10% 
(17/177). 
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Table 1. Comparison of Demographics  
between the KI Survey and 2000 US Census Data 
  KI Survey 2000 US Census 
Gender   
 Male 49.7 % 49.4% 
 Female 50.3 % 50.6% 
Age1   
 20-24 years old 2.3% 6.0% 
 25-34 years old 14.1% 23.4% 
 35-44 years old 16.9% 18.1% 
 45-54 years old 22.0% 10.9% 
 55-59 years old 9.6% 3.2% 
 60 years old and over 21.5% 11.7% 
Race/ethnicity   
 White 76.7 % 75.9% 
 Black/African American 14.0 % 15.2% 
 Hispanic 5.8 % 3.6% 
 Other2 3.5 % 3.9% 
Household Size (median) 3.0 2.0 
1. There were 21 respondents who did not report their age and 3 respondents (1.7%) under 
the age of 20. 
2. “Other” category includes Asian (n = 1), American Indian (n = 1), Hawaiian (n = 1), and 
those who also reported “other” during the survey (n = 4).  
 
When asked if they would obtain KI tablets, 40% (60/150) of the respondents who 
never received KI tablets indicated that they would obtain KI in the future. The most 
often cited reason for not obtaining KI tablets for themselves and their family was a low 
level of concern about a radioiodine release from the NPP. Additional reasons for not 
obtaining KI included an inconvenience to pick up, availability through a workplace or 
school stockpile, as well as safety concerns. 
Each respondent was asked, “What do you think would be the best way for local 
health officials to distribute KI to you? Out of 177 households, 41% (n = 72) preferred KI 
tablets to be distributed in the mail, whereas 24% (n = 43) preferred the current 
distribution sites at schools or fire departments and 20% (n = 35) preferred to receive KI 
through a physician’s office or local pharmacy (Figure 3). Approximately 10% (n = 19) of 
respondents also noted “other” methods of distribution, including door-to-door delivery 
and distribution at businesses and college campuses. 
Additional questions were asked about expected individual response to a nuclear 
emergency. When asked what would be the first thing that they would do in the event of a 
nuclear accident at the nearby NPP, most residents (n = 151; 89%) indicated that they 
would evacuate or listen for emergency announcements. Residents were also asked about 
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locations where they thought they might be able to get KI, if there was an emergency. Of 
the 172 who responded to this “check all that apply question,” 36% (n = 62) did not know 
where they might be able to get KI tablets, whereas 40% (n = 69) believed they would be 
able to get KI from their local health department. The remainder believed they could 
obtain KI tablets from a hospital emergency room (n = 40, 23%), a fire department (n = 
33, 19%), or other locations, including the American Red Cross and shelters (n = 3, 2%). 
Figure 2. Receipt and Retainment of KI Pills among Surveyed 10-mile EPZ 





Figure 3. Preferred KI Distribution Method Reported  
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Four of 172 (2%) respondents were able to correctly answer all five KI knowledge-
based questions. A majority of respondents replied “don’t know” in their responses to 
these questions. In a comparison between those that had received KI tablets versus those 
who did not, those households who had obtained KI tablets performed significantly better 
on the knowledge assessment than those who had never received KI (Spearman’s rho (ρ) 
= 0.19, p < 0.05). As indicated in Table 2, age (ρ = 0.17, p < 0.05) and length of 
residence (ρ = 0.172, p < 0.05) were found to be positively correlated with knowledge of 
potassium iodide, along with EPZ awareness (ρ = 0.23, p < 0.01). Gender and education 
were not significantly correlated with knowledge, but there were differences among racial 
and ethnic groups. The average knowledge of KI among White, non-Hispanic, 
respondents was found to be positively correlated (ρ = 0.20, p < 0.01), whereas 
knowledge among non-Hispanic African-American respondents was found to be 
negatively correlated (ρ = -0.17, p < 0.05). However, overall knowledge of KI among 
respondents was low—a mean response among non-Hispanic Whites of 1.75 (less than 
two of five questions correctly) and among non-Hispanic African-Americans of one of 
five. 
 
Table 2. Correlations of Residents Potassium Iodide Knowledge to Demographic 
and EPZ Effects in North Carolina, 2010 
Variables Knowledge of Potassium Iodide 
Demographics  
Age+    0.17* 
Gender (Female)  -0.18 





     0.20** 
   -0.17* 
Hispanic    0.02 
Other    0.03 
EPZ Effects  
Length of residence+     0.17* 
EPZ Awareness       0.23** 
Received KI      0.19* 
n = 170   
Significance levels: * p< 0.05, ** p < 0.01  
+ Pearson’s r;  Spearman’s Rho 
 
Awareness, Communication, and Concern 
 
With regard to the distribution in May 2010, 58% (n = 97) of respondents who had 
not received KI during the May 2010 distribution reported that they had not heard about 
the distribution opportunity. As a follow-up to this response, respondents were also asked 
about the best ways in which LHDs and other officials could distribute information about 
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KI to them. A majority of respondents (59%) prefer to receive information and 
communication about KI from LHDs through the mail, while others preferred email 
(26%), telephone (25%), television (14%), and other methods (21%), such as radio, 
newspaper, or text messaging (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Preferred Methods of Communication about KI Distribution  
Reported by EPZ Residents, North Carolina, 2010 (n = 97)* 
 
* Total respondents are those EPZ residents who were unaware of the May 2010 KI distribution. 
 
Regardless of KI receipt, household representatives were also asked to identify all 
possible sources from which they received most of their information about nuclear 
emergencies and the use of KI. On average, respondents reported two different sources of 
information (range: 1-8 sources). The five primary sources included the power company 
that owns the NPP (33%), television (29%), mail (24%), online (21%), as well as “other” 
sources, including pamphlets, school handouts, and signage (19%). 
Residents were asked how concerned they were about local hazards affecting them in 
the next five years, including flooding, NPP accident, ice storms, tornadoes, hurricanes, 
and terrorist attacks. Only 34 out of 159 (21%) respondents reported a high level of 
concern (4 or 5 on a scale of 1-5) for any of the hazards, whereas 90 (56%) expressed 
very little or no concern (1 or 2). Respondents were more concerned (4 or 5) about ice 
storms (35%) and hurricanes (34%), than they were about a NPP accident (22%) in their 
local environment. In fact, respondents rated NPP accidents as one of their lowest 
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accident were also reflected in a related question in which respondents asked whether 
they lived within ten miles of a NPP. Twenty six percent (44 of 170) were not sure 
whether they lived in the 10-mile EPZ and twelve residents (7%) reported they did not 
live in the 10-mile EPZ. Length of residency, however, was directly correlated to 
knowledge of EPZ residency (ρ = 0.21; p < 0.01) with newer residents less likely to 
confirm EPZ residency than residents who had lived in the EPZ for longer than the 




Our findings indicate that the voluntary KI pre-distribution program was associated 
with low household coverage rates in one North Carolina EPZ four months after 
distribution. Very few EPZ residents received KI during the May 2010 distribution and 
even fewer reported that they could locate their stockpile at the time of the survey 
(September 2010). While the large majority of residents in this EPZ reported they have 
never received KI, a significant number of residents interviewed indicated that they 
would obtain KI in the future, suggesting that there is a demand for KI that has not been 
met with the existing distribution method. Only a third of our respondents reported 
hearing about the May 2010 distribution opportunity. A change in marketing techniques 
and promotion of the designated dates and locations of KI distribution centers may 
increase household KI coverage rates. Targeted communication to 10-mile EPZ residents 
is likely to be more successful than broad messaging. For example, one respondent 
suggested that a way to improve awareness of designated KI distribution locations was to 
use automated notification systems (e.g., Reverse-9-1-1) to selectively alert 10-mile EPZ 
residents to KI distribution opportunities in their area. 
Over 40% of EPZ residents expressed preferences for an alternative to the current 
distribution model, notably receipt of KI through the mail. While the distribution of KI 
through the mail has been used in some jurisdictions, it may not be feasible for most 
LHDs who receive no federal or state funding to offset the cost of their KI distribution 
activities. Pre-distribution of KI through the mail is associated with higher household 
coverage rates than the single distribution site method used in this case (National 
Research Council 2004), but there is little long-term data on whether KI is readily 
accessible at home in the years after initial distribution. Cost-effectiveness studies are 
needed to compare per household costs of providing KI through various KI pre-
distribution methods (e.g., mail, community distribution) to offer LHDs practical 
guidance on how to increase KI coverage most efficiently. 
Findings from the survey also suggest that a lack of demand for KI among EPZ 
residents may play a role in the observed low coverage rates. The knowledge assessment 
revealed that most EPZ residents did not have a basic understanding of KI and its use. 
EPZ residents are unlikely to demand countermeasures that are not well understood. Our 
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results suggest a need for improved communication and education about KI. Some EPZ 
residents rated an NPP accident as their lowest level concern as compared with 
meteorological hazards such as hurricanes, tornadoes and ice storms. These residents may 
not be interested in obtaining KI tablets through any distribution method employed by the 
LHD. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that most EPZ residents considered evacuation and 
listening to emergency announcements as their primary response actions after an NPP 
accident. Our survey did not investigate knowledge of evacuation plans and routes, but it 
is important to note that KI is a supplemental countermeasure to evacuation of the 10-
mile EPZ in most NPP accident scenarios. 
Nearly one-third of 10-mile EPZ residents did not know or were not sure whether 
they lived in the 10-mile radius of a NPP. This lack of basic knowledge among a 
significant minority of EPZ residents highlights the need for improved communication 
and education about the NPP’s location and its implications for residents living nearby, as 
well as appropriate preparedness and response activities. Although a number of residents 
reported receiving information about the NPP in their mail, redundant means of notifying 
residents of EPZ residency should be considered. One possible explanation for the lack of 
understanding about nearby hazards in this EPZ is the explosive population growth seen 
in the area over the last decade. We found that residents who had lived in the EPZ for less 
than the median length of residency (8 years) scored lower on KI knowledge tests and 
were more likely to be unaware that they lived in the 10-mile EPZ. This suggests that 
preparedness initiatives targeting new residents to the community (e.g., public safety 
welcome kit) may be successful in maximizing impact among jurisdictions with limited 
funds. EPZ population growth is not unique to our study area; nationally there has been a 
17% increase in EPZ residents over the past decade (2010 US Census). State and national 
policymakers may want to consider development of new policies or enforcement of 
existing ones such as mandatory disclosures about a home’s distance from an NPP as part 
of rental or real estate transactions. 
One strength of this study is the generalizability of the results to the entire four 
county EPZ area. The GIS-based survey site selection toolkit allowed for random 
selection of households in the second stage of sampling which ensured that selected 
households were independent and represented the totality of the households in the cluster 
(Lemeshow and Robinson 1985). Although the sample size of this study is relatively 
small, the two-stage cluster sampling methodology is designed to be representative of the 
source population and has been widely validated (Malilay, Flanders, and Brogan 1996). 
This study has several limitations. If those who are at highest risk for being missed by the 
KI distribution were also more likely to be missed in this survey, there is potential for 
response bias. To minimize this problem, interviews were conducted on weekends and 
weekdays; however, surveys were only conducted during daytime hours. A comparison 
of demographic variables collected through the sample with US Census data suggests 
minimal bias. More generally, this assessment was conducted among residential 
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households and does not assess the coverage rates among schools, daycare facilities, or 
large businesses (more than 100 employees) within the EPZ. One LHD in the EPZ used a 
“push” distribution method to deliver KI tablets to these non-residential EPZ locations 




Although EPZ residents expressed relatively low concerns about a NPP accident at 
the time of the survey (September 2010), the NPP crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP in 
2011 may have altered concerns and knowledge associated with KI and radiological 
preparedness at an international, national, and local level. A substantial increase in 
demand for KI in the western United States occurred after the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident despite the fact that harmful levels of radioactive iodine did not materialize 
outside Japan. Like similar fear-driven pharmaceutical runs (M’ikanatha et al. 2005), 
these spikes in demand generally result in the misallocation of scarce drugs to individuals 
that do not need them. The only individuals that the USNRC currently recommend 
receive and store KI as a prophylactic countermeasure are those who live or work within 
a 10-mile radius of an NPP. Our results show that most residents of a central North 
Carolina community living in the 10-mile EPZ of an NPP lack household access to KI 
and an understanding of its use. In light of renewed interest after the Japan NPP accident 
to broaden the pre-distribution of KI beyond the 10-mile EPZ parameters (Markey 2011 
letter), future planners and policy makers should balance the benefits and barriers to 
successful pre-distribution in the 10-mile EPZ to help devise new strategies to increase 





1. According to the Food and Drug Administration (2001), the protective benefits of KI 
decrease with age with dosages adjusted according to age, exposure, pregnancy 
and/or lactation status. KI is recommended to pregnant women, lactating women, 
children, and adolescents to minimize the risks of abnormal thyroid function, 
including hypothyroidism and thyroid cancer. Benefits are minimal for those between 
the ages of 18 and 40, unless projected exposures are high (>10 cGy). With the 
exception of these groups, the benefits of KI for individuals over the age of 40 are 
negligible unless very high radiation doses (>500cGy exposure, approximately 
equivalent to 500,000 chest x-rays or coast-to-coast airline flights) are projected. For 
additional details and dosage breakdowns, see US FDA (2001). 
2. The shelf life of KI tablets was extended to seven years by the Food and Drug 
Administration in 2004 (US DHHS 2004). 
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The “story” of a disaster is no longer simply told by the traditional media. Along with 
developments in communication technology, we are witnessing the desire of active 
citizens, via acts of citizen journalism, to be involved in telling the story of a “disaster”. 
Accordingly, from the perspective of disaster researchers seeking to understand how 
others perceive response to disaster, material created by citizen journalists provides a 
unique insight into the activities of members of the public following a disaster. The 
article begins by providing illustrations of acts of citizen journalism following acts of 
terrorism include the 2007 Glasgow airport attacks and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The 
article then goes on to provide researchers with a methodological tool known as 
qualitative media analysis for the study of citizen journalism data. It will provide 
evidence of this methodology in action by presenting a case study of the 7th July 2005 
London bombings. 
Keywords: Citizen Journalism, disaster, sociology, response, communication. 
 
News in contemporary society is no longer simply produced solely by those 
journalists working in the professional news media industry. In addition, there is an 
increasing presence of the public in the reporting process via acts of citizen journalism. 
Some academics have taken the important route of trying to understand what citizen 
journalism implies for disaster communication and first response (Novak and Vidoloff 
2011). This article takes a different perspective of citizen journalism by showing how 
material created by citizen journalists can be accessed and analysed by researchers to 
assist them in understanding how citizens at the scene of a disaster perceive others to 
respond.  
The aim of this article is threefold. First, it will provide a number of examples of 
citizen journalism activity following a terrorist attack to show what type of material 
citizen journalists are able to produce. Second, the article will use qualitative media 
analysis to interpret citizen journalism data. The article will discuss this methodological 
technique and illustrate its usefulness by supplying the reader with an analytical case 
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study of the 7/7 London attacks. The article will conclude by considering some of the 
important considerations for researchers when accessing and utilising data created by 
citizen journalists. 
 
What is Citizen Journalism? 
 
At its simplest level, citizen journalism involves the activity of members of the 
public, who lack professional journalism training, in the capture, production and 
distribution of news items. Within academia, citizen journalism has been discussed using 
several alternative terms, including participatory journalism (Bowman and Willis 2003; 
Nip 2006; Domingo et al. 2008; Paulussen and Ugille 2008), user generated content 
(Hermida and Thurman 2008) and citizen participation (Bakker and Paterson 2011). This 
article uses the term citizen journalism to refer to the involvement of the public in the 
collection, production and distribution of news items, as also referred to by a number of 
other scholars (Allan 2007; Allen and Thorsen 2009; Rosen 2008; Greer and McLaughlin 
2010 and Lewis et al. 2010).  
As argued elsewhere, citizen journalism can be broken down into two distinct forms: 
dependent and independent citizen journalism (Watson 2011). The primary distinction 
here is that dependent citizen journalism relies on existing professional news 
organisations for the distribution and publication of information, whereas independent 
citizen journalists utilise their own forms of communication for the self-publication of 
material. The following diagram seeks to show the difference between the two: 
As seen in Figure 1, this article’s understanding of what constitutes citizen journalism 
has been influenced by exposure to other studies (Allan 2007; Bowman and Willis 2003; 
Bakker and Paterson 2011). With such disagreements over the usage of the terms, it 
seems suitable to keep the term “citizen journalism” but to make a distinction between 
different forms of citizen journalism within the news production process—with editorial 
control at the forefront of this distinction. Due to their aspiration for publication within 
existing media organisations, dependent citizen journalists are under editorial control of 
the news provider they choose to submit their material to. Alternatively, independent 
citizen journalists are not under any official editorial control; rather it is at the discretion 
of the individual to edit his/her own material prior to self-publication via the web. 
This article will focus on providing examples of dependent citizen journalism to show 
how they are both useful in understanding how citizen journalists perceive that others 
respond to a disaster and how ordinary members of the public turn to technology to 
communicate their experiences following a disaster. Focus will predominantly be placed 
on the 7/7 attacks which, although dated, are important to the emergence of citizen 
journalism in the wake of a terror attack. The 7/7 attacks marked a point in time when the 
news media noticed and commented upon the importance of the contributions from 
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members of the public to help present the news. The BBC’s director of news Helen 
Boaden (2008) wrote: 
 
[F]or newsgathering, what happened on 7 July three years ago marked a 
watershed: the point at which the BBC knew that newsgathering had 
changed forever…Within 24 hours, the BBC had received 1,000 stills and 
videos, 3,000 texts and 20,000 e-mails. What an incredible resource. 
Twenty-four hour television was sustained as never before by 
contributions from the audience...At the BBC, we knew then that we had 
to change. We would need to review our ability to ingest this kind of 




Figure 1: Forms of Citizen Journalism 
 
 
Citizen Journalism and the Public Response to Disaster 
 
Sociologists interested in the study of disasters have identified a tendency for 
narratives to be centred on the promotion of disaster myths. Disaster mythology as a 
concept suggests that following a disaster, the everyday norms by which people live their 
lives will collapse and be replaced by irrational and unpredictable behaviour. Typical 
characteristics of this understanding of public reaction include people fleeing in panic, 
being psychologically dependent, suffering from shock and therefore unable to act 
independently, acting selfishly, and taking part in looting (Alexander 2003; Almedom 
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2008; Fischer 2002; Glass et al. 2002; Jacob et al. 2008; Jones et al. 2006; Leitmann 
2007; Quarantelli 1954; Wessely 2005; Stock 2007).  
As Perry and Lindell (2003, p.49) argue, those affected are often referred to as being 
socially disorganised as well as being personally disorientated. In a recent assessment of 
common myths discussed in the wake of a disaster, Jacob et al. (2008, p. 562/563) 
assessed the distinction between myth and reality following Hurricane Katrina in 2005: 
 
Regarding the issue of psychosocial responses to disaster, it was believed 
and hyped in the media that massive trauma led to the abandonment of 
social mores and relationships and even to violence, as people attempted 
to escape or to satisfy their own individual needs (Myth #4). To the 
contrary, studies of behaviour in disaster show that the great majority of 
those directly affected tend to remain calm and behave in an orderly and 
considerate fashion... Contrary to the view that affected populations 
respond with shock, helplessness, and overall passivity (Myth #5), the 
tendency toward social affiliation also leads to a multicultural dedication 
to the common good, expressed in altruism, camaraderie, and social 
solidarity among victims, enabling many to find new strength and 
resiliency during the emergency and to respond positively and generously.  
 
As seen in the extract above, Jacob et al. (2008) found that the media generally 
exaggerate what are known as mythical responses to disaster; emphasis is placed on poor 
community relations and individuation, but in reality individuals respond in a calm and 
orderly manner. Individuals can be resilient and find new strength when faced with 
adversity. Accordingly, if perceptions of how the public reacts to terrorist incidents are 
shaped by inaccurate disaster myths, this could have negative effects on how the public 
regard the threat of terrorism, and may hinder their capacity to respond to future attacks.  
Elsewhere Furedi (2007) argues that the public react in one of two ways following a 
disaster: with resilience or vulnerability. He develops two paradigms to aid understanding 
of the difference between a resilient and a vulnerable response to terror. When regarding 
a vulnerability paradigm, focus is placed on the individual rather than the community, 
and it is believed that the individual/community is unable to cope with an attack. In 
comparison, under a resilience paradigm, there is an “orientation towards the 
community” and the faith in the ability of the community to cope (Furedi 2007, p. 4). 
Following 7/7, citizen journalists generally seem to point towards a more resilient 
interpretation of response to the attacks. This is supported by a number of studies that 
have since directly assessed the response of those caught up in the attacks. Sheppard et al. 
(2006, p. 235) found that while the media reported of widespread panic following the 7/7 
attacks, in fact there was cohesion, unity, and mutual co-operation. A study by Rubin et 
al. (2005) found that, following a telephone survey of 1,010 Londoners 11-13 days after 
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the attacks, one third of the sample reported symptoms of stress as a result of the attacks. 
Nonetheless, when asked whether or not the attacks had impacted their planned future 
travel arrangements, only 30% stated that they planned to use public transport less. 
Following the study, further information from the underground rail network in London 
suggested that use of the underground had “returned to expected levels within three 
months” (Sheppard et al. 2006, p. 235). 
Alternatively, by using the method of triangulation, through the analysis of 
newspapers, archival personal accounts and primary data collection, Drury et al. (2009, p. 
84) found that despite the widespread reports of panic following the London bombings, 
their analysis suggests otherwise: 
 
In describing the London bombings of July 2005, the term “panic” was 
used by a number of witnesses and survivors—and, indeed, more so by 
commentators who did not witness events directly. Yet the concrete and 
detailed descriptions of survivors’ behaviours tell the opposite story. 
Rather than personal selfishness and competition prevailing, mutual 
helping and concern was predominant amongst survivors, despite the fact 
that most people were amongst strangers rather than affiliates. There is 
also evidence that this helping behavior took place in spite of perceived 
danger rather than because people felt that they were now out of danger. 
(Drury et al. 2009, p. 84) 
 
Drury et al. (2009, p. 85) found that there was predominantly a sense of resilience in 
the form of solidarity, rather than an individualised, vulnerability-led response. 
Importantly, some of the archival personal data that Drury et al. (2009, p. 72) used for 
part of their analysis were blogs and other accounts submitted to news media sources 
such as the BBC.  
As supported in a study of citizen journalist material submitted to the BBC following 
the London bombings, individuals sharing how members of the public are perceived to 
respond to an act of terrorism can counter the aims of terrorism by dispelling the myth of 
a panic prone public and presenting a resilient response to terrorism (Watson, 2012). 
Other examples of citizen journalism following a disaster can be found after more recent 
acts of terrorism that reveal both positive and negative consequences of the increasing 
emergence of citizen journalism. One such incident is the attempted suicide car bomb at 
Glasgow Airport in 2007. The Glasgow airport attack took place at 15:15 when a Jeep 
Cherokee drove into the front doors of the airport, trapping itself in the automatic doors. 
After numerous attempts to get the car to move farther into the building, two would-be 
suicide bombers tried to flee the scene but were quickly tackled by police officers who 
were assisted by members of the public (BBC 2007; BBC 2010). From the perspective of 
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citizen journalists, once again members of the public had the tools at their disposal to 
record unfolding events (Boaden, 2008). 
Videos uploaded to YouTube by traditional news media organisations reporting the 
Glasgow attacks reveal that they relied on contributions from citizen journalists to help 
them in the visual presentation of the news. The video of the BBC’s report of the attacks 
was three minutes and forty seconds long, and had, by 19 February 2011, been viewed 
26,077 times—showing that the material was indeed receiving an audience.  The video 
includes an interview with an eyewitness, John Smeaton, who assisted the police in 
tackling one of the men responsible for the attack. Alongside video footage of the 
Smeaton interview is a series of photographs of the attacks. The YouTube content reveals 
two instances of citizen journalism, the first of which comprises images taken by 
members of the public at the scene of the attacks and utilised by the BBC in its report. 
The second instance is the act of recording BBC footage and sharing it with others on the 
video sharing website YouTube (Dstpfw 2007). From the perspective of researching 
citizen journalism material, researchers are able to access a range of data in the form of 
text, photographs and video footage. 
The Glasgow attacks were reported to be part of a larger scheme by individuals 
associated with Al Qaeda, who had failed to set off other car bombs in London on the 
previous day (BBC 2007). Hermida’s (2007) discussion of the presence of citizen 
journalism following the Glasgow attacks in the UK also notes that the BBC was 
inundated with footage of the attacks, with over 70 images and videos sent in by 
members of the public. Hermida (2007) argues that it is “the public, rather than 
professional journalists” who are “increasingly recording the first draft of history”.  
In contrast to the 7/7 attacks and the Glasgow airport attack discussed here, the 2008 
Mumbai attacks saw the media confronted with the dangers of relying on the public for 
information. On the 26th November 2008, Mumbai became the victim of multiple terror 
attacks, the worst it had ever experienced. A series of attacks perpetrated by Muslim 
terrorists from Pakistan occurred within minutes of each other. In the first attack, gunmen 
targeted the Chhatrapati Shivaji railway station; in the second, gunmen opened fire on a 
popular café (Café Leopold). In the third attack, gunmen seized Nariman House, a 
business complex housing a Jewish outreach centre, and the fourth attack targeted Cama 
and Albless hospital for women and children. Finally, the fifth and sixth attacks involved 
the seizure of two luxury hotels, Oberoi-Trident and the Taj Mahal Palace. During these 
attacks, gunfire was widely reported throughout the city (BBC 2008). The attacks 
resulted in 165 fatalities and approximately 304 injuries (Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs Dossier 2009).  
The Mumbai attacks were also accompanied by eyewitness statements to media 
organisations such as the BBC, where those directly affected by the attacks contributed to 
the reporting. In the quote below, Farhang Farzad Jehani spoke of incidents in the café 
that he owned, in which terrorists killed some of his customers and employees. In this 
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instance, a member of the public involved in a terror attack is able to offer a sense of 
reality by telling his/her story to the news media. In his account, Jehani provides context 
through rich descriptions of sounds and imagery, and presents claims about the 
continuing movements of the terrorists: 
 
On the night of the attack, I was watching the cricket match between India 
and England on TV in the bar upstairs with my brother...I suddenly heard 
a big blast. It sounded like a grenade. I peered down and spotted two 
young boys standing outside the cafe with automatic weapons who were 
firing indiscriminately…The firing continued for some four to five 
minutes. I crouched on the floor upstairs…After that, the guns stopped. 
Then the two men continued walking down a by-lane, firing from their 
guns. They were on the way to the Taj hotel. By the time I came down to 
the cafe, two of my employees and six customers, including three 
foreigners, lay dead on the floor. (BBC 2008) 
 
Following the attacks, the BBC was criticised for its heavy reliance on the social 
networking website Twitter as a tool for information, raising questions about the amount 
of trust and reliability we can place on citizen journalist-based information. In responding 
to the criticisms, one of the BBC’s editors Steve Hermann (2008) argued that the BBC 
did indeed monitor the micro-blogging service. He argued that the BBC was forced to 
make quick judgements in selecting what they thought was relevant and informative 
information. For Hermann (2008), messages from Twitter did not supply a great deal of 
information about the events, but did “give a strong sense of what people connected in 
some way with the story were thinking and seeing. In concluding his report on the BBC’s 
actions during the Mumbai attacks, Hermann (2008) argued that the BBC, like other 
news organizations, were still learning how to deal with new forms of information during 
events and that an active audience is required to analyse and interpret the information.  
Although citizen journalist material submitted to the news media was present during 
the Mumbai attacks, the attacks were most notable for the contribution of citizen 
journalists in a more independent form, with the publication of material via blogs and 
social networking sites such as Twitter rather than the news media (Gauravonomics 2008; 
Beaumont 2008). As Stelter and Cohen (2008) reported for the New York Times: “at the 
peak of the violence more than one message per second with the word ‘Mumbai’ in it was 
being posted onto Twitter”. Twitter was not only a popular platform for citizen 
journalism; for some, it was a means of staying up to date with unfolding events (Stelter 
and Cohen 2008). Indeed, some believed independent citizen journalism during the 2008 
Mumbai attacks upstaged the efforts of professional journalists (Moses 2008). When an 
attack takes place in the public eye, the future of reporting is not simply left to the work 
of professionals; amateurs can also play a crucial role in the production of information 
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and photography surrounding an event. This has similarly been identified by a series of 
studies investigating citizen journalism following a crisis (see the volume edited by Allan 
and Thorsen 2009). 
What we are witnessing is the increasing activity of individuals involved in reporting 
a disaster. This presents researchers with a wealth of information for analytical purposes, 
as seen by the work of Drury et al. (2009). Elsewhere, there is evidence to suggest that 
researchers are accessing citizen journalist-based material to help them assess how the 
public responded to the attacks (additional studies include Novak and Vidoloff 2011 and 
Vultee and Vultee 2011). The existence of these studies support this articles view that 
sociologists engaged in the study of disaster responses should engage with news material 
created by members of the public – citizen journalists – in the aftermath of a disaster.  
Assessing citizen journalism in the wake of a disaster offers social scientists the 
opportunity to assess data that was created during a crisis. This information ought not to 
be used in isolation, but can be used alongside other forms of research to assist a more 
comprehensive understanding of how the public responds to disaster. To show how 
citizen journalism material can be seen as useful, this article will next provide evidence 
of forms of dependent citizen journalism that tell us how dependent citizen journalists 
perceived others to have responded 7/7. The next section will describe the procedures 




The emergence of citizen journalism data for research purposes is all well and good; 
yet, researchers must consider the methodological tools at their disposal for analysis. One 
such tool for analyzing material created by citizen journalists is qualitative media analysis 
(QMA). This methodological tool, developed by Altheide (1996), can also be utilised in 
the analysis of material created by dependent citizen journalists. 
QMA involves the reflexive study of documents, which is a necessary aspect of 
sociological research as it allows the researcher to approach the study of culture. This 
method is also referred to as qualitative document analysis, ethnographic content analysis 
and qualitative content analysis (Bryman, 2008). The method is widely accepted across 
the social sciences and has been included in the Sage Encyclopaedia of Social Science 
Research Methods as described by Altheide (2004: 325): 
 
Ethnographic content analysis (ECA) refers to an integrated method, 
procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and 
analysing documents for their relevance, significance and meaning...A 
document is defined as any symbolic representation and meaning that can 
be recorded and/or retrieved for analysis. 
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As elaborated by Bryman (2008) these methodologies emphasise the role of the 
researcher in understanding the construction of meaning within documents. This may for 
some be referred to as an ethnographic practice under the principle that performing 
ethnography involves researchers spending a significant amount of time observing a 
particular social setting (Bryman 2008). Although contentious, Altheide et al. (2008, p. 
134) defends the method as being ethnographic by stating that qualitative document 
analysis “involves immersion, exploration, contextual understanding and emergent 
insights into social meanings, relationships and activities”.  
QMA is an exploratory research method that immerses the researcher in a process of 
discovery in the study of documents via observation (Altheide et al. 2001, p. 306). This 
immersion of the researcher into documents allows for the gradual development of a 
protocol for studying documents in an in-depth fashion. It allows the researcher to 
interact with the material that he or she is viewing and to understand its content by 
placing it into its appropriate context. Understanding the context of a given situation is 
essential as it enables the greater understanding of the way in which individuals come to 
define a situation, in this case the London bombings.  
In this analysis of dependent citizen journalism, data were gathered from BBC News – 
Special Reports of the London Bombings. The BBC was chosen as the site from which 
citizen journalism content would be analysed for three main reasons. First, during an 
investigation of the presence of citizen journalists during the London bombings, the BBC 
was the most prominent news source that actively noted the importance of members of 
the public in the news-gathering process (Boaden 2008). Second, the amount and range 
of material submitted to the BBC during the attacks made it a useful news organisation to 
study in relation to its interaction with the public in the news production process. In their 
annual report, the BBC reported that on the day of the attacks, they received “about a 
thousand images and clips emailed in by members of the public (BBC Annual Report and 
Accounts 2005/2006, 2006, p. 48). Not only did the BBC receive a vast amount of 
material, but it attracted a vast audience—receiving over 116 million page impressions 
(that is requests to open a web page) on the day of the attacks (BBC Annual Reports 
2005/2006, 2006, p. 45). Finally, the data submitted to the BBC for publication were 
accessible for research purposes.  
Prior to performing QMA on material submitted to the BBC by dependent citizen 
journalists, it was necessary to assess the range of material produced by members of the 
public that were found on the BBC’s Special Report page for the London Bombings. 
Material included the presence of photographs, video footage, eyewitness statements and 
a survivor’s diary. This material was analysed and the results were written up prior to 
conducting QMA of comments submitted to the BBC by members of the public.  
The data used for QMA of citizen journalism content within the media were also from 
the BBC website in the form of comments that were submitted to BBC’s Your Accounts 
pages. It is necessary to point out that the sample used was from comments that were 
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chosen by the BBC for publication—176 comments in total. The BBC has established 
editorial guidelines to ensure that comments uphold their established values and 
standards—trust, truth and accuracy, impartiality, editorial integrity and independence, 
harm and offence, serving the public interest, fairness, privacy, children, transparency 
and accountability (BBC Editorial Values 2011). The BBC moderates the content 
published on its website in three forms—pre-moderation, post-moderation, and reactive 
moderation (BBC Editorial Guidelines 2011). Pre-moderation refers to material 
submitted to the BBC requiring editorial moderation to determine whether it is suitable 
for viewing prior to its publication on the BBC website.  Post-moderation includes 
material that is automatically published on the BBC website, but then may be removed if 
the editor feels that the material is unsuitable. Lastly, reactive moderation enables the 
BBC audience to highlight concerning material to BBC editors, which will then be 
inspected.  
The comments were not solely written by those residing in London, but were 
submitted by individuals from across the world. For analytical purposes, the 176 
comments were filtered, so as to only include comments that had been written by people 
in London. The reasoning for this filtering process was a desire to understand what those 
in and around London on the day of the attacks had to say. Each comment was copied 
and pasted into NVivo 8 for storage, after which the first 50 comments were examined to 
identify a protocol with which the content of comments could be analysed. By 
concentrating on 50 of the comments in the examination stage of the research, 13 
variables were identified as being central to the textual analysis of the research: 
description, resilience, thanks and praise to emergency services and London transport 
staff, panic, no panic, chaos, calm, frightened, wanted to help, thoughts to victims, young 
(under 18), media-related comment, speculation and rumour. In order to code the data 
according to the protocol established above, each category was created as a free node. If a 
comment was relevant to the variable it would be classified according to the relevant 
code. At this stage, it was then possible to proceed with the analysis of the data according 
to the protocol. The section that follows presents a sample of results taken from the 
analysis to show how dependent citizen journalists’ material can be used to provide 
researchers with an insight into how others perceive and respond to a terror attack.  
 
7/7 and Dependent Citizen Journalism 
 
The UK’s capital, London, fell victim to several acts of terror on the 7th July 2005.  
At 08:50 British Summer Time (BST) of 7th July 2005, the city of London was attacked 
by suicide bombers. The London transport system was targeted by four British 
Muslims—Mohammed Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shehzad Tanweer and Germaine 
Lindsay. The first terrorist attacks occurred on the London Underground (subway system) 
on the Circle line between Aldgate and Liverpool Street. The second occurred at Edgware 
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Road Station and the third on the Piccadilly line between Russell Square and King’s 
Cross. The fourth attack occurred an hour later targeting a London double-decker bus 
service at Tavistock Place. These attacks on the London transport network caused 52 
fatalities and 770 injuries (BBC 2005a). Immediately following the attacks, broadcasts of 
“breaking news” were seen on news websites and television stations. Crucially, 
information about the attacks began to appear online from members of the public both 
directly and indirectly affected by in the attacks. Emphasis will be placed here on three 
forms of dependent citizen journalism—a survivor’s diary, Your Accounts (reports 
submitted to the BBC by members of the public), and photographs (also submitted to the 




Following an independent act of citizen journalism, in which the author wrote and 
self-published a blog post on London forum Urban 75, North (2007) was approached by 
the BBC to write a seven-day electronic Survivor’s Diary. This became an on-going piece 
of dependent citizen journalism that would be published on the BBC website. Survivor’s 
Diary presents evidence of the news media approaching individuals for content; in this 
case, the BBC approached North and invited her to share her experience with others. This 
indicates that interaction and communication between the news media and the public can 
be horizontal, with the news media approaching the public for information, as well as the 
public approaching the news media to publish their information.  
The diary begins on the 7th July 2005 and includes an account of North’s (2005) 
experiences during the London bombings – providing researchers with documentation for 
analysis:  
 
Even more people got on at Kings Cross. It felt like the most crowded 
train ever. Then, as we left Kings Cross, at about 8.55am, there was an 
almighty bang...It was so dark that nobody could see anything...I thought I 
was about to die, or was dead. I was choking from the smoke and felt like 
I was drowning... Air started to flood in through the smashed glass and the 
emergency lighting helped us see a bit. We were OK. 
 
North then proceeded to post an account of her daily life, again including a range of 
comments concerning her emotions and her interactions with other people.  
 
SATURDAY 9 JULY 2005 1031 BST: Yesterday was a weird day. I felt 
sick all day, which I think was the smoke inhalation and the news 
overload. Friends called and texted and several beautiful bunches of 
flowers arrived. I love flowers. (BBC 2005d) 
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For BBC audiences, this personal account developed an understanding of the short-
term responses of an individual caught up in a terrorist attack. The Survivor’s Diary can 
be seen as an extension of first-hand citizen journalism to a comprehensive account of the 
seven days following the attacks, involving an individual’s reflection. For the author, 
agreeing to write for BBC functioned as a form of healing; she reported “the words 
flowed out of me...writing for myself became a lifeline, writing for others a comfort” 
(North 2007, p. 113-114). Although subjective, North (2007, p. 113-114) can be seen as 
viewing her act of citizen journalism as a comfort both to herself and to others. 
 
Writing was a way of releasing the demons, the madness and despair that 
can bend the shocked brain out of shape and fracture the sense of safety 
and self after too-close horror. When I was writing I did not feel alone; 
though the audience was faceless, intangible, nonetheless I could feel a 
connection with those compassionate strangers. Through that hopeful pull 
of other people’s presence, further along the path ahead towards the light 
of normality, encouragement sensed and read in other people’s written 
responses, I could feel it and find it: a way out of the tunnel. 
 
From the perspective of disaster researchers, not only can dependent citizen 
journalism such as a survivor’s diary provide an insight into individuals’ immediate 
perceptions of response around them, but material created by dependent citizen 
journalists can also go some way towards aiding understanding of an individual’s 




The analysis of Your Accounts consisted of a QMA of 176 comments that were 
submitted to the BBC and subsequently published. These comments were written by 
those members of the public in the UK only; comments from people abroad were 
excluded so as to focus on British response only. 
Some accounts of the 7/7 attacks include general descriptions of events, which can be 
seen to range from being extremely descriptive to being relatively short; some pay 
particular attention to detail, while others supply very little information. This shows the 
variation in the level of detail supplied by members of the public. The construction of 
news by members of the public through Your Comments is not restricted to specific 
lengths or levels of detail; in supplying their own personal accounts, members of the 
public are given the opportunity to say as much or as little as they desire. Examples 
include the following accounts (BBC 2005b). 
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Short and Specific: I was getting of the west bound central line at 
Liverpool street station at about 8.50. Halfway up the escalator, I felt the 
stairs shake a little and then there was a cloud of smoke that shot up from 
underneath the stairs. The alarm went off and people went crazy and just 
run out of the station. 
 
Long and Descriptive: I was stuck on the Piccadilly train behind the one 
that exploded for over two hours in a very cramped, hot carriage and I 
wanted to highly praise the driver for how calm, assuring and often 
amusing he was. He kept in communication with us, letting know what 
was going on (power cut to whole system), and what was happening next. 
His best quote was when he had tried to evacuate us all onto the train 
behind, but, because we were in the first carriage, by the time we had got 
close to the other train, it was too full to get us on. He said something like: 
"I don't know how you do it every day, but you all managed to squeeze 
yourselves onto that [first] train. But I can't now get you all onto the other 
train. I've tried, but there are pregnant women in there. So you lot are 
going to have to wait, we'll take the other train back to Arsenal and then 
we'll come back for you. You'll be on your own, but we'll be back soon." 
(not exact words) They left us there, and then the power came on, together 
with the air con - he advised us to close all the doors and vents to take 
advantage of the air con [air conditioner]. After a bit, our train started 
reversing and we were able to get off onto the station through the driver's 
door. I don't know if you can forward my thanks to this driver. His voice is 
heard on the amateur mobile video titled "Passenger praises tube driver's 
calm", from about 1:05 seconds into the footage. 
 
Not only do descriptions of events provide researchers with information about how 
witnesses perceive events to unfold around them, but with regards to the sociological 
study of response to disaster, accounts submitted to the news media by dependent citizen 
journalists can provide evidence of how witnesses perceive others to respond. For 
example, in some comments, there appears to be evidence of individual’s witnessing 
resilience amongst Londoners (BBC 2005b): 
 
I'm quite amazed by the resilience of Londoners. We were let out of the 
office early and I had made up my mind to get home walking if I had to, I 
was not going to take the bus after seeing photos of the blown up double 
decker. I was surprised seeing so many fearless Londoners jumping on 
buses as if nothing happened! Amazing spirit. 
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Thank you to the kind lady in her MPV running a free shuttle service 
between Marble Arch and Shepherd’s Bush last night. No fuss, no 
nonsense – just a sense of humour and the Dunkirk Spirit. Made me proud 
of my city and proud of my country. It’ll take more than this to break the 
Brits 
 
Elsewhere, comments submitted to the BBC by dependent citizen journalists can 
provide an insight as to whether or not panic occurred. As discussed in the previous 
section, following a disaster, there is often discussion that seeks to understand whether 
the public responded with panic. Quarantelli (1954) defines the term panic by placing 
emphasis on fear and a loss of self-control—“An acute fear reaction marked by a loss of 
self-control which is followed by non-social and non-rational flight behaviour” 
(Quarantelli 1954, p. 272). An individual experiences panic, according to Quarantelli, 
first as an emotional response and second as a physical response.  The presence/absence 
of panic within the public response to disaster is an essential area of research, as it goes a 
long way to offering advice as to how members of the public are able to cope with and 
respond to adversity. In the case of the 7/7 attacks, citizen journalism can help to 
illustrate how members of the public perceived others to have responded to the attacks.  
In total, the QMA found only eight comments out of 176 (4.5%) that stated that panic 
had occurred. One individual described their experience on the day of the London 
bombings as complete panic but, as can be seen in the quote below, there is no contextual 
evidence to support the statement. This forces us to question whether panic did actually 
take place.  
 
Was coming out of Liverpool Street when the first bomb went off then 
was down towards Aldgate when the second did. The worst day of my 
working life, complete panic, but we must all stand tall and not let these 
people win ever. (Comment 5) 
 
A second comment describing panic is:  
 
I was on the Piccadilly Line-the first after there was a fire alarm at 
Caledonian Road. Just after Kings X there was a "bang" coming from the 
front carriage-the light went out and emergency lighting came on-smoke 
came apparently from outside-There were no announcement-some people 
started panicking after a while and tried to smash the doors-but only to 
injure themselves- after about 30min 2 policemen opened the back door 
and let people out...They should have passed information that there is no 
fire etc. the atmosphere in a packed tube carriage is already frightening 
enough. (Comment 128) 
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In contrast to comment 5, comment 128 supplies some contextual evidence to support 
the claim that panic was present, with people smashing the doors of a train carriage and 
in danger of injuring themselves. Returning to Quarantelli’s (1954) definition of panic 
discussed above, evidence from the comment suggests that its author is describing the 
physical aspect of panic. Overall the author supplies a broad description of events 
allowing for an understanding of the type of situation that may be classified as panic – 
showing how important further context is to be able to infer what is meant by the terms 
used.  
Although analysis of the comments suggests that some people did respond with a 
sense of panic, there was also evidence to suggest that there was no panic. For 
researchers interested in the public’s perceived response, it is important to identify both 
circumstances, and to understand the full context of a situation, otherwise, public 
response may be misinterpreted. This places precedence on what an individual implies by 
the term they choose to use; how they construct an account is of utmost importance. For 
some, as discussed above, the term panic may imply mass hysteria, whereas for others it 
is seen as a flight to safety. The term panic thus does not necessarily imply a negative 
emotion and/or response. When categorising comments, five instances of no panic were 
identified, two examples of which are given below. 
 
I missed the Kings Cross explosion by 10 minutes and was evacuated from 
Moorgate station. I need to send heartfelt thanks to the emergency 
services, LU staff and fellow commuters. Not once was there any panic 
and the calmness and determination of everyone to get on with their day 
made me so proud. (Comment 2) 
 
I was on the tube from Highbury and Islington on the Victoria line at 
about 9.05am…En route, the driver made a second announcement that he 
had received the wrong message and that the train would not stop at KC St 
Pancras after all… As I walked from the station I overheard a walkie-
talkie message that said something about "evacuating" the station. Outside 
of the station, most people we were on mobile phones to tell their 
workplaces they would be late, others were checking maps for bus routes. 
There definitely didn't seem to be any panic, but as I walked down Oxford 
Street (about 9.40am) there were so many sirens that people began asking 
others what had happened. There was definitely a sense of uneasiness that 
set in. (Comment 152) 
 
Both of these comments give broad descriptions of events, allowing for an 
interpretation of whether the identification of an absence of panic is appropriate given the 
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wider context of the usage of the terms. Comment 2 emphasizes not only the lack of 
panic, but also the calmness and determination of individuals to get on with things. 
Comment 152 also emphasizes there not being any panic. Instead, the author describes a 
sense of unease that set in with the extensive presence of the emergency services, causing 
people to question what had happened. From the perspective of those analysing material 
created by members of the pubic, it is essential not to rely on these comments as 
presenting facts. They are simply interpretations of events, which in themselves are of 
interest to researchers interested in understanding how the public construe a situation. 
Not only can dependent citizen journalism provide evidence of perceived response to 
a disaster, but further still, dependent citizen journalism can be seen as a way that some 
make sense of a situation. For instance, some comments provide evidence of individuals 
reflecting on the day’s events, assisting them with making sense of a situation and, 
indeed, the consequences of an incident and further reflection of the necessary societal 
response to overcome the incident.  
 
I have been in the City of London close by the sites of today's outrages. I 
would just like to praise the calmness and common sense of Londoners 
who have acted calmly and with unflappable good humour in the face of 
the callous cruelty of these attacks. If only the perpetrators of these attacks 
could have seen the deep resilience of the Londoners I've been with today 
they might find themselves doubting the effectiveness of their vicious 
small minded philosophy of life. (Comment 79) 
 
There are 6 million people in the capital, most of whom get up and get on 
a bus or tube and do a journey twice a day. The bombers managed to kill 
only 37 of us, so it's going to take them a long time to really make any 
impact on Londoners. We will not be intimidated by anyone - no matter 
who they are or claim to represent! (Comment 334) 
 
Elsewhere, there is also evidence of individuals wanting to be of use during a 
disaster—perhaps an additional way of individuals being able to cope with a situation 
that is in many ways beyond their control. 
  
It would be very helpful for me to know if BBC can inform us the way to 
do blood donation in a most appropriate way, if it is necessarily. I think 
that is only thing I can do at the moment for people who injured. 
(Comment 85) 
 
In both instances, dependent citizen journalism, provides researchers with insight into 
disaster response that, although biased, may then encourage them to further investigate 
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the usefulness of dependent citizen journalism, not only in meaning making, but also, in 
being able to assist in the response to a disaster. This is of particular interest to future 
studies that seek to understand the role of social media and citizen journalism in assisting 




Following the events of 7/7, vast quantities of photographs and videos were uploaded 
to the Internet and submitted to the news media for publication. In their annual report, the 
BBC reported that on the day of the attacks, they received “about a thousand images and 
clips emailed in by members of the public (BBC Annual Report and Accounts 
2005/2006, 2006b, p. 48). Of this material, the BBC published 16 images in the section 
London Explosions: Your Photos, ranging from photographs taken by those walking up 
underground tunnels to photographic evidence of the bomb blasts—providing evidence of 
the BBC’s editorial practices in place. In an analysis of these images, five categories of 
images have been identified.  
The first group of images provides evidence of the nature of destruction caused by the 
attacks—visual evidence that professional journalists would not have been able to capture 
unless they had been at the scene of the attacks. Figure 2 presents evidence of the 
destruction that was caused by the bombs. 
As can be seen in the photograph supplied here, the quality of the image is worthy of 
publication; others may not have been, which may account for the limited number of 
images that the BBC decided to release of the attacks. In addition, it may have been that 
editors felt that it was of no use publishing dozens of pictures of the same content.  
The second category of photographs consists of those submitted to the BBC by 
individuals caught underground following the attacks. The five images chosen for 
publication by the BBC provide evidence to supplement our understanding of how some 
people behaved during the attacks.  
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Figure 2: An Office Worker Took These Photographs From Her Workplace. 
 
 
Figure 3: Passengers Are Led Through the Tunnels to Safety. 
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The third category comprises photographs of attack survivors.  
 
Figure 4: Graeme Weston:” I met these two people at Tavistock Square walking to 
hospital. They said they were in the front carriage of the tube as it left Kings Cross 
when a bomb had exploded. They said they were the lucky ones.” 
 
 
The fourth category of photographs consists of three images documenting the 
presence of the emergency services following the attacks. People then, are not only 
taking photographs at the onset of an event; they also take photographs after the event has 
taken place. 
The final category of photographs comprises images of people seeking a way to go 
home or elsewhere following the attacks. 
A range of different types of photographic evidence was submitted to the BBC for 
publication. Images are not simply restricted to photographs of destruction, but serve to 
provide a wider contextual and visual representation of the public response to the London 
attacks. Photos chosen for publication by the BBC can be seen to tell a story of the 
unfolding events of the day—ranging from images that present the beginning of news 
about the blasts; to images of people caught underground, victims, and emergency 
services; and finally, at the end of the day, pictures showing Londoners attempting to 
travel to alternative destinations. 
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Figure 6: Tim G: "Water was the best way off Canary Wharf and the queue was 
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As a form of data for research purposes, photographs from dependent citizen 
journalists are extremely useful forms of data for visual research practices. As identified 
by Bryman (2008), although the use of visual methods in social research declined 
following the Second World War, there has been a recent revival. Not only can 
photographs of a disaster be used as a source of data for secondary analysis of data from 
a disaster, but in addition, they could potentially be used for future research in the 
aftermath of a disaster as a form of photo-elicitation in qualitative research practices for 




Assessing citizen journalism in the wake of a disaster offers social scientists the 
opportunity to assess evidence created during a crisis. Although it does not singularly 
provide enough evidence to explain how communities cope in a disaster, citizen 
journalism does facilitate an understanding of the response capabilities and difficulties 
posed by the public. Furthermore, the act of participating in the reporting of an event 
shows that, rather than cowering in fear, people actually stop to record and participate in 
the wider discussion and production of information. This alone is an interesting area of 
enquiry, particularly if we are interested in individuals’ motivations following a disaster. 
This information should not necessarily be used by itself to understand the public 
response to adversity, but can be used alongside other forms of independent research to 
assist a more comprehensive understanding as seen in the work of Drury et al. (2009).  
As noted in other studies, there is also great potential for citizen journalism to be of 
use in responding to a disaster. For instance, in their study of citizen journalism in the 
wake of the 2007 California wildfires, Novak and Vidoloff (2011, p. 196) found that 
citizen journalism not only provided more real-time news than professional journalism, 
but in addition had the potential to help frame official response to disasters. Current 
research projects such as a project being run in Australia titled Mapping Online Publics 
(2011) focuses its efforts on understanding use of social media, including acts of citizen 
journalism following a crisis—providing evidence as to why it is necessary for disaster 
researchers to engage further with research relating to the digital arena. However, while 
this is predominantly a positive view of citizen journalism, it is important to note some 
more negative consequences of citizen journalism.  
During the analysis of citizen journalism following acts of terrorism, a query was 
raised in The Guardian. Following the Glasgow attacks, Welsh (2007) was concerned 
about whether individuals would place themselves in danger by trying to record evidence 
and ignore their civic duty to assist others. This is an extremely interesting area of 
consideration for sociology that should be investigated further. Sociologists need to 
develop a greater understanding of the motivations behind citizen journalism. Welsh also 
brings attention to the issue of how far people will go to participate in citizen journalism. 
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Will individuals put themselves in danger to satisfy their need to record events for 
publication? Does citizen journalism pose a threat to security and safety? From a 
practical point of view, if first responders are to utilise citizen journalists in the official 
response to a disaster, they must take these individuals’ safety into consideration. 
Another way of viewing the dangers associated with citizen journalism, is by 
developing an understanding of whether or not such behaviour is anti-social (Bakker and 
Paterson 2011, p.191). Baker and Paterson (2011) refer to the work of Glaser (2005), who 
investigated the idea of citizen journalists acting as “citizen paparazzi” after the London 
bombings.  
 
That naked impulse to tell a disaster story, glaring kleig lights and all, was 
once the province of mainstream and tabloid news organizations. But no 
longer. Now, for better and worse, our fellow citizens stand by, 
cameraphones in pockets, ready to photograph us in our direst times.  
 
Glaser points to Jardin, a freelance technology journalist, who raises the question of 
the ethical implications of citizen journalist behaviour. If we are able to utilise technology 
to capture people in their “direst times”, we therefore have an ethical obligation to 
consider our actions—particularly in relation to norms such as compassion and 
responsibility. This is consistent with Welsh’s (2007) questions of why the people with 
the mobile phones choose to take pictures rather than step in and help. It is essential 
therefore, to question what citizen journalism means for our morals in certain situations. 
Furthermore, we must consider, as researchers, the various ethical considerations of using 
this data.  
From a research perspective, there is a wealth of ethical considerations to be 
addressed in terms of accessing and using material posted by citizen journalists. A 
number of studies discuss some of the ethical concerns of accessing online data such as 
that posted on social networking websites and blogs (Berry 2004). There appears to be 
particular attention paid to the security surrounding access to information and whether 
information is in the public or private sphere (Lange 2008; Berry 2004). For researchers 
interested in studying citizen journalism data, it is necessary to take appropriate ethical 
measures. 
The wealth of information available on the Internet brings with it issues regarding 
whether the information is “trustworthy, reliable or relevant” (Youngs 2009, p. 136; Keen 
2007), and what other uses information might have. As a result, Youngs (2009) argues 
that it is necessary for audiences within the blogosphere to be critically active rather than 
consuming information passively, individuals must sift through the mountain of 
information that is available to them and use their knowledge and intuition to decipher its 
meaning. This was particularly relevant following the Mumbai (2008) attacks where the 
BBC were criticised for their reliance on Twitter users.  
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More recently, following the April 2012 Indonesian earthquake and the subsequent 
threat of a tsunami, there was the added danger of false videos being placed on YouTube. 
One video in particular (Mudaduda 2012) claimed that the Indonesia earthquake had 
caused a tsunami. The availability of this video was announced on Twitter, yielding the 
potential to attract a vast audience. Subsequent Tweets claimed that the video was false 
(see Figure 7). The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) announced that there was 
no impending danger of a tsunami (PTWC 2012). Within a day this YouTube video 
received over a million views. From a research perspective, this example—as well as 
others such as the Mumbai terror attacks—indicate that it is of the utmost importance for 
researchers to take into consideration the validity of the data under inspection.  
 
Figure 7: Indonesia Earthquake & False YouTube Videos 2012 
 
 
As researchers, it is our responsibility to understand and consider the perspectives and 
experiences of others. As shown here, material created by the public provides a unique 
insight into the experiences of ordinary citizens during a disaster that can be utilised with 
other forms of data and research practices to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the public’s response to disasters.  
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Time permeates the disaster process. Yet, few scholars have integrated various notions of 
time in their disaster studies. In this paper, I introduce the ideas of event time, clock and 
calendar time, social time, and rhythm of life within the context of the pre-impact, impact, 
and post-impact phases. Simply, day-to-day life in industrialized society is based upon a 
series of schedules, calendars and routines on a daily, weekly, and yearly basis. Events 
that we call disasters and catastrophes upset our normal rhythm of life, creating degrees 
of social disruption from the individual up through the community units of analysis. 
Social units in impacted areas move from clock and calendar time (doing what is 
scheduled) to event time (doing what is needed now) when disaster strikes. The process of 
recovery is reflected in attempts to reestablish these same (or similar) clock and calendar 
time patterns as before the disaster.  
 





In this theoretical paper, I advocate the use of social time in order to obtain a clearer 
understanding of disaster. Key concepts related to time used throughout this paper 
include, event time, clock time, calendar time, and rhythm of life. Although disaster 
researchers have used the notion of social time in disaster research, at best they have 
generally relegated the concept to a sentence or small (e.g., Neal 1997; Quarantelli 1998; 
CDRSS 2006). Specifically, I draw upon general works on social time that related to the 
idea the patterns of everyday life or the rhythm of time (e.g., Zerubavel 1981; Hall 1983), 
which in turn serves as a point of comparison when events lead to social disruptions 
(Fritz 1961). In addition, I draw upon related theoretical and empirical studies disaster 
studies and some of my own disaster fieldwork for further illustrations. In short, these 
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and other studies noted in this paper demonstrate an underlying interest and further need 
in exploring the relationship between disaster and social time.  
To punctuate the importance of time in this field, consider how the general notion of 
time serves as the defining component of our two main approaches to our field – disaster 
and hazard (CDRSS 2006).  In essence, hazards are events waiting to occur. By contrast, 
disasters are the actual events.  As a result, the hazards tradition has focused upon pre-
impact type of activities (i.e., mitigation, some preparedness). By contrast, the disaster 
tradition initially looked at response (i.e., impact) issues and to a lesser degree 
preparedness activities (Phillips, Neal and Webb 2011, pp. 40-42).  
In organizing this paper, I draw upon a specific notion of social time – disaster 
phases. Going back to Carr’s (1932) early work on disaster phases, researchers have used 
a wide range of possible approaches and categories to reflect the disaster life cycle (Neal 
1997). Since the recommendation by the National Governor’s Association (1978) to 
organize hazard and disaster events under the categories of preparedness, response, 
recovery, mitigation, the four phases of emergency management have received extensive 
support and use by disaster professionals and academics.  For these two groups, the “four 
phases” provide an excellent heuristic devise for organizing data, information, or 
activities (Neal 1997).  
Yet, these and other life cycle configurations present analytical problems (Neal 
1997). First, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Put another way (and 
demonstrated below), the phases of disaster overlap. Thus, the four phases (and other life 
cycle configurations) are at best a “heuristic device” rather than a concept for scientific 
analysis. Second, in part related to the first point, the use of any set of disaster phases 
force both professionals and researchers to look at disasters in a way that really does not 
exist (Neal 1997). Finally, various disaster phase categories draw upon the use of 
everyday language rather than being grounded in any type of empirical reality or 
conceptual/theoretical framework. Thus, these categories come with the baggage of 
meanings attached to everyday life. Such simple terms as pre-impact or preparedness, for 
example, may have multiple meanings amongst multiple actors.  As Quarantelli and 
Dynes (1977) show, the concept disaster has similar problems, being a “sponge” concept 
that has soaked up multiple everyday life and scientific meanings. 
Using some form of disaster phases makes some sense to organize an initial paper on 
disaster and social time. I will use the stages of pre-impact, impact, and post-impact to 
organize the structure of this paper. Yet, by using this type of configuration, I recognize 
that I will encounter the problems I have already noted above. For example, some of my 
discussions on pre-impact topics slide into impact issues. Or, some illustrations regarding 
impact patterns cross into post-impact activities. Until we devise better social time and 
disaster concepts, these three stages will serve as my mechanism to order this discussion. 
In short, I hope to invoke new ways we can understand the social process of disaster with 
the use of time. 
  





For thousands of years, cultures throughout the world have operated on event time. 
Event time occurs when people perform activities based on necessity. For example, 
people ate when they became hungry. They awoke when the sun rose and went to sleep 
when the sun set (which, except in the tropics, varies from season to season). Farmers 
planted and harvested crops when it was time. Even the flooding of the Nile River 
thousands of years ago was an event that would set the stage for the start of a new 
agriculture cycle in Egypt. Based upon the region and irregularities of weather (e.g., 
temperatures, rain), the planting and harvesting of the crops could vary greatly based 
upon a calendar (Landes 1983; Steel 2000).  
Religious practices created the need for activities during specific times of the day 
(i.e., “clock time”), week, or year (i.e., calendar time). For example, in about the 12th 
century, religious practices by monks in Europe demanded the need for clocks, calendars 
and schedules. Monks would rise the same time every day, and throughout the day 
engage in various tasks (e.g., praying, copying texts, eating, attending mass). Each day 
would also have a different set of tasks driven by the clock and the calendar. Of course, 
the culmination of these activities occurred on Sunday, in which a rigid schedule of mass 
occurred. In short, the clock and calendar, not events based on need, activated specific 
behaviors (Landes 1983).  
The use of “clock time” later facilitated the emergence of industrialization. Rather 
than following the rules of event time, industrialization demanded clocks, schedules and 
calendars for production and management reasons. Urban areas, the centers of 
industrialization, adapted to clock time. By comparison, agrarian areas stayed with event 
time, which in turn created a further schism between urban and rural settings. Thus, clock 
time drove modern industrial societies and those living in such settings. Zerubavel (1981, 
p. 7) states this quite nicely:  
 
In general, most of our routine daily activities are scheduled in a fairly 
rigid manner for particular times of the day and for the particular days of 
the week. Thus, we usually eat not necessarily when we are hungry, but, 
rather, during officially designated eating periods such as “lunchtime” or 
“dinner time.” Similarly, we usually go to bed not necessarily when we get 
tired, but rather, when it gets “late.” Cleaning one’s home is another 
activity which typically takes place not necessarily when things get dirty, 
but, rather, on particular days of the week that are designated as “cleaning 
days” in a standard fashion. 
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In short, many societies today, especially industrialized societies, operate on 
clock and calendar time.  
 
Social Time and the Rhythm of Life 
 
Both event time and clock/calendar time take on social meaning, thus creating the 
notion of social time. Social time influences how we perceive events, what we to do 
within a specific period (e.g., clocks, calendars and schedules), and how we may perceive 
the pace of time (e.g., fast or slow). Simply, social time drives many of our collective 
actions and activities. Some components (e.g., minutes, hours, days) originate from 
measures of objective time since they rely upon astronomy or consistent pulsing of 
radiation. Yet, these objective measures take on social meaning and are used to create 
schedules. For example, hours, days, specific dates and even years serve as important 
socially defined markers or take on special meanings for specific activities. As a result, 
social meanings based upon objective measures of time emerge. Schedules and calendars 
reflect socially defined institutionalized rituals among and within societies, organizations, 
institutions, families, groups and subgroups. A wide range of events or time markers, 
such as holidays, work schedules, times for worship, sleeping, eating, waking, vacation 
and recreation may all occur annually, monthly, daily and at certain times of the day.  
The intermeshing of these activities based upon social time generates patterns of 
behavior at both on the macro and micro sociological level. When we combine social 
time markers with the macro and micro socially defined activities, we build connected 
and institutionalized social cycles that create a rhythm of live. These cycles and rhythms 
produce some degree of predictability to our lives, which in turn helps to maintain some 
form of social order (Zerubavel 1981, p. 8-12). Similarly, Hall observes (1983:153) 
“individuals are dominated in their behavior by complex hierarchies of interlocking 
rhythms.” Although beyond the scope of this paper but appropriate for later investigation, 
integrating social time and disaster allows us to explore key theoretical issues in 
sociology related to units of analysis, social order, and social change—along with the 
central topics of deterministic and voluntaristic behavior (e.g., Alexander 1982).  
 
Cultural Influences of Time  
 
Culture influences how individuals perceive and interpret time (i.e., pace of time, 
power, expectations of everyday life). Let’s look first at the pace of time. Generally, 
individuals may perceive the passage of time quickly or slowly, depending upon the 
circumstances or event. For children, the days or weeks before a major holiday may seem 
to take “forever.” For a new couple madly in love, their first six hour dinner and movie 
date may feel like one hour’s worth of time. Broader cultural influences also impact the 
pace of time (e.g., Sorokin 1943; Lauer 1981; Hall 1983; Levine 1997). As Zerubavel 
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(1981) documents through his extensive observations of different regions and peoples, 
Latin cultures operate within a slower, less precise notion of time. By comparison, 
Northern European cultures have a faster, more precise meaning and use of time.  He also 
demonstrates that in the United States, geography influences different versions of time. 
One living in the South experiences a much more leisurely pace of time than those living 
in the North. Certainly, urban areas operate at a quicker and more precise pace than most 
slower rural settings (Zerubavel 1981). 
Consider for a moment how a culture’s pace of social time could influence the 
expectations (and perceptions) of disaster response and the transition to recovery. One 
could theorize that in northern Europe, social expectations would be quite high for a 
quick, or “on time” response. Even in the United States following Hurricane Andrew, the 
local disaster coordinator was exclaiming “People are dying. Where is the cavalry?” 
when in fact FEMA had already arrived. Gleick (1999) describes how in American 
society individuals try to do as many tasks as possible, and as fast as possible. Perhaps his 
notion of “faster” is worth exploring regarding citizens’ expectations of federal, state and 
local response and recovery activities.  For example, one could compare cultural 
expectations in the United States to those in other geographical regions. Would, using an 
objective measure of time, response be slower than in the United States or Northern 
Europe, or Central and South America?  Would expectations and perceptions in countries 
of these regions be different than under their own “normal” conditions? Perhaps an 
analysis of disaster archives, such as at the Disaster Research Center at the University of 
Delaware (with about 50 years worth of data) would reveal “faster” expectations in 
disaster. Put another way, how “fast” is an effective and efficient disaster response and 
recovery, and what influence may culture have upon these collective expectations? 
The use and pace of time is also interwoven with power. In designing new societies, 
both Comte and St. Simone created calendars in part to maintain social order by 
controlling time amongst the populace (Coser 1977). Certainly, we are all familiar with 
the relationship between the length of time a person waits to see another person and 
power or prestige. The speed of recovery activities following disaster provides a unique 
perspective to understand issues related to increased vulnerability and power. For 
example, ethnic minorities, those in lower social classes, and women and children appear 
to move thorough the recovery process slower than others (Neal 1997; Phillips 2009; 
Dash, McCoy and Herring 2010; Blinn-Pike 2010).  
Next, by drawing upon the ideas of social time, the rhythm of life, and social order, I 
argue that we can think of disasters as occasions that disrupt our socially defined 
routinized activities or “rhythm of life.”  Such social disruptions can occur whether a 
society operates within event time or clock time. However, those societies that have 
much more rigid ties to clock time will incur much more social disruption. Furthermore, 
during more extreme cases of social disruption (which we may call a “disaster”), we 
would see that different units of analysis (e.g., individuals, groups, communities) would 
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operate on event time (e.g., tending to activities that need to be done) rather than clock or 
calendar time (i.e., following a predetermined schedule).  Later in the paper, I also show 
that part of the process of recovery from disaster and a return to “normalcy” specifically 
hinges on (re)creating a similar or even new predictable rhythm of life. For the purposes 
of this paper, my discussion will focus upon social disruption of highly routinized 
settings normally driven by clock time (which would represent most if not all 
industrialized societies). 
 
Social Time and Social Disruption 
 
Social disruption plays a central role in many definitions of disasters. A traditional 
starting place for understanding disaster is Fritz’s (1961, p. 655) adaptation of 
Endleman’s definition: 
 
an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or relatively 
self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and 
incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the 
social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the 
essential functions of society is prevented. 
 
Two ideas from this definition, although not necessarily in the exact meaning as used 
above, become key components for this section: time and social disruption. Since I have 
already discussed the notion of social time related to social order (or the rhythm of day-
to-day life), next I will elaborate on social disruption.  
Bates and Peacock (1989, 1992) and Stallings (1998) discuss the general notion of 
social disruption in relation to disaster, but in a slightly different context than this paper 
(i.e., social time is not a key factor). Yet, their logic, which relates to varying degrees of 
social disruption and different units of analysis, provides an excellent foundation for my 
discussion.  In addition, I note the idea of “post disaster rituals” as a mechanism for 
communities to consider the past while moving forward to their new normal (Thornburg, 
Knottnerus and Webb 2007). 
While focusing specifically on the issue of disaster recovery, Bates and Peacock 
(1989) contend that events in the social environment lead to the organizational or 
systematic failures.  As a result, daily normal patterns of system or organizational 
behavior become disrupted. Thus, new, ad hoc patterns develop to manage the event and 
assist in bringing matters back to normal. As a result, recovery becomes “the process by 
which a system which has experienced a structural failure . . . reestablishes a routine, 
organized, institutionalized mode of adaptation to its post-impact environment (Bates and 
Peacock 1989, p. 353).”  In addition, they stress that researchers must also consider the 
impacts at different units of analysis. For example, a few households impacted by an 
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event will not create broader social disruption within a community. However, a much 
larger scale of impact among many more households will generate much more social 
disruption—hence an event that we call disaster (Bates and Peacock 1989, 1992). 
Although not couched in such ideas as “social time” or rhythm of life explicitly, 
Stallings (1998) provides additional insight into the relationship among social time, social 
disruption and disaster. Stallings grounds his discussion in the classical sociological 
theoretical foundations of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, focusing on the key issues as 
social order, social change and emergence. Rather than use the word “disruption” due to 
the multiple meanings it has, he uses the concepts of routines, exceptions and exception 
routines.  Stallings (1998, p. 137) talks about routines as “Actions and interactions 
repeated routinely provide structure for individual’s lives and, in the aggregate, constitute 
the structure of social systems.” His ideas of routines do reflect what social time scholars 
refer to as the rhythm of life.  In relation to disaster, his notion of routines reflects 
everyday life activities. His second category, “exceptions,” reflects patterns of behavior 
that must change due to a specific event.  Units of analysis may be impacted differently 
by such events. Stallings notes that, at an organizational level, fire departments handle 
fires and courts handle divorces on a “routine” basis. However, at the individual or small 
group level, a house fire or divorce are exceptions to daily action. Events that disrupt the 
routine at the macro level then become “exceptions,” resulting in what we may describe 
as a response to disaster.  Stallings’ notion of “routine exceptions” reflects a social unit’s 
attempt to handle events that may occasionally occur. As a result, fire departments 
develop to handle house fires, while local, state and federal emergency management 
organizations develop to handle disasters (Stallings 1998). Thus, the logic behind 
Stallings’ ideas of routines, exceptions, and exception routines within various units of 
analyses influences my rationale throughout this paper. 
Ritual is another component of the rhythm of life. These rituals help to further 
provide meaning to day-to-day life, including stability (or social order).  When disaster 
strikes, many rituals may disappear (i.e., “deritualization).”  As a result, social 
participants begin socially constructing new meanings and rituals to provide new 
meaning and structure to life (Thornburg, Knottnerus and Webb 2007). 
Drawing upon the work noted above, in my next section (i.e., Pre-Impact), I describe 
in more detail the rhythm of life in the context of daily or everyday life, and how macro 
level entities (e.g., communities, cities) can absorb social disruptions that occur at the 
micro level. Next, looking at the impact period, I provide empirical examples how 
occasions can create disruptions at the micro and macro level, resulting in major social 
disruptions and throwing the rhythm of life out of synchronization. Finally, I discuss the 
role of social time in understanding the post-impact (or recovery) process. 
 
  




As noted above, social time creates a rhythm of life. This rhythm makes predictability 
or social order possible on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis among individuals, 
households, families, groups, organizations and communities.  Consider our own daily, 
weekly and yearly patterns. During the week, we generally awake at the same time and 
then follow through with the same morning rituals (e.g., use of the bathroom, eating) 
before we begin our work. We may take the same mode of transportation and the same 
route to work every day. These similar patterns continue through the week. For many 
academics, due to our teaching schedules, Mondays, Wednesday, and Fridays may be 
more similar while Tuesdays and Thursdays may be more similar. At the end of the 
semester, we settle into another (predictable) set of routines until the start of the next 
semester. Planned disruptions to these routines, such as holidays (e.g., birthdays, 
Thanksgiving) or business travel occur. However, we have plans for these events. In 
short, we can see our daily, weekly, monthly and yearly activities as part of a rhythm of 
life—a rhythm we generally count on to help manage our lives. 
Within this context, certain events may disrupt individual lives. For example, we may 
lose electricity or water, which interrupts our morning activities.  A car accident may 
interrupt the drive home.  On a more personal level, a family member may have a heart 
attack or a neighbor's house may catch on fire. For a while, the victim’s or victims’ own 
daily patterns of activity will change (i.e., are disrupted).  Also, those closely associated 
with the victim(s) may make temporary changes in their daily patterns of behavior.  Such 
events could put a strain on the victim(s) and even victims’ primary group’s (i.e., family 
and friends) resources.  In some cases, the victim(s) may even die, perhaps creating 
broader changes for the family and friends of the victim(s). However, outside of the 
sphere of family and friends, in most cases life goes on normally in the neighborhood, 
community or society. 
Indeed, communities and societies prepare for these types of events that may impact 
individuals, families or small groups. Various organizations within the public and private 
sector handle these types of events on a daily basis.  For example, fire departments in the 
United States design their organizations to respond to fires, traffic accidents, small 
hazardous materials incidents, heart attacks, and similar incidents. Predictable trends help 
to budget resources and personnel activities. Data show that on a daily basis, the times 
between 3:00pm and 5:00pm result in the most fire runs. More broadly, mid-afternoon is 
the busiest time, whereas pre-twilight has the fewest number of runs (Topical Fire Report 
Series 2007). Certain days of the year also have fire peaks. Holiday events such as the 4th 
of July and New Year’s Day are associated with fireworks and lead to two of the three 
highest peaks of fire runs on a yearly basis. Warm weather brings people outdoors in the 
spring, leading to another spike in fires (FEMA 2004). For firefighters, March and April 
are the busiest months, whereas November is the least busy (Tropical Fire Report Series 
2007).  In short, the fire community has a strong idea of fire trends on an hourly, daily, 
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weekly, monthly and yearly basis. These patterns fit a much broader rhythm of life, and 
are in part tied into holidays, celebrations and the weather.  
Other local organizations such as police departments, public works departments, and 
the utilities all assist handling such emergencies when called upon. Local volunteer 
organizations (e.g., the Red Cross, Salvation Army) may help feed emergency responders 
or assist a family affected by the event. Hospitals, especially emergency room staff, also 
plan for and expect a certain number of patients on a daily basis. At some times (e.g., 
Saturday nights) they may have additional staff on hand, knowing that the medical needs 
will be greater than at other times (e.g., Wednesday mornings).  Local citizens would 
express anger if local government and other organizations that participate in emergency 
response activities could not handle such routine accidents and events.  
The types of events noted above do not disrupt the operation of a community.  In fact, 
these emergencies actually become part of the rhythm of life since they too often take 
place on a generally regular and predictable basis.  At the macro level, organizations or 
communities expect and absorb the disruptions at micro levels. As a result, the micro 
disruptions have little if any impact upon the rhythm of life at a more macro level (e.g., 
community).  The cold harsh reality is that although individuals or small groups may 
experience emergencies and specific organizations respond to these events, for the rest of 
the people within a neighborhood, community, or society, the rhythm of life beats on.  
Yet, if an occasion occurs that disrupts social time and the rhythm of life at a more 
macro level (e.g., such as a community), the normal routine for the community (including 
individuals, families, groups, and organizations within the community, or put another 
way, both micro and macro levels) changes dramatically. In fact, such a broad change in 
the rhythm of life would result in an event that we know of as a disaster or catastrophe.  
The distinction of social disruption at the micro versus the macro level also highlights a 
key sociological component of disaster. For example, Mills (1959) differentiates between 
a “trouble” and an “issue.”  Let’s apply Mills’ concepts to this context.  If one family’s 
house burns down it is a routine event for emergency response organizations and related 
businesses (e.g., insurance, clean-up companies, construction companies). For the family, 
it is a “trouble” or problem, but life continues within the sphere of the community. 
However, when an event such as a wildfire, tornado, or earthquake destroys 500 homes 
and a wide range of lifelines (e.g., water, sewage, electrical power, transportation) within 
a community, an “issue” emerges. The patterns of hundreds of victims are disrupted, but 
so are the patterns of the complete community. Victims and members of the community 
must face a much larger set of social problems – problems that impact the whole 
community and perhaps beyond.   
By integrating the ideas of social time, the rhythm of life, units of analysis, and social 
disruption, I set the stage to then differentiate among the commonly used terms 
“emergency,” “disaster,” and “catastrophe” by looking at how various institutionalized 
routines may become disrupted. When these disruptions are minor and/or are actually 
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part of the predicted routine within a community, then such events are emergencies. They 
are part of everyday life. As I show below, when both macro and micro units of analysis 
become socially disrupted, the occasion then becomes some degree of a disaster. If the 
level of disruption expands to beyond the community, such as in the cases of Hurricanes 
Andrew or especially Katrina, then a transition occurs from disaster to catastrophe. 
Others (e.g., Britton 1986; Quarantelli 2005; Fischer 2008) have already suggested that 
some form of a “continuum of disaster” exists. Here, I am suggesting that an empirically 
derived measure of social disruption can capture one dimension of a continuum of 
disaster. 
Thus, this discussion highlights the importance of understanding the pre-impact 
setting when studying how disasters impact various social units with a community (or 
even higher units, such as a region or even nation). Specifically, one must understand the 
pre-impact rhythms of life, including how people and organizations use social time, 
calendars and schedules, before one can assess the actual impact of a disaster or 




In the section above, I showed how perturbations impacting the rhythm of life of a 
few individuals or other small social units (e.g., families, small groups) are part of 
everyday life and can be called emergencies. Although such daily events may be 
“troubles” at the macro level, organizations and communities generally are well prepared 
to manage these events. As a result, the overall rhythm of life continues. In this section, I 
show how macro social disruptions (coupled with micro social disruptions) in the rhythm 





Consider what we may call a disaster of any type in any major community. Before the 
event, a wide range of interlocking schedules, calendar time and clock time guides 
behaviors and creates a predictable social order for individuals, families, groups, 
organizations and communities. Yet, when a disaster occurs, the hourly, daily, weekly, 
monthly, and yearly schedules for many no longer matter. The situation demands that 
individuals, families, groups, organizations and communities move from clock time to 
event time. The event creates a situation that different and/or new sets of tasks and/or 
social organization (aided by the emergence of new roles and norms) must develop now 
(i.e., event time) to deal with a new set of demands generated by the event (Dynes and 
Quarantelli 1968; Dynes 1970). In short, these new activities are not based upon a 
calendar, schedule or clock (i.e., clock or calendar time). Rather, immediate needs drive 
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activities such as clearing debris, searching for the living, delivering victims to the 
hospital, establishing shelters, and providing food for victims and responders (i.e., event 
time). City officials may cancel other scheduled activities, such as the enforcement of 
parking tickets, garbage pickup, and recreation league sporting events. These activities 
become of minor importance since they divert resources needed for the response. As a 
result, authorities may minimize or cancel these scheduled activities during the initial 
response. They will direct their personnel and resources to event based needs (e.g., debris 
clearing, search and rescue, restoration of utilities, setting up shelters, providing food for 
victims) rather than calendar or clock time activities.  
Compare the various events of car accident, medical emergency, or house fire with 
the social impact I observed during field trips of Hurricanes Andrew or Katrina. As 
already noted above, in the cases of the car accident, medical emergency, or house fire, 
the rhythms of life for the community continue with little if any disturbances or 
problems. By contrast, individuals, families, groups, organizations and various 
communities impacted in the Miami, Florida, or New Orleans, Louisiana, areas faced 
enormous disruptions with their rhythm of life. For example, most if not all commerce 
stopped within these and nearby cities. Jobs vanished. And victims went without shelter 
and food. People moved from their residences to other abodes. Following Hurricane 
Andrew in Homestead, Florida, some survivors lived in tent cities for months. In the case 
of Hurricane Katrina, many survivors relocated out of state. The hurricane’s destruction 
of lifelines also changed totally the rhythm of life. Ruined vehicles coupled with 
damaged or flooded roads made transportation virtually impossible for days. Some 
victims and responders went weeks with no electricity, phone service, water, and sewage.  
As a result, the lack of an infrastructure further disrupted the normal, typical every day 
routines of the residents.  The pre-impact clock time, social calendars and schedules of 
simple normal activities such as sleeping, eating, drinking water, or using the toilet 
became major chores.  Ironically, in order to establish a new form of social order, or new 
rhythm of life, victims had to make new schedules for some of these activities. With 
commerce stopped and schools closed, people had “new time” on their hands to manage.    
Not only were individuals’ daily routines dramatically altered, the consequences of 
the storms stripped local emergency response organizations from any type of effective 
response.  Each city and surrounding areas needed large amounts of outside resources to 
meet the basic needs (e.g., food and shelter) of the victims. Therefore, cities changed 
their initial priorities to the main provisions of life—food and sheltering.  The survival of 
the communities, the welfare of homeless victims, and the re-establishment of 
infrastructure highlight just a few of the major priorities. With a lack of resources, and 
community goals shifting to basic survival, many day-to-day local government and 
business operations ceased to exist. In some cases, the personnel and equipment were not 
available.  Due to the destruction, some people could not get to their jobs right away.  
Even if people could travel, jobs did not exist.  
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When disaster strikes, those in the impacted area, whether individuals, families, 
groups, organizations or other configurations, transition from social time to event time. 
These entities no longer engage in actions based upon a calendar, schedule or clock. 
Rather, behavior becomes focused on a completely new set of tasks generated by the 
disaster—and the sooner (i.e., the pace quickens) those tasks are accomplished, the better. 
When disaster strikes, event time trumps clock time.  
To summarize, two interrelated social time events occur when disaster strikes. First, 
the rhythm of life becomes disrupted at both a micro (e.g., individual, household) and 
macro (e.g., organizations, community) levels.  Second, the generation of unmet needs 
and new social priorities creates a major change from clock time to event time. In order 
to meet the immediate needs generated by the unmet needs (e.g., search and rescue, 
sheltering victims, clearing road debris), day-to-day and weekly schedules become 
irrelevant during disaster. Yet, as the event proceeds, new schedules emerge, combining 
both event time activities and emerging new schedules during the response in order to 
manage the event. The search to mobilize new resources (and the creation of emergent 
groups to assist with this and other processes) eliminates pre-impact schedules, calendars 
and rhythms of life which, in turn, creates a whole new—albeit temporary—rhythm of 
life. Then finally, as I discuss in the post-impact section, a community strives to 
transition back to a semblance of its pre-impact rhythms.   
 
Some Empirical Examples of Social Time during Disaster 
 
Social time has generally not been a part of theoretical or empirical discussion 
regarding disasters. However, a few studies have integrated the idea of the rhythm of life, 
time, and social disruption to understand disaster. Below, I discuss these few empirical 
studies that look at the notion of social time and social disruption. One looks at how 
citizen populations adjust to war and potential bombings, while two others describe the 
transition from social disruption to a reacquisition of a pre-impact rhythm of life during 
post impact or recovery phase following a tornado and volcano. 
War and the Interrupted System. Kimmerling (1985) looked at the unique situation 
in Israel and how civilian society responds to the “interruption” of war. While primarily 
focusing upon the 1973 war, he also integrated observations and data from the 1967 and 
1982 Israeli conflicts. Since much of disaster research was initially grounded in 
preparedness and response to war (e.g., Quarantelli 1987), Kimmerling’s observations fit 
well with the theme of this paper. Specifically, Kimmerling (1986, p. 84) looked at how 
the 1973 war influenced individuals’ and families’ routine activities. A few of the routine 
activities continued or increased over time (e.g., prayer, listening to the news, taking 
medication smoking, reading the newspaper). However, a large number of activities 
(often associated with a specific time of day) significantly decreased (e.g., sleep, 
studying, handicrafts, traveling) during the war. A few specific activities had rather large 
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decreases (e.g., regular eating, meeting friends, cleaning one’s home, care for personal 
appearance, reading books). Kimmerling’s (1985, p. 113-114) detailed analysis led to the 
following conclusion: 
 
In times of social interruption, most of the activities (except for going to 
work and prayer) become marginal – even in terms of the complementary 
goal-and indeed there was a general tendency in the system to appeal for a 
moratorium (to a differential extent) from the fulfillment of various 
routine roles, which indeed aided in maintaining the individual’s “cosmic 
order,” but whose contribution to the systems upkeep seems to have been 
perceived as marginal. 
 
Social Disruption and Disaster Phase Transition. Perry and Lindell’s (1986) 
analysis of the volcano threat around Mt. Saint Helens touched upon household routine 
and disruption. The community of Toutle, Washington, suffered more damage from the 
volcano than did Lexington, Washington. As a result, only 24% of the Toutle residents 
believed that the volcano did not impact their household routine. On the other hand, 
almost 56% of the Lexington residents believed the volcano did not disrupt their 
household routine. In fact, not one Lexington resident responded that their routine was 
significantly disrupted, whereas almost 13% in Toutle believed so. The authors suggested 
that the volcano threat created a situation where new behaviors and beliefs were needed 
to cope with the new threat. As a result, what had been a disruptive situation had become 
a way of life. 
While also documenting that response and recovery phases are not discrete events, I 
drew upon social disruption and the time it took for “normal” services to return to a 
community following a tornado (Neal 2004). In describing the transition from response to 
recovery, I used a wide variety of activities and events to “mark time” in understanding 
when response started and ended, and when recovery began. Some examples of these 
events and activities include: 
 
• the opening and closing of a command post 
• the sheltering of victims 
• the beginning and ending of search and rescue activities,  
• the disruption and restoration of electricity, phones, gas, water and sewer service 
• establishment and demise of a curfew 
• beginning and ending of volunteer organizations assisting the community 
 
This paper has notions of social time and event time embedded within its findings. 
First, I showed suggested that some events must finish (e.g., road debris cleared) before 
other events (e.g., re-establishment of electrical power) can begin. Thus, how well or 
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poorly authorities manage one issue can affect following events. Second, my data 
documented clearly that response and recovery activities overlap. Put another way, we 
cannot pinpoint the exact time when response ends and recovery begins. As a result, I 
contend that asking questions such as “how long will it take to recovery” may not be 
appropriate. 
Improvisation, Role Conflict and Social Time. The concepts of improvisation and 
role conflict also relate to social time, disruption and, disaster. Social schedules define the 
day’s activities for people. Within these schedules, people take on specific roles. For 
example, 6:00 a.m. to about 8:00 a.m., one could have the role of parent. From 8:00 a.m. 
until noon, one would have a professional role (e.g., professor). Lunchtime could mean a 
planned lunch with one’s significant other. Such schedules and calendars may diminish 
opportunities for spontaneous behavior (Zerubavel 1981, p. 47-49). Yet, as research 
shows, when disasters strike, people and individuals must abandon their pre-disaster 
schedules and roles to deal with the new tasks. Put another way, they must improvise 
(Webb 1998; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; Mendonça and Wallace 2004). Whereas 
rigid schedules and a lack of spontaneity drive everyday life, disasters destroy scheduled 
events and force spontaneous behavior and improvisation based upon newly developing 
needs.  
Role conflict and abandonment in disaster emerged as a controversial issue regarding 
the development of nuclear power plants following the Three Mile Island incident in 
1979 (Dynes 1986). The issue still arises at times in regard to disaster planning and 
response. Although grounded in a long line of sociological research, role conflict is 
actually another example showing how schedule, social time and social disruption all 
intersect (McGrath 1988). For example, emergency responders cannot be at different 
places at the same time look after their families and do their professional jobs. Not only is 
this a matter of role conflict, but actually time conflict. Their schedules during disaster 
suddenly overlap, and as Dynes (1986) clearly demonstrates, the professionals tend to 
their jobs. Yet, these professional do not abandon their jobs, or their families. Informal 
mechanisms and networks keep families and responders in touch. In summary, the 
management of role conflict in disaster is actually another example of how social 





For this paper, I define the post-impact period as the process of various social units 
moving back to the new normal rhythm of life in part through clock and calendar time 
(rather than event time). Post-impact research has generated some of the more explicit 
examples of (social) time, generally under the rubric of “recovery.”  In the first part of 
this section, I will discuss how research on the recovery phase has shown that sub-stages 
of recovery appear to go through different (and overlapping) steps, and that these steps 
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may appear at different rates of speed. Thus, using objective time, one type of event may 
move through recovery more quickly or slowly than others. Furthermore, different 
segments of society or individuals (based such factors as social class or ethnicity) may 
move more quickly or slowly through various phases of recovery than others. Second, I 
apply a term from the social time field, entrainment, to provide additional insight on how 
social time is useful for understanding post-impact events. In this case, when events may 
shake or shatter the rhythm of time or an individual, group, or community, these entities 
have a natural tendency to return to pre-event patterns.  
 
Post-Impact Empirical Studies 
 
Trainer and Bolton (1976) compared the recovery process following the Managua 
earthquake and Rapid City flood. In my view, their analysis is one of the first that 
explicitly touches upon the importance of social time and social disruption. They noted 
that during recovery, daily routines may be difficult to reestablish based upon strong 
norms to assist other family members. In addition, they discussed “temporal constraints” 
that further disrupt the efforts to return to a normal routine. For example, attempts to 
repair or clean one’s home, find new housing, search for a job, and travel further for a job 
all prevent victims from quickly returning to their pre-disaster rhythm of life.  
A practical question often asked is, “How much time does it take to recover from a 
disaster?” Although some may toss around certain figures in weeks, month, or even 
years, that is not the real question to ask. Rather, recovery appears to have a specific 
sequence or processes of events that must occur. Depending on the case or situation, 
recovery can literally last from a few weeks to years. For example, Kates and Pijawka 
(1977) discussed not the time of overall recovery, but the pace of recovery. They devised 
a “period of response” with four stages: emergency, restoration, reconstruction I and 
reconstruction II. Simply, for recovery to begin and end, these stages must occur in this 
order (while also noting that some overlap will occur between each stage).  Drawing 
upon four disasters (1906 San Francisco Earthquake, 1964 Alaskan Earthquake, 1972 
Nicaragua Earthquake, 1972 Rapid City Flood), they made some relevant observations 
regarding the pace of recovery (and by implication the response). The authors noted that 
the time each phase takes is in part contingent upon how large the disaster is, but other 
factors do intervene. Specifically, Kates and Pijawka (1977, p. 20-21) stated: 
 
Reconstruction for functional replacement will be 100 times the 
emergency period – for most disasters it takes between two and eight 
years. Monumental commemorative, betterment, or development 
construction might lead to a doubling of the required time. It is not entirely 
clear why this is so, except that the length of the emergency period serves 
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as both a measure the magnitude of damage and the potential social 
response. 
 
By implication, their data suggests that the life cycle of disaster has further embedded 
within it, its own “rhythm.”  
Although a disaster interrupts the rhythm of life, what occurs when and after disaster 
strikes has its own rhythm. As noted above, Kates and Pijawka (1977) showed this notion 
associated to recovery. Quarantelli (1982) observed these patterns (i.e., emergency 
shelter, temporary shelter, temporary housing, permanent housing) regarding the different 
types of shelter and housing patters that cut across the response and recovery phases. 
Studies by Bolin (1982) and Phillips (1993) documented these general sheltering and 
housing patterns during other disasters, and that these stages or phases cut across what we 
would call impact and post-impact (or response and recovery) phases. In addition, these 
studies also suggested that different groups of people, based upon such factors as class or 
ethnicity, move through these categories at different rates of time.  In short, the process of 
sheltering and housing has its own life cycle and these cycles exist within the broader 
context of recovery, which in turn exists with the broader cycle of the four phases of 
disaster.  I find it quite suggestive that the phases of sheltering and housing cut across the 
impact and post-impact (or response and recovery) categories. Perhaps other sub-
categories may exist within (or across) the impact and response categories that we have 
not yet uncovered. Or, even consider the notion of “warning,” that  begins during the end 
of the pre-impact phase in some cases (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes), while in other 
circumstances does not begin until just after the actual impact (e.g., earthquakes, 
explosions). That disasters may have their own life cycle, and that they may then move 
back to a “pre-disaster” rhythm, leads to the next section of this paper. 
 
Returning to “Normal” 
 
Eventually, almost all communities recover from disaster. Members of communities 
orient their tasks and activities toward getting back to a (new) normal. Below, I discuss 
two processes that assist with the process toward normal—entrainment and disaster 
anniversary events. 
Entrainment A term borrowed originally from the and still salient within the 
biological sciences, entrainment involves different entities getting their own particular 
rhythms in synch. In biology, entrainment occurs when “one cyclic process becomes 
captured by, and set to oscillate in rhythm with, another process” (McGrath and Kelly 
1986, p. 80). The authors use the example of jet lag, and how the body’s cells and 
functions get out of synch with the new time zone, but then slowly adjust.  
Generally, scholars have used entrainment in microbiology, animal behavior, and 
even individual human patterns of behavior getting synchronized again. However, it 
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appears that except for McGrath, scholars have not focused upon entrainment regarding 
broader human social behavior. Let me describe how social entrainment may help us 
understand the process of returning to pre-event patterns.  Various social units (e.g., 
individuals, groups, communities) all have different rhythms. These rhythms can be 
social (e.g., work, rest, regeneration) or biological (e.g., birth, maturation, puberty, etc.), 
ranging from micro (e.g. cellular) to macro (e.g., community yearly cycles). Some event 
can last for just a few seconds, to a month, if not longer.  When two units are together, 
key rhythms often synchronize with each other. One social example is communication 
patterns. A key part of entrainment is that these social rhythms or cycles can be disrupted. 
At a micro level this may include, talking, motor capabilities, gaze and body movements. 
At the macro level, this could be how social systems stay in synch with other systems. As 
a result, the rhythm or cycle for that event becomes disrupted, and an attempt to return to 
a rhythm occurs. What is of interest here, is the idea that an “occasion” can disrupt or jolt 
the system, knocking it out of synchronization. Afterwards, the system attempts to return 
a cycle or pattern similar to earlier ones (Hall 1983; McGrath and Kelly 1986). Certainly, 
these illustrations could present a wide range of conceptual and empirical areas of 
exploration. However, taking such an approach comes with a warning. Early attempts at 
understanding society and “social systems” first adopted a biological model. Yet, as 
social scientists and others discovered later, using a strict biological model presents a 
static and rather conservative view of human and systems behavior and should not be 
applied to human organized settings. Thus, if one draws upon the notion of entrainment 
for this line of research, one must also be aware of and avoid the strict biological 
metaphor. 
Certainly, one can make an argument that entrainment occurs following disaster. 
Once recovery begins, the goal often seems to be to “get things back to normal.” Such 
activities may include the mundane (but actually quite important) such as getting the 
garbage picked up on a regular basis, to businesses and schools operating on their regular 
pre-disaster schedule.  Overall, I believe that entrainment should be used to further 
understand the recovery process of disaster, and be used as a means to understand when 
recovery is complete. One would look for the rhythm of life returning to some degree of 
normalcy while also coming as close as possible to the pre-disaster rhythm of life. The 
amount of social change from the disaster would be a comparison of “normalcy” of the 
rhythm and patterns of life before and after the disaster.  
Disaster Anniversaries. Over the past 20 years or so, we have seen that communities 
often have one week, one year or even five-year “celebrations” to commemorate a 
disaster. Some suggest that these anniversaries reveal more than just a marking of time. 
Forrest (1993) argued that, although disaster anniversaries may mark the date of an event, 
they become important when these anniversaries create a social time perspective of 
disasters. During these events, people share memories and experiences. Disaster 
anniversaries, he shows, help to create a collective memory. Anniversaries also produce a 
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sense of community among members that survived the event. As a result, the past (i.e., 
the disaster event) may actually become redefined.  Studying the five year anniversary 
following the Loma Prieta Earthquake, Phillips and Hutchinson-Ephraim (1995) 
suggested that disaster anniversaries provide a signal that it is time to “move forward” 
rather than staying stuck on the consequences of the disaster.  
Typically, we do not see these commemorative events after five years time (obvious 
exceptions of course exist, especially with major events such as the 10-year anniversary 
September 11 terror attacks). Calendar time (i.e., the same month and day, and on some 
occasions the exact time of the event) marks the event, rather than how far the 
community has progressed in the recovery or back to normal process. Yet, such events 
give people time to think to what degree they have recovered, and how much further they 
have to go. Perhaps these disaster anniversaries are part of the entrainment process to 
demonstrate that the rhythm of life is headed back to normal. Disaster anniversaries force 
various publics to look into the past and future regarding risk, hazards, disasters, 
mitigation.  Finally, both in its own right and within the context of disaster and time, the 
aspect of disaster anniversaries is a topic worth additional study. 
 
Some Final Implications 
 
In this paper I have shown that the application of social time and social disruption to 
disaster settings (i.e., pre-impact, impact, post-impact) along can provide a unique way to 
understand disasters. First, by integrating the ideas of event time, social time, and social 
disruption, we can develop a foundation for creating an empirically based continuum of 
everyday life/emergency, disaster, and catastrophe. An implication of this approach is 
that we use specific social criteria (based upon social disruption via the various time 
concepts) to define the event. As a result, drawing upon social time and social disruption 
casts a rather wide net in understanding events what we call disaster. Occasions such as 
tornadoes, chemical disasters or other similar events would fall under these categories, 
but so could political assassinations, riots, and other events. Consider Friday, November 
22, 1963, in the United States. Time metaphorically stood still from early Friday 
afternoon (following the reports of the initial shots and the President’s death) through 
Monday evening (with the end of the funeral). Most people sat in front of the television 
waiting for new bits of information. Almost all other weekend events and activities 
ceased.  The use of social time may also give us a unique view on understanding slow 
moving disasters (e.g., environmental events, famines and droughts) when compared to 
sudden impact events. Social time and social disruption provides tools to define disaster 
without making assessments (i.e., good/bad) of the event.  
As previously noted, the word disaster has become a “sponge concept” in that it soaks 
up many different meanings—from the vernacular to the scientific (Quarantelli and 
Dynes 1977). However, the use of clock and calendar time with social disruption takes us 
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beyond everyday language (e.g., disaster, hazard, tornado, flood, explosion, terrorist 
attack, war, riot, deaths, economic loss) and provides a means to put such occasions a 
continuum. Thus, we can use the “degree of social disruption” (i.e., emergency, disaster, 
catastrophe) as a variable to better understand the social impacts of these types of events. 
Second, I believe that the concept of entrainment could open new doors for 
understanding post-impact behavior, or the transition from post-impact to pre-impact (or 
everyday) behavior. This may include how an impact “shocks” a wide array of social 
units (e.g., individuals, groups, families, organizations, communities, societies), how new 
definitions of time are used during recovery, and how these units attempt to revert back to 
their pre-impact patterns and rhythms of social time. Rather than using economic, 
demographic, familial or other measures of social change, entrainment could be a key 
measure in understanding social change and disaster. For example, one could determine 
and compare pre-impact and post-impact social time rhythms among various units of 
analysis to determine social change. Drawing upon such variables as age, social class, 
ethnicity, and gender, once could further hypothesize and analyze which groups return to 
their pre-impact rhythm of life.  
Third, in order to capture the complete disaster process, researchers need to focus 
more on obtaining data during the pre-impact or “everyday life” periods. Otherwise, we 
cannot pinpoint the actual degree of social disruption when an event occurs, or even 
make an accurate comparison to determine when different groups or categories of people 
complete the recovery process. Asking respondents about their pre-impact patterns of 
behavior certainly is one step in the right direction. Yet, I believe finding existing non-
obtrusive measures could yield further insight into the relationship between disaster and 
social time. 
Drawing upon Perry and Lindell’s (1986) work, one could also determine how such 
shocks to the system then become routinized or institutionalized—or just ignored. 
Although I cannot find the original citation, I remember sitting in my undergraduate 
collective behavior class hearing my professor (Joseph B. Perry, Jr.) describe how during 
World War II, London residents became used to the bombings by the Germans. After the 
initial series of bombings, when the air raid sirens went off, the population stopped what 
they were doing, went to the shelters, then remerged from the shelters, engaged in fire 
fighting and search and rescue work, and then went back to their other routine. Put 
another way, behavior that initially was new and disruptive, later became routinized and 
institutionalized during times of crisis. 
Finally, I need to point out and address a conundrum noted at the beginning of this 
paper. In order to create an organized structure to present these ideas, I drew upon a 
rather simple set of categories to represent disaster stages (i.e., pre-impact, impact, post-
impact). Yet, the use of these (or other life cycle of disaster categories) failed to provide a 
good analytical basis for understanding the process of time and disaster. Probably the 
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most salient issue is that events cross categories (or put another way, the categories are 
not mutually exclusive for specific events). The organization of this paper encountered 
this problem. Thus, as I pointed out over a decade ago (Neal 1997), it is time for us to 
devise a new set of categories or a new way to look at time and disasters. In short, 
perhaps we need to look beyond the use of “life cycle” stages. Or, using a grounded 
theory approach (rather than march into a research setting with a pre-existing notion of 
ideas and concepts), enter communities or the field asking questions about activities, 
priorities and having those impacted and/or participating in the disaster event provide 
their own notion of time and events. From such work, we could then devise empirically 
derived notions of social time direct from the field. Such a fresh approach possibly 
improves a wide range of conceptual issues in disasters and hazards. In addition, such an 
approach would give us insights on how disaster managers, emergency responders, and 
disaster victims (recognizing that these “roles” may overlap in some cases) see, use and 
experience time. This, in turn, could assist with a number of applied issues (e.g., warning, 
effective “response,” priorities in “recovery”) throughout the process of disaster. 
Overall, I have made this broad conceptual paper on disaster and social time 
suggestive rather than definitive. Hopefully, I have successfully sensitized those in the 
field of disasters, hazards and risk to consider including a wide array of social time issues 
in their analysis. Previously, scholars have generally ignored any notion of time. Now, 
we need to make explicit our use of time in understanding disaster. Such an application, I 
believe, will give us a much deeper understanding on defining disaster, how and why 
such events unfold, and how various social entities attempt to return to normal after the 
event. Finally, the use of social time in disaster can provide sociologists a deeper look 
into understanding key theoretical issues related to social order, social change and social 
emergence, along with voluntaristic versus deterministic patterns of behavior among 
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Negotiations of Acknowledgement Among Middle Class Residents: 
An Analysis of Post Disaster Interactions and Performance in a Danish Context 
 





This article presents an analysis of communication processes between residents, between 
residents and people in the broader societal context, as well as of media coverage of a 
fireworks disaster in a Danish suburb. It demonstrates how residents (all members of the 
Danish middle class) were able to have their situation—their affectedness—
acknowledged in interactions with others and gain considerable attention immediately 
after the accident. In addition, it demonstrates how the initial acknowledgement 
decreased over time. In this case, the axes of differentiation did not relate to questions of 
gender, ethnicity, class or other social categories normally recognized as influential in 
case of disasters. Since the population in the area was very homogenous, the axis of 
differentiation was instead linked to the social category of affectedness, and a hierarchy 
of affectedness was identified within the population. 
 
Keywords: Post disaster communication, axes of differentiation, performance theory, 




This paper is based on an analysis carried out among residents in a small Danish 
suburb of Kolding that experienced sudden, drastic changes in their daily lives when a 
local fireworks warehouse exploded in 2004. Since the affected residents are fairly 
homogenous in regard to class, income, sexual orientation and ethnicity, the case 
provides a good opportunity to investigate processes of differentiation beyond structural 
and macro-sociological conditions and differences. The application of performance 
theory, and working with interactions from the viewpoint of those affected by a disaster, 
takes its departure in micro-sociological processes and will touch on the issue of 
recognition of context, how people whose everyday lives have been highly affected by an 
incident are met by others and how they experience their own context. It will be argued 
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that people are held accountable for their performance, as well as holding themselves 
accountable. 
This article argues that research on disaster communication can benefit from 
employing a performance theoretical approach to increase understanding of certain 
commonly occurring processes in the aftermath of a disaster. Specifically, the concept of 
“affectedness” will be presented to serve as an analytical approach to understanding the 
interactions and communication processes in a social field affected by a disaster. 
Focusing on the dynamic processes of differentiation that can be identified after a 
disaster, this article addresses the question of how attention is given immediately by the 
media and the outside world in some disasters but not others, and to eventually decrease 
even though the situation of those affected has not truly changed. The process of 
comparing and contrasting different disasters is one of the processes identified in the 
aftermath of a disaster as well. The analysis examines how people affected by a disaster 
respond to their situation in the aftermath of the disaster, how others interact with them 
personally and what the media coverage is like. 
During the course of the event, the people affected initially experienced an all-
encompassing focus on their situation, an outpouring of sympathy and an 
acknowledgement of their situation from outside the area—from family members, 
authorities, politicians, the media, and the public in general. Interest waned after a short 
period though. The character of the interest changed not due to the fact that the context 
changed completely, but because the social field outside the area began to define the 




As in other studies, this one builds on the assumption that processes defining the 
severity and consequences of an event are subject to dynamic negotiations, discussions, 
and even dispute in society (Alexander 1997; Hewitt 1997; Oliver-Smith 1996). Such 
discussions are found in literature on mass emergencies and disasters as well, where 
attempts have been made to define what types of events have the necessary traits to 
legitimately be called disasters. For example, the disaster literature addresses the issue of 
whether the label is exclusively linked to natural hazards, or whether it also includes 
technological hazards, terrorism, war etc. (Heelsloot and Ruitenberg 2004; Lagedec 
1982; Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1993; Peek and Sutton 2003; Quarantelli 1993; 2005; Sattler 
2003). Another aspect examined in the literature is whether the number of casualties can 
earn an event the label of disaster (Kreps 1998). The character of the hazard agent is also 
an issue of extensive debate (Blaikie et al. 1994) that involves questioning whether the 
agent causing the crisis is relevant. Finally, how the incident is dealt with after the 
response phase is also a topic of discussion (Oliver-Smith 1996).  
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The case studied in this article involves a fireworks warehouse exploding in a 
residential area in a small suburb of the city of Kolding, Denmark, in November 2004 
and can generally be labelled as a technological accident with a sudden onset, but few 
casualties. The warehouse was subject to the requirements of the European Union Seveso 
II Directive, meaning that it was defined as a high risk plant. In 2000, an expansion in 
storage capacity at the warehouse coincided with the occurrence of a severe disaster in 
Enscheede, Holland, caused by a fire in a fireworks factory. The Dutch incident caused a 
number of citizens living close to the warehouse in Kolding to complain about the 
expansion and question the placement of a fireworks warehouse in the middle of a 
residential neighbourhood, but the local politicians and authorities failed to heed the 
complaints. A container fire caused an explosion in the warehouse where 1,200 tons of 
fireworks—roughly the equivalent of 300 tons of net explosives—were stored. One fire 
fighter was killed and several others injured during the operation. An efficient evacuation 
in the hours before the explosion is one reason for the notably low number of casualties. 
In spite of a huge operation to intervene, the largest on Danish soil since World War II, 
more than ten houses burned to the ground and approximately 350 houses were more or 
less severely damaged.  
This paper argues that massive material destruction is not the only feature defining 
this disaster. First, there was the substantial rebuilding that took place due to the colossal 
destruction of the neighbourhood. Second, there was disruption of normal everyday life 
for even more people. For some families, the rebuilding and the re-housing extended 
beyond a year after the accident. In addition, efforts made to discover the cause of the 
explosion were influenced by a prolonged debate that also shed light on the role a number 
of politicians and authorities played in the incident. Several evaluations were carried out 
to identify and place responsibility for the disaster. Finally, politicians, the authorities, the 
media and local residents were highly focused on the psychological reactions of the 
affected residents and the personnel involved in the operation in an effort to avoid 
psychological trauma and other long-term consequences.  
The case analysis undertaken shows that the people affected by the fireworks accident 
defined the event as a disaster, a conclusion broadly acknowledged by the authorities and 
the media as well. Consequently, the accident can be defined as a disaster (Buckle 2005; 
Rosenthal 1998). Instead of pursuing Krep’s (1998) approach and discussing whether the 
incident was a disaster or whether it simply had the potential to be a disaster, I follow 
Alexander (1997) and Dombrowsky (1998), who question the benefit of working with 
absolute definitions that differentiate between disasters and other events. I also draw on 
Fordham (1998) by arguing that processes of differentiation should be analysed in both 
the developed and developing world as well as in regions capable of managing large-
scale calamities as well as in areas with less structured emergency management. Finally 
this study departs as well on David’s (2010) argument that processes of “studying up” 
and including a broad range of class and resource settings are needed to get a more 
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Although this article suggests a new focus of analysis in studies of post-disaster 
communication, it is inspired by two existing research traditions in the disaster literature. 
One, the vulnerability approach, is represented by Alexander (1997), Blaikie et al. 
(1994), Cutter (1996), Fordham and Ketteridge (1998), Hewitt (1997) and Phillips et al. 
(2010). These authors have sought to comprehend the macro-sociological question of 
why some societies or particular social groups such as children, women, the deprived, 
ethnic minorities and illegal immigrants are more vulnerable, and not just physically, than 
others in the event of a disaster (see Zahran et al. 2008 for an overview). Focus on this 
area is vital since it can help to raise awareness about the groups of people most exposed 
in the event of a disaster. The other approach addresses the question of how media 
contribute to setting the public agenda about disasters in terms of determining which 
victims are worthy of attention and how to show compassion (e.g., Chouliaraki 2006; 
Pantti 2009; Robinson 2008). Furthermore, this research perspective focuses on the ways 
in which the media represent worthy versus unworthy victims and also the media’s ability 
to set an agenda that includes some incidents and excludes others.  
The article proffers a theoretical framework that focuses on interactions that allow for 
the inclusion of perspectives not covered by the two other research traditions just 
described. This alternative analytical approach aims at introducing ways to understand 
principles and axes of differentiation other than those of gender, class, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, and disabilities. Specifically, it focuses on the micro-sociological level, 
taking into account the dynamics of local communication processes that influence who is 
acknowledged and for which reasons, though it also offers conclusions regarding 
processes on a more macro-sociological level (Goffman 1959; Heritage 1984; West and 
Fenstermaker 1995; West and Zimmerman 1987). This framework is centred on 
interactions primarily diverges from the other traditions in two ways. First, it differs from 
previous work on vulnerability since it does not address the unequal distribution of 
resources (e.g., Fordham 1998; Hewitt 1997) or examine the structural disparity present 
in any society (Cutter 2005). The dominant literature on disaster vulnerability 
understands that people bring their vulnerability into a disaster qua their race, ethnicity, 
class, gender, sexual orientation, disability and the like.  Second, the framework covering 
interactions and performance applied in this article offers a perspective on the media’s 
that goes beyond solely analysing media texts (Chouliaraki 2006; Pantti 2009; Tester 
2001). Overall, in the context of this paper, this approach predominantly concerns the 
media’s impact on the people affected by a disaster, how the media allow them to 
understand their own situation, and their experience of the ways compassion is meted out.   
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A pivotal argument in this article is that the local context has to be considered in an 
analysis of the distribution of acknowledgement after a disaster. That is , the analysis has 
to be situated (West and Zimmerman 1995, p. 23). The population in the case study 
presented here, in contrast to other cases, is largely defined by a high degree of financial 
equality and a fair distribution of resources. The middle class neighbourhood struck by 
the explosions was also homogeneous in other characteristics such as ethnicity. Thus, the 
degree of equality and homogeneity in the population provides a solid basis for 
investigating communicative and performative differentiations as well as processes of in- 
and exclusion beyond structural inequality.   
The foundation for the analysis undertaken in this article is the theoretical work of 
West and Zimmerman (1987), West and Fenstermaker (1995) and Butler (2004). In this 
performance theoretical approach, which derives from cultural sociology, one of the main 
arguments is that, as people interact and communicate, they are held accountable for their 
actions and their performance by others while simultaneously holding themselves 
accountable for their own actions and performance. That is, members of a society 
regularly evaluate their own performance and that of others, regardless of whether there 
is a disaster. The texts by the aforementioned authors chiefly look at accountability in 
relation to the social category “gender”, where they approach gender as a social category, 
something that is done or performed, not as an essential trait of a person. This is an 
approach that also has been applied in disaster research by Fothergill (2004, p. 15). The 
key idea is that people are held accountable for their performance in a number of other 
social categories such as the ways they express their identification with a certain racial or 
ethnic group or their performance in a role such as a police officer, parent, journalist or 
other categories that serve as axes of differentiation (Appelros 2005; Krekula, Närvänen 
and Näsman 2005; Martin and Jurik 1996). 
The analysis argues that certain expectations are established for people affected by a 
disaster, as will be demonstrated in the Danish fireworks incident. People are held 
responsible for their performance of what can be called the social category of 
affectedness after the event; they also hold themselves accountable for their own 
performance of this category. Affectedness is not an omnirelevant category as is the case 
with gender (West and Fenstermaker 1995, p. 25). Instead, it is a situated, post-disaster 
category in Kolding. The act of holding someone else or oneself accountable for an 
appropriate performance of the category of affectedness allows the identification of 
significant processes of differentiation, specifically the distribution of acknowledgement. 
Identifying the distribution of acknowledgement is another way to understand the 
processes set in motion in the aftermath of a disaster regarding how some people receive 
an abundance of symbolic privileges in terms of acknowledgement and others do not. It 
provides insight as well into how this distribution is subsequently dealt with by people 
struck by a disaster. The point is that gaining status in any social category is achieved 
through a dynamic process in interaction with others (West and Zimmerman 1987; West 
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and Fenstermaker 1995; Butler 2004). Consequently, using a performance theoretical 
approach provides what the concept of vulnerability is less capable of—examining 
interactions after a disaster by considering local dynamics and the constant change in 
definitions in order to understand the distribution of attention and symbolic 
acknowledgement given to people affected by that disaster.  
Other researchers have previously dealt with some of these issues. In a discussion of 
theories of modernity, Edelstein (2000) has approached the relationship between people 
affected by a technological disaster and those outside who have not experienced the same 
calamities. Kroll-Smith and Couch (1990) show the mutual evaluations of citizens in 
between in a town threatened by a technological disaster, whereas Bos, Ullberg, and ‘t 
Hart (2005) analyse how different victim communities are more or less able to work for 
remembrance of disasters and the mourning of those who lost their lives. It is argued that 
people have to be articulated in order to keep the public agenda focused on the event, the 
grievances, and the questions that remain unanswered (p. 22). Although these studies are 
based on other theoretical traditions than the one employed here, they present relevant 
findings since they touch on the question of distribution of acknowledgement in a post-
disaster period. 
It is widely recognised that the media play a crucial role in the process of defining an 
incident, as well as contribute to the distribution of acknowledgement and engage others 
to evaluate actors’ performances (Chouliaraki 2006; Pantti 2009; Tester 2001). This 
article argues that the media contribute to defining the parameters of the social field 
affected by a disaster and are co-producers of meaning. Hence, in contrast to research 
arguing that the media have the power to define the situation, it will be argued that there 
is a complex interplay between media coverage and the interactions in the field that 
delineates the situation. Nonetheless, the media admittedly have a central, though not 
exclusive, position in the social field and influence the definitions that arise in a disaster 
(Höijer 2004). The theoretical framework in this study builds on the assumption that the 
local and situated accomplishments of social categories happens in interplay with the 
institutional arrangements (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 146). A concluding section of 





I conducted a comprehensive qualitative study in the Kolding area that began two 
weeks after the incident occurred and lasted seven and a half months. The findings 
presented in this article stem from qualitative in-depth interviews with fifteen residents 
living in ten different households affected by the accident to varying degrees. I 
interviewed both husbands and wives in five households. In the other five households I 
interviewed only one adult; two of those adults were single, whereas only one adult had 
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time to participate in an interview in the other three households. Altogether, eight women 
and seven men from the neighborhood are represented in this article. Five were in their 
thirties, two in their forties, one in his fifties, two in their sixties and five in their 
seventies. The neighborhood was partly dominated by the first generation of residents 
who were in their seventies and partly by younger families who were second generation 
residents. The homes of these interviewees are located within one kilometre of the 
warehouse and were all either totally destroyed or damaged by the explosions that took 
place. Some residents had remained in their homes when the interviews took place, 
whereas others had been temporarily rehoused. 
During the first weeks after the accident, I met a woman from the disaster struck area 
and asked her if I could talk to her for my research. She didn’t feel up to participating in 
an interview at the time, though she said she would like to help me to get in contact with 
people from the area. She became my “sponsor” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1993) by 
putting me in contact with the first five households, an approach that can be categorized 
as a “sampling of convenience” (Trainor et al. 2006). The interviewees in these five 
households all connected me to yet another household, an approach to be characterized as 
snowball-sampling (ibid.).    
There is no available socio-economic analysis of the residents living in the area struck 
by the explosions. Based upon interviews with officials at the municipality, I estimate 
that the residents have an average income for Danes and information in the qualitative 
interviews suggests that this is the case for the interviewees as well. All of the 
interviewees except one owned their homes. Some of the interviewees had post-
secondary education and, not including those who had retired, all were employed at the 
time of the accident. The residents in the area held economic and symbolic capital to such 
a degree that they can be characterized as belonging to the middle-class (Bourdieu 1984; 
1998). There were no differences in ethnicity, since no ethnic minorities lived in the area. 
I interviewed seven police officers, four of them in senior positions, as well as four 
senior administration officials from the municipality of Kolding. Ten men and one 
woman represent the authorities in this article. They were all involved in the emergency 
management during and after the accident. Due to the goodwill of the authorities, I was 
permitted to interview the officials involved in the operation. 
One of the central aims of the interviews was to provide interviewees with a forum to 
offer representations of their experiences and their situation (Gubrium and Holstein 
1997). The interviews were not designed to get interviewees to reveal their inner feelings 
or to assess whether they were traumatised or would later develop post-traumatic stress 
disorder (LaJoie, Sprang, and McKinney 2010; Stimpson 2005). The purpose was to 
record their accounts of what happened. It should be noted that “revealing feelings” and 
“representations” of feelings are in no way equivalent (Gubrium and Holstein 1997, p. 57 
ff.). The interviewer in a qualitative interview is often seen as a co-producer of the 
interview (Holstein and Gubrium 2003), since the interview situation in itself can be 
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viewed as an acknowledgement of people’s situations (Killian 2002). The interviews 
conducted in this case study were designed not to question the interviewees’ 
representations of affectedness, but to give them an opportunity to describe their 
experiences. In this way, I contributed to the representations of affectedness by creating a 
sense of recognition of the interviewees’ context. 
In addition to the qualitative interviews, I analysed the media coverage from the day 
after the accident, 4 November 2004 through the next eight months until 30 June 2005. 
This period is nearly equivalent to the amount of time spent carrying out fieldwork and 
has provided the opportunity to discuss, draw parallels, and identify discrepancies 
between the fieldwork analyses and the media coverage. Moreover, it also was possible 
to identify the correspondence between local residents’ understandings of the disaster and 
what was published in the media.  
The media coverage analysed is from two Danish newspapers, Jydske Vestkysten, a 
regional paper, and Jyllands Posten, a national paper. I searched the Danish database 
Infomedia, which gathers all Danish media texts and found 499 media texts that 
contained either the words “Johnsen”, “Seest”, “fyrværkeri”, or “eksplosion” (the name 
of the warehouse, the name of the suburb, and the Danish words for fireworks and 
explosion, respectively). Of these 499 texts, 211 contained either representations of 
residents, accounts concerning the residents’ situations, or interviews with residents. The 
texts include op-eds, editorials, letters to the editor, columns, commentaries, news reports 
and articles. 
Phillips argues that qualitative research can offer new perspectives on disasters since 
it is grounded in peoples’ experience (2002, p. 203). The analysis presented in this article 
is a product of an abductive process of analysis (Blaikie 1993) where the theoretical 
framework has informed the reading of the empirical material and vice versa. The data 
produced showed signs of differentiation processes in the area but it did not concern 
class, ethnicity, and gender to the degree shown in previous studies. Due to this, new 
research questions emerged (Phillips 2002, p. 203). Thus the questions arose “how is 
acknowledgement distributed?” and “how do the axes of differentiation occur when 
differentiation concerning categories such as gender, class and ethnicity is not that 




Accomplishment of the Social Category “Affectedness” 
 
In the case of the Kolding fireworks explosion and other incidents, disasters and the 
changes in conditions they cause, affect interactions in the field. After the Kolding 
explosions, the affected residents were no longer expected to express themselves and 
interact as they had before (Andersen 2008). They interacted and expressed themselves in 
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new ways due to their radically changed situation; they expected themselves to express 
that they had experienced a traumatizing accident and suffered from a number of losses. 
The outside world also expected them to express their experience in some way—not just 
one way but several ways (West and Fenstermaker 1995). Disasters call for new 
expressions that are not necessarily familiar, given that people acquainted with disasters 
are more likely to have experienced natural hazards rather than technological ones 
because natural disasters can be chronic (see Alexander 1997). As a result, I suggest that 
the interactions can be conceptualised as dominated by a new social category, 
affectedness, that arose when the warehouse exploded (Andersen 2008). 
The analysis below is divided into four parts. First, it touches on the communication 
processes in the local area and how the category of affectedness became central in the 
interactions during the initial period after the explosions. This was a time when everyone 
was working to conceptualise the disaster and make sense of the residents’ situations in 
order to distribute appropriate acknowledgement. Second, the analysis shows how the 
initial acknowledgement and recognition of people’s situation changed as the triggering 
event—the explosions—receded into the past. Finally, the analysis shows how this 
particular accident, and the affectedness of the residents, was put into perspective and 
evaluated in relation to a number of other disasters in order to make sense of the 
situation.  
Initially, getting acquainted with the social category of affectedness was a process for 
the residents affected by the explosions, as was finding out which expressions would be 
acknowledged as appropriate after having experienced a devastating accident and living 
in a damaged neighbourhood. Although the performance of affectedness was 
accomplished as the residents interacted in this new, alien situation, they found out what 
to express and how to express it by interacting with each other and with people living 
elsewhere, who also contributed to the residents’ efforts to find out how to approach the 
new and unfamiliar category. In the course of their interactions, residents discovered 
what was acknowledged, how to perform in an appropriate manner and whose 
performances were considered either appropriate or inappropriate. They became 
acquainted with evaluating interactions in the local area and also began holding each 
other accountable in an ongoing process (West and Fenstermaker 1995; West and 
Zimmerman 1987). 
During the first five days after the explosions, residents were denied access to their 
homes so the authorities could investigate the area and secure it from further damage as 
well as assess the state of the homes that were not totally destroyed. During this time, 
residents met in a local schoolyard several times a day to receive news about the state of 
their homes.  A woman in her forties describes how the residents at these meetings were 
aware of each other’s’ expressions:  
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the police officer told us that none of the people in our driveway were able 
to move into their homes … my neighbours and I yelled and wept … well, 
I don’t know exactly why I wept and moaned like that.  
 
The response of yelling and mourning were found to be appropriate in the situation, 
though this was only one out of many forms of expression evaluated in the close 
interactions at the local school that served as a convenient opportunity for the residents to 
navigate how to perform in such an unfamiliar situation. 
One key aspect of what happened was that people from outside the neighbourhood 
also contributed to production of the social category. Due to the fact that the residents 
were kept outside the area for several days, there was close contact on a number of 
matters between the residents and representatives from the authorities. This contact 
allowed residents the opportunity to have their expressions of affectedness acknowledged 
and the definition of their situation as terrible was established. The interviews are 
dominated by accounts of the ways in which the authorities showed their care and 
concern for the residents but, particularly, how the police treated people. Senior police 
officers and municipal officials described how they had decided to carry out an ethical 
strategy to be caring towards the residents in the days after the explosion. The police saw 
themselves as playing a role in order to “protect and create a feeling of safety and 
security” among people in the destroyed neighbourhood. Through these acts the police 
contributed to the accomplishment of the category of affectedness by expressing that the 
incident was devastating and that the residents were indeed in a situation where they 
needed care and compassion. 
A woman in her thirties describes how a senior police officer, “showed understanding 
and was so caring”. She also explained that the same officer was overwhelmed with 
emotion when describing the miserable state of their homes to residents. The police 
acknowledged the residents and their expressions of grief, anger, fear, worry and 
frustration. Consequently, the police, as well as the FRS and the municipal officials 
played a central role in the accomplishment of the category of affectedness, since they 
expected the residents to show how affected they were.  
The journalists covering the accident for the Danish media engaged with people in the 
same way by reassuring residents that they had been put into a devastating situation. 
Acknowledgement from people outside the area that the residents’ situation was 
exceedingly difficult, and the articulation of the need for help and support expressed in 
the contact and interaction between residents and people from outside the area, served to 
establish the social category in addition to being appreciated by the residents. 
Previous studies point both in the direction of disaster response being militarized in 
case of Hurricane Katrina (Tierney et al. 2006) and in the direction of caring officials 
(Linenthal 2001; Wachendorf 2004) and media contributing to the acknowledgement of 
victims in a somewhat parallel situation (Bos et al. 2005). The question is whether the 
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level of conflict or care depends on institutional and macro sociological traits in a society, 
or if the interactions between officials and the media on the one side and people struck by 
an incident on the other side should be explained with reference to the local context and 
circumstances. 
The people directly affected by the explosions experienced identical interactions not 
only with family members, friends, colleagues, and local authorities, but also with people 
from Danish institution with whom they were less acquainted, such as representatives 
from the state of Denmark, the Queen of Denmark, and several ministers. In addition, 
several non-local private charity initiatives—organised online and promoted via the 
media—provided goods, clothing, furniture, accommodations, money etc. to those in the 
affected area. Due to the fact that Denmark has a low level of charitable giving on a 
national level, the effort to assist was a unique sign of recognition of the people of 
Kolding for what they had been through.  
The aforementioned groups undertook an assessment of how residents expressed 
themselves. This assessment found the reactions to be appropriate in the context of a 
damaged home and thus took the shocking experience into consideration. As a result, aid 
was offered in a large variety of ways that ranged from practical assistance such as 
housing to compassionately listening to residents express feelings of grief, anger and 
exhaustion. Furthermore, the media was a key player in evaluating the residents’ situation 
and how they expressed themselves. The incident was covered intensively in the first 
weeks after it had occurred. There were news stories on the radio and television as well 
as articles and op-eds in newspapers in which people’s doubts about the future and their 
frustrations about how their protests against expanding the warehouse went unheeded. 
News items also addressed the loss of financial worth of residents’ possessions, their loss 
of possessions with symbolic value, whether losses would be covered, and their reactions 
to the violent experience and possible traumatisation. Local and national politicians also 
acknowledged the residents’ difficult context, promising to provide help and support as 
well as to take action to prevent similar accidents from happening again. Compassion was 
expressed (Tester 2001) and the residents were portrayed as worthy victims (Höijer 2004; 
Pantti 2009). The broad variety of issues covered in the media did not convey whether 
some aspects of the situation were easier to recognise and focus on than others, especially 
to people not directly affected, or if it was simply the situation as a whole that was 
recognised.  
 
From Agreement to Disagreement 
 
One important assumption in the writings on social categories and accountability in 
relation to the performance of categories is that expectations towards a social category 
are not static. Categories are dynamic in the sense that the context always is taken into 
consideration when someone’s performance is evaluated. As a result, this means that if 
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the identification of the context changes, expectations about people’s expressions change 
as well (McCall 2005; West and Fenstermaker 1995). The context will therefore always 
be taken into consideration when people are held accountable for their performance of 
affectedness and other categories. Analysis of the communication processes in Kolding 
shows that, over time, an observable lack of recognition for the context is identifiable and 
the evaluation of expressions undergoes a change. The interviewees tell how interactions 
with people from outside the area changed to some degree since the affectedness had to 
be negotiated to a larger extent than was the case in the initial phase. The residents 
experienced a shift in their contacts with others. 
One of the central criteria for the commencement of dis-acknowledging expressions 
of affectedness is a change that leads to a decline in the recognition of people’s contexts. 
Initially, agreement was easily reached about what the reasons were for expressing 
affectedness. The devastating situation was mainly defined by issues such as the potential 
of the explosions to have caused a much greater number of casualties and the destruction 
of peoples’ possessions, as well as the authorities failure to heed complaints by 
neighbours. Some interviewees explained that they were later held accountable for 
contexts they could not recognise at all. For example, some people from outside the area 
believed that the tragedy was manageable because of the low number of casualties and 
because the rebuilding had begun. From the local residents’ point of view, this 
description of the context failed to include the larger picture. One woman in her thirties 
explained “Every time you talked to someone, it was like, ‘You’re lucky that you’re 
alive! That’s so wonderful’. And stuff like that. And I remember thinking, ‘I didn’t feel 
lucky. It didn’t feel like I was lucky at all’”. 
In interactions with people from outside the area, people from the neighbourhood hit 
by the explosion also experienced being positioned as gaining financially from the 
incident since insurance companies were able to cover the expense of rebuilding. A man 
in his forties quoted the remarks of a colleague, who said to him “You must have earned 
a fortune from this”. However, although the interviewee had a new home instead of the 
old damaged one, he did not feel that he had won out financially. The colleague’s 
comments were a source of frustration because of the immense number of symbolic 
losses suffered. Another example of the change in the recognition of context is illustrated 
in the following quote, in which a woman in her thirties cites a visiting relative from 
another town who said “Now there is no reason for people in this neighbourhood to cry 
any more. You’ve either got a new house or restored the old one—so stop complaining”. 
Engaging her relative in a discussion to negotiate a different evaluation of the story, 
she argued that she would gladly take back her old home with poorly insulated windows 
if it meant that that the explosions had never happened. She would do anything to get her 
old life back. Such efforts to negotiate the evaluation of stories after a calamity are also 
presented by Fordham (1998). 
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For the residents affected by the explosion, their perceptions of fundamental changes 
in their ordinary contexts lasted for a long time, while outsiders quickly began to question 
the terribleness and severity of the situation. This difference in recognition of the context 
led to negotiations about affectedness. As was the case during the initial period after the 
accident, the evaluations that stemmed from interpersonal contact were reflected in the 
evaluations presented in the media. Nohrstedt (2007) argues that in- and exclusions of 
issues discussed by the public are backed by the media since the media create 
“ideological horizons”. Therefore, an analysis of the mediated discourses provides a good 
opportunity for a co-investigation of the dynamics in the social field. 
The media texts show that after the initial phase, the amount of news coverage and 
the number of texts on the accident decreased, though recognition of a number of 
elements in the residents’ contexts were still on the agenda. Op-eds, however, show a 
significant and apparent questioning the residents’ context. A few days after the accident, 
a letter to the editor in the regional paper states: 
 
What happened in Kolding is tragic. I feel for the people affected by this, 
especially for the relatives of the fire fighter who was killed. But now 
we’ve heard enough about it (…) It’s been almost 8 days, so we don’t 
have to talk about it anymore. At least not those of us not directly affected. 
(Jydske Vestkysten, 17 November 2004) 
 
This letter to the editor argues that acknowledgement of affectedness can only go on 
for a limited period, a week in this case, for the people affected by a technological 
accident of the magnitude experienced in Kolding. 
Another letter to the editor in the same newspaper states: 
 
I feel sorry for the people whose homes have been destroyed by the large 
explosion. Money, clothing, accommodations and assistance have been 
offered and sent from all over the country to the families in Kolding that 
were hit by this catastrophe. And then I read in my paper about a couple 
frustrated about not being able to move on with their lives (…) How can 
you write something like that? They ought to be happy that they haven’t 
lost their children, wife or husband. In this case I am thinking of the 
person most affected, the fire fighter who died to save you. If anyone feels 
bad and terrible, then it is his relatives, his children and his wife. (Jydske 
Vestkysten, 20 November 2004) 
 
This letter suggests that complaints and expressions of frustration are inappropriate 
when people affected by the incident have not lost a family member. Compared with the 
loss of life, the symbolic loss of a home and the resulting insecurity are not enough to 
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merit compassion or make people worthy victims (Pantti 2009; Robinson 2008; 
Chouliaraki 2007). People are held accountable for their performance of affectedness in 
relation to the situated context and it seems that a part of the struggle relates to 
disagreements about the situated context. The question then arises as to what is the actual 
situation of the residents. 
For many people, affectedness still rests on doubts about the future,  futile protests 
against expanding the warehouse, loss of possessions of financial value, the loss of 
possessions with symbolic values, the question of whether losses will be covered, 
reactions to the severity of the experience, traumatisation and the children’s situation. 
From the residents’ point of view, the category of affectedness involves many more 
aspects that are not widely accepted, or at least, not accepted in ways that create 
continuous acknowledgement of the expressions of affectedness.  
Notably, the overall picture of the distribution of attention and acknowledgement is a 
blurred one. In the months after the incident the authorities withdrew when their activities 
ended, though a group of psychologists continued the treatment of trauma. Interactions 
involving care, acknowledgement and recognition of affectedness by family members and 
friends continued. The people affected by the incident were met simultaneously by 
disinterest and distance as well as interest and involvement, contradictory evaluations that 
influenced their evaluation of themselves. 
Analysis of the Danish incident shows that these dynamics appeared in the social 
field immediately after the incident, which means that the residents had to confront 
conflicting evaluations of their situations. After a while, only certain sources 
acknowledged the residents’ situation. The universal agreement on rendering attention 
and care for people and a way of conceptualising the situation that everyone can agree on 
undergoes negotiation after a brief amount of time before the agreement rapidly turns into 
disagreement. One of the central issues of the debate is the issue of what context or 
situated practice must be taken into account when evaluating the people’s expressions of 
affectedness (McCall 2005).  
 
Hierarchy of Affectedness 
 
Disasters lead, as also shown by Linenthal (2001) and Larabee (2000), to discussions 
of whom to privilege and thereby to processes of exclusion. The last part of the Kolding 
analysis shows how a hierarchy of affectedness is constructed in interactions within the 
group of people in the local area, in interactions between those from the area and those 
outside the area, as well as in the media coverage. The hierarchy is based on the question 
of who is worthy of being included and takes positions on whom to exclude.  Both the 
interviews and the media negotiate a local hierarchy and discuss, for example, the status 
of the accident in comparison with other disasters. The hierarchy that I identify in the 
empirical material resembles Butler’s (2004) hierarchy of grief, which is based on 
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common agreements in a social field regarding the matter of what makes for a grievable 
life and why some lives are worth mourning and others are not. I identify similar 
processes of differentiation in a social field during disasters by bringing into play the 
notion of a hierarchy of affectedness (Andersen 2008), which still refers to processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in an interactionistic analysis framework.  
Struggles can be identified in order to position one’s own affectedness in relation to 
others. There are accounts in the local Kolding hierarchy in which each family positions 
itself in relation to other families and their degree of affectedness. A number of 
interviewees mentioned a particular family in the area who lost three young children in a 
fatal fire some years prior to the firework accident. Their home had now burned to the 
ground again. A story in the regional newspaper (Jydske Vestkysten, 6 November 2004) 
suggested that the locals were unable to fathom the degree of this tragedy. Interviewees 
often referred to this family in order to put their own story into perspective. One’s own 
affectedness is nothing compared to the misfortune of this family that even makes the 
interviewees’ situation seem privileged. References were made to other families or 
households against whom the interviewees measured themselves and their situations. 
Families who had lost items of high symbolic and low financial value were often placed 
in the category of very affected. Having family photo albums spared from destruction, for 
example, was considered to be a major privilege. 
Some of the people affected by the incident ended up questioning their position in the 
hierarchy. A woman in her thirties was unsure as to whether the psychological 
counselling being offered was also available for people in her situation. Did someone in 
her position and with her degree of affectedness have the right to take advantage of the 
counselling offered? She asked a good friend who worked at the local hospital what she 
thought and her friend said “You know what? There are a lot of people who haven’t had 
experiences as bad as you have who come to see the psychologist”. Ultimately, she 
concluded that she could also consult a psychologist but she needed help in order to 
evaluate her position. 
The hierarchy constructed after the explosions concerns the positioning of citizens in 
the local area, but also involves the construction of a hierarchy that places the Kolding 
residents in relation to people affected by disasters elsewhere in the world. Making sense 
of the fireworks accident was achieved by making comparisons to previous global and 
historically familiar incidents. After the explosions, the accident was positioned in 
relation to events such as World War II, 9/11 and the 2004 South East Asia tsunami. This 
was the case for residents, politicians and journalists who had covered wars. Parallels that 
might appear peculiar to people from the outside made sense within the social field and 
facilitated an understanding of the gravity of the situation and the residents’ affectedness. 
Parallels to 9/11 appeared in a debate on the phenomenon of convergence occurring 
in the area. People from outside who were labelled as curious (Kendra and Wachendorf 
2003) practiced a kind of convergence, showing up to get an impression of the 
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dimensions of the incident. When the appropriateness of doing so was discussed in the 
regional newspaper, the point was made that tourists in New York often visit Ground 
Zero to make sense of 9/11. (Jydske Vestkysten, 2 December 2004 and 21 November 
2004). 
Despite the comparisons made in the neighbourhood and backed by politicians and 
the media in the initial phase between the fireworks explosions and other international 
disasters, the hierarchy of affectedness was undergoing changes. The point is that there 
never will be any obvious structure defining worthy victims (Pantti 2009) since new 
disasters will occur. The context of the Kolding accident was put into perspective, for 
example, by the 2004 South East Asia tsunami. This international catastrophe challenged 
the context of the Danish incident, setting a local process in motion of negotiating the 
hierarchy in order to place the fireworks incident in relation to the tsunami. For some 
people, the tsunami played a central role in helping them understand the diminishing 
acknowledgement of the people in the neighborhood, both in relation to personal 
interactions and mediated ones. One newspaper editorial stated: 
 
The fire and the gigantic, fierce explosions at the fireworks warehouse 
aren’t something you forget right away, if you were there for what has 
rapidly – and fairly – came to be called a disaster (…) Very few, if 
anyone, could have foreseen that the disaster in Kolding would end up 
seeming like a manageable accident within a short time span. But when it 
is followed by the Asian tsunami, then the proportions suddenly change. 
After all, with the exception of one fire fighter who died, it was primarily 
things of material value that disappeared in Kolding. (Jydske Vestkysten, 2 
January 2005) 
 
A number of the local residents agreed with the statement in this editorial. They 
thought that the 2004 South East Asia tsunami was much worse than the technological 
disaster in Denmark, when seen in relation to the context of material damage and few 
casualties. However, not everyone agreed. Some people negotiated the importance of 
keeping the Kolding accident on the agenda instead of letting the tsunami dominate 
everyone’s attention in Denmark. One reason for the commitment to this struggle was the 
question of financial help for the families in Kolding who did not feel that they had 
received sufficient financial compensation from their insurance companies and who 
would have liked the government’s involvement in the matter (which the Danish 
government refused). A male interviewee in his forties stated: “Phuket down there … that 
tsunami and whatever … they can send several billion in funding down there, but when 
something happens in their own backyard … you can’t even catch their attention”. 
It is not an extraordinary occurrence to receive social welfare in Denmark where 
comprehensive forms of welfare payments are offered. Thus, asking for financial help is 
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not experienced as stigmatizing in the way that Fothergill (2004) showed in an U.S. 
context. This is only the case among few of the older interviewees in the Danish case. 
However, the tsunami was not solely understood as a competition about who received the 
most financial help. A disaster such as the tsunami brings about changes in the 
acknowledgement of the affectedness. In Kolding it was seen, for example, as a threat 
since the Danish media agenda changed significantly, just as it did in other countries 
(Pantti 2009). One woman interviewed stated: 
 
We really felt like we were being pushed out in the cold when the tsunami 
came between Christmas and New Year’s Eve … A television programme 
had been made about the Kolding incident and everybody in the 
neighbourhood … that’s what everyone was talking about. We’d really 
been looking forward to seeing the program and then the television station 
just cancelled it! They thought that the tsunami had brought enough 
disaster. 
 
The interviewee sees the media agenda as important because it represents a platform 
from which those affected could receive not only recognition from others but also gain an 
opportunity to recognise themselves and their affectedness as well. Symbolic recognition 
also happens through the media just as it does in interpersonal interactions. Consequently, 
when the media coverage changed quantitatively, so did the way people experienced 
having their situation acknowledged. 
It is of importance to note that the severity of the accident and the despair among the 
residents were negotiated differently in the local area. For some, it was important to have 
their situation acknowledged several months after the accident, whereas others 
understood and accepted the decrease in interest and recognition. As emphasised in other 
studies, incidents that are kept on the agenda and stay in the collective memory , or 
incidents that are placed in the top of the hierarchy of grief (Butler 2004), or that keep 





The conclusion of the Danish study is that outcomes of the post-disaster interactions 
cannot be foreseen since a number of relations and dimensions have an influence on the 
negotiations, processes of negotiations, and hierarchies constructed in relation to a 
disaster. The analysis of the processes in the Danish disaster-struck area with middle 
class residents shows how people in their interactions simultaneously support each other 
and have conflicts while negotiating the situation, a situation that is also well described 
by Fordham (1998) and Fothergill (2004). Meanwhile, the widespread practice of 
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insurance purchase g the Danish middle class makes it difficult to identify characteristics 
from other studies e.g. concerning processes of stigmatization of people in need of 
financial help.  
The Kolding study is rich in accounts of caring officials and authorities that 
acknowledged the residents’ situation and is, in this regard, consistent with some of the 
findings in the existing literature on officials’ supporting roles post-disaster (Linentahl 
2001; Wachendorf 2004). It is worth noting, however, that contrary findings are also part 
of the research field, arguing that militarization, rather than care, is identified in other 
cases (Tierney et al. 2006). Officials and authorities can have disparate influences on 
post-disaster processes and their influence on in- and exclusions should therefore be 
taken into account as well.   
The existing literature demonstrates that the media often cover disasters intensively in 
the initial phase followed by a decrease in coverage. In this study, I argue that it is 
important to understand how the media coverage is understood and interacts with other 
processes as well. The results of the Kolding study are in accordance with a basic premise 
in the existing research that the media play a central role regarding compassionate 
coverage (Chouliaraki 2006; Pantti 2009; Tester 2001) and that the media appoint those 
they consider to be worthy victims (Chouliaraki 200; Pantti 2009; Robinson 2008). 
Hence, the Kolding study concludes that more academic attention should be given to 
analyses of how media coverage influences interactions. 
The outcome of the post-disaster communication processes regarding issues such as 
the acknowledgement of affectedness, principles of differentiation, and negotiation of 
hierarchies in a local area does not entirely depend either on interactions among residents, 
interactions between residents and people in the broader societal context, or media 
coverage. Instead there is a concurrent interplay among processes going on in, and in 
relation to, a disaster struck area, and a number of situated dimensions might have to be 
taken into account. Even though the findings from the Kolding event seem to be in line 
with those within the disaster research field, in which post-disaster processes of in- and 
exclusion are well described, the outcome of communication processes are always the 




This analysis sheds light on the different ways situated practices are understood in a 
disaster as well as on how differences in context and a decrease in focus on a difficult 
situation for the group of people affected go hand in hand. The performance theoretical 
approach emphasizes the importance of recognizing context regarding the overwhelming 
interest and acknowledgement often given immediately to people affected by a disaster, 
at least in the developed world. This approach can help to shed light upon the post-
disaster disagreement on the question of defining the context for people affected by that 
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disaster. I argue that disaster research, and research on disaster communication processes 
in particular, can benefit from a performance analytical approach due to its immediate 
focus on local processes of negotiating what expressions are deemed appropriate or 
inappropriate in a post-disaster period.  
The Kolding explosion illustrates the theoretical assumption that, though it is the case 
in this study that the social category of affectedness apparently gets accomplished locally 
in the aftermath of the incident, it is also well nurtured and supported by society in 
general—including the authorities, politicians and media coverage. Interactions in the 
social field are the product of dynamics and definitions constructed in the encounter 
between the micro level and society in general. The Danish authorities acted in a caring 
and compassionate way towards people from the middle class in general and, since a 
majority of Danes belong to the middle class, they could identify themselves with the 
residents of the damaged neighbourhood because they were familiar with their way of 
living. Finally, the media held an interest in covering incidents with which readers could 
identify. It can be argued that this is why the local residents gained attention and 
acknowledgement. At the same time, the way that the disaster was dealt with in this 
particular case, which was broadly covered in the media, set standards in society in 
general. This will have an impact on disasters to come. 
An additional point made in this article is that “studying up” in the research on mass 
emergencies and disasters creates insight that calls for new analytical frames and notions. 
One conclusion of this study is that even though middle class people might experience a 
disaster without suffering financial losses, they might suffer from symbolic losses that 
can be hard for others to grasp. Those who experience a shortage of symbolic 
acknowledgement require additional resources to gain attention. A number of people in 
the case studied were unable to keep the accident on the public agenda despite the fact 
that they belonged to the middle class and had a financial status that made it difficult to 
categorise them as vulnerable. It takes more; resources of a more subtle character than 
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International disaster volunteers are an important group of workers on the ground after 
a disaster who have not been the subject of much research. Utilizing survey data from 
volunteers with a non-governmental organization in Leogane, Haiti after the 12 January 
2010 earthquake, this paper focuses on volunteers’ characteristics, their health behaviors 
(i.e. protective and risky), and their interactions and relationships with their host 
community. The volunteer population was primarily made up of single young adults with 
a high level of education. They engaged in various protective health behaviors, with 
women more likely to use of bug repellent and sunscreen more frequently than men. The 
majority of volunteers believed that interactions with the host community were not 
significant to their work; however they believed that a strong relationship was important 
to the success of the relief effort. Disaster volunteer health behaviors and relationships 
with the host community should continue to be studied. 
 




Haiti was devastated by an earthquake registering at 7.0 on the Richter scale on 12 
January 2010 at 4:53 PM Pacific time. The epicenter of the earthquake was 15 miles 
west-southwest of Haiti’s Capital, Port-Au-Prince, in the city of Leogane (U.S. 
Department of the Interior 2010; Millar 2010). International agencies have long been 
providing assistance and services to Haiti; prior to the earthquake, Haiti had more 
operating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) per capita than any other country in 
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the world. Following the earthquake, international organizations led the recovery process 
(Farmer 2011). NGOs and others provided rescue teams, food, health care, general relief 
and, in the months following the quake, assistance with rebuilding homes and 
infrastructure. Using a social survey, this study characterizes international volunteers that 
responded to the earthquake in Haiti, with a focus on their health behaviors and 
relationships with the host community. These themes emerged as most relevant during 
the first author’s month-long volunteer service in Haiti with a NGO after the earthquake 
and relate to previous research literature, to be discussed next. Few studies have sought to 
examine the behavior and characteristics of international disaster volunteers; however, as 
the magnitude and frequency of disasters increases, we assume this population will 







While the characteristics of international disaster volunteers have rarely been 
examined, the literature does describe volunteers more generally with regards to their 
age, sex, educational attainment, and previous disaster volunteer experience. Previous 
studies have shown volunteers (not disaster volunteers) to primarily fall between the ages 
of 30 to 50 (USDL 2010). Among volunteers in emergency and disaster situations the 
likelihood of participation drops as age increases (Rotolo and Berg 2011). Immediately 
following a disaster, younger adults tend to volunteer as the relief work is generally 
physically laborious (Wenger and James 1994). Women are more likely than men to 
volunteer in general; however men have a higher probability of volunteering in 
emergency preparedness and disaster relief work (Rotolo and Berg 2011, SDL 2010). 
Specific to disasters, men have been found to be more involved in search and rescue 
operations whereas women are more likely to be involved with supplies (Wenger and 
James 1994). 
Socioeconomic status (SES) is positively related to volunteerism (Kanaisty and 
Norris 1995). Relatedly, an individual’s probability of volunteering is heightened as 
his/her level of educational attainment rises (Plummer, Ai, Lemieux, Richardson, Dey, 
Taylor, Spence, and Hyun-Jun 2008; USDL 2010), although this association may relate 
to early life experiences, which are associated with educational attainment and 
volunteering (Musick and Wilson 2007). In contrast, when focusing on emergency 
preparedness and disaster relief volunteers, individuals with high educational attainment 
(i.e. college graduates and individuals with advanced degrees) are less likely to 
participate in volunteer efforts as compared to individuals with less than a high school 
diploma (Rotolo and Berg 2011). Previous experience as a volunteer generally predicts 
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an increased likelihood of volunteering both time and services in a disaster relief effort 
(Beyerlein and Sikkink 2008, Plummer et al. 2008, St. John and Fuchs 2002).  
 
Volunteer Health Behaviors 
 
Although attention is often directed at the health of victims of disaster (e.g. Bailey 
and Deshazo 2008; Chambers, Campion, Courtenay, Crozier, and New 2006), volunteers 
can also face health challenges, but this has been studied to a lesser degreee. Individuals 
who respond to natural or technological disasters are vulnerable to adverse physical and 
mental health effects (Perrin, DiGrande, Wheeler, Thorpe, Farfel, and Brackbill 2007), in 
part due to a lack of knowledge about the risks they face (Swygard and Stafford 2009). In 
this way, their health behaviors (i.e., protective or risky) are an important area of focus. 
The majority of previous research on the health of disaster volunteers has focused on 
mental health (e.g., Dolce and Ricciardi 2007; Perrin et al. 2007). In this paper, we 
instead focus on volunteers’ health behaviors (i.e.,protective health measures and risky 




It is usually necessary that volunteers take preventative health measures when 
traveling to disaster areas. For example, although not directly addressed in prior studies, 
wearing a mask is an important protective health measure when removing concrete 
rubble, a common activity for volunteers in Haiti post-earthquake. More generally, in 
tropical areas like Haiti, important protective measures include use of insect repellent, 
sunscreen, anti-malaria pills and gastro-intestinal medications. In one of the few studies 
examining the protective health behaviors of volunteers, 69% of health care professionals 
volunteering after Hurricane Katrina used sunscreen and 46% used insect repellent 
(Swygard and Stafford 2009). Although not a disaster-specific study, only 24% of 
American university students studying abroad in a malaria-risk region acquired anti-
malaria pills and gastrointestinal medication for their trip (Hartjes, Baumann, and 
Henriques 2009). Seventy-one percent of workers in high malaria-risk areas with 
Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO), an agency that sends volunteers to address poverty 
in developing countries, reported that they slept under a mosquito net (Bhatta, Simkhada, 
van Teijlingen, and Maybin 2009). Which social groups of volunteers were more likely to 




Risky behavior has not been generally studied when looking at disaster volunteers. 
However, researchers have examined risk taking by volunteers in developing countries 
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(Dahlgren, DeRoo, Avril, Bise, and Loutan 2009) and among students studying abroad 
(Hartjes et al. 2009). Important risk-taking behaviors identified include unsafe sexual 
behavior and drug and alcohol consumption. It may be that the freedom associated with 
international volunteer work and the emotionally and physically challenging environment 
lead volunteers to engage in risky behaviors (Dahlgren et al. 2009). 
Age has been identified as a key predictor of risky sexual behavior among volunteers 
(Bhatta et al. 2009). Aid workers from The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 
over age 50 were 55% less likely to engage in sexually risky behavior than those younger 
than 49; 25% of volunteers reported sometimes or never using condoms, and 12% 
admitted to engaging in sexually risky behavior that they would not have engaged in at 
home (Dahlgren et al. 2009). Length of service was also important: Dahlgren et al. (2009) 
also found that individuals serving a longer volunteer term were more likely to engage in 
general sexual activity. Increase in tobacco and alcohol consumption is another 
documented risky behavior that aid workers engage in when deployed internationally. 
Among expatriates working with the ICRC, 14% reported an increase in alcohol 
consumption and 43% of smokers reported an increase in their smoking. Additionally, 




The social connections between international disaster volunteers and host 
communities have not been examined much in previous disaster research; however, there 
has been research on “volunteer tourists” and their interactions with host communities 
(Raymond and Hall 2008; McBride, Brav, Menon, and Sherraden 2006). Research into 
volunteer tourism has mainly been focused on the “gap year” (year between high school 
and college) taken by young Europeans (Raymond and Hall 2008). Organizations 
advertising to gap year individuals tend to romanticise poverty, emphasize the 
“developing” world and the maginalized population, and further entrench the volunteers’ 
belief in a ‘them and us’ ideology (Simpson 2004). In this way, volunteers embark on 
their service differentiating between themselves and the host community and believing 
that the host community is reliant upon the volunteers. 
Language differences can be a barrier to interactions between host communities and 
international volunteers. The Westernized elite population (those most likely to speak 
English) are usually the individuals who interact most often with the mostly monolingual 
English international volunteers (Cohn and Wood 1985), contributing to a divide between 
the general surrounding population and the international volunteers. Apart from language 
barriers, international volunteers can also be spatially segregated from host communities 
(Raymond and Hall 2008), which contributes to the social distance between the two 
groups. McGehee and Santos (2005) explained that being surrounded by like-minded 
individuals in a group of volunteers can create a comfortable atmostphere and allow 
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volunteers to isolate themselves. This creates two societies for volunteers, one of 
international volunteers and another in which the volunteers interact with the host 
community.  
The power differentials and inequalities that exist between host communities and 
international organizations are, in some cases, perpetuated by those organizations. 
Organizations may focus primarily on their volunteers (i.e. qualifications, education, 
recruitment), while neglecting host community members, which perpetuates the 
inequalities inherent in these relationships between people from more and less affluent 
countries. Despite not having previous experience or skills, international volunteers 
sometimes take on the roles of the teacher or supervisor of local volunteers and staff, 
indpendent of the skills of the local volunteers/staff (Raymond and Hall 2008), which 
contributes to a power differential. 
Longer terms of residence in host countries for volunteers can reduce the social 
barriers and power differentials between volunteers and residents. Individuals who 
volunteer abroad semi-permanently may be more easily incorporated into the host 
community than those just volunteering on vacation because long-term volunteers live 
and worke in local conditions (Palmer 2002; Devereux 2008). This allows volunteers to 
understand the host community through their informal relationships and can help to 
facilitate more effective programs (Devereux 2008).   
Given this information and the first author’s experiences as a volunteer in Haiti for 
one month during the summer of 2010, this paper addresses the following research goals. 
First, we characterize the volunteers on the dimensions of age, sex, income level, 
educational attainment, employment status, marital status, disaster experience, and their 
incoming perceptions of Haiti (Research Goal [RG] 1). Second, we characterize the 
prevalence of protective and risky behaviors amongst these volunteers (RG 2). Third, we 
examine correlates of protective measures and risky behaviors (e.g., age, sex) (RG 3). 
Fourth, we characterize the relationships between the international volunteer and the host 
communities based on volunteer perceptions (RG 4). Finally, we analyze correlates of the 
strength of the relationships and frequency of interactions (e.g., conversing with, sharing 
a meal with and working with Haitians as well as playing with Haitian children) between 
the volunteers and members of the host community (based on the volunteers’ 
perceptions) (RG 5). 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The study relies on survey data from volunteers working with a US-based NGO that 
began operating in Leogane, Haiti on 15 February 2010, which prefers to remain 
anonymous. The mission of the NGO is to connect volunteers with communities in need 
following disasters. Prior to the earthquake in Haiti, this organization had responded to 
14 disasters, the first being the 2004 tsunami in Thailand. Since the earthquake in Haiti, 
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they have responded to eight additional disasters and are still in operation today. In Haiti, 
the primary functions of this NGO’s volunteers were demolition, removal of rubble, 
construction of schools, and spending time with orphans; the volunteers were largely 
unskilled in these forms of labor. In addition, the organization conducted several other 
smaller, secondary projects such as gardening.  
Before discussing the methodological details of the survey, we will first review some 
of the organization’s policies and practices that likely shaped volunteers’ experiences and 
behaviors. The NGO required that all volunteers be over the age of 18. In materials 
provided online to the volunteers pre-trip, the NGO suggested the following related to 
health—the use of masks while removing rubble and demolition, the use of anti-malarial 
pills, bug repellent, sunscreen, and mosquito nets, but they did not explain why these 
measures were important and none of these items were required for service. They did not 
have any policies prohibiting sexual behavior and they provided condoms to the 
volunteers for free. They did not allow drugs or alcohol on the base where the volunteers 
lived, and they enforced a 10pm curfew. Many volunteers consumed alcohol at a bar next 
to the base. Smoking on base was permitted, but restricted to a smoking area away from 
the sleeping area. The NGO did not allow Haitians not directly employed by them within 
the secure perimeter of the base. This meant that they permitted cooks, drivers, and 
translators, but not the unpaid Haitian volunteers working for the organization. When the 
first author was in Haiti, there were approximately a dozen Haitian staff members and 15 
local volunteers (mainly young men, many of whom were in school before the 
earthquake) who worked alongside approximately 115 international volunteers. 
In terms of data collection, an online survey through Survey Monkey, piloted with 
eight university students, was sent to volunteers as an item in a newsletter produced by 
the NGO. The 660 volunteers who were emailed the newsletter had served in Haiti with 
the NGO for a minimum of one week between January and December of 2010. To 
increase the response rate, we wanted to contact the volunteers directly though a separate 
set of e-mails, but the NGO was not willing to share the email addresses of their 
volunteers, and they would not send the survey in a email separate from the newsletter. 
The survey was open for four weeks beginning January 7, 2010 and volunteers were 
emailed the link twice, once at the opening of the survey, and once one week before it 
closed (it was included in a newsletter both times). Completion of the survey served as 
informed consent (as per Fiala, D'Abundo, and Mariano 2010). This study was approved 
by our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the NGO. 
Despite the research limitations established by the organization throughout the 
research process, we felt it was the optimal choice for this study. First, they were one of 
the largest organizations responding after the earthquake in Haiti, with over 100 
international volunteers working throughout the summer of 2010. By January 2011, they 
has hosted 660 volunteers in Haiti. Second, they are well respected among volunteer-
based NGOs and had been coordinating international disaster volunteers for six years at 
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the time of the quake. Third, they were willing to participate in the study. Given the 
exploratory nature of this project, we believe any information gained about this disaster 
volunteer population is important because no other study has looked at this type of 
population.  
There were 90 individuals who responded to the survey. Assuming that every 
individual on the e-mail distribution list received the survey link, the response rate would 
be at least 16%. We assume that some of the 660 people on the list did not receive the 
survey, but we are unable to estimate that proportion. We do not know how many 
newsletters were returned to the NGO as undeliverable (the NGO denied our request to 
provide this information) or filtered by spam and how many volunteers never opened the 
emailed newsletter and therefore were never aware of the survey. Nonetheless, this 
conservative estimate of the response rate is comparable to previously reported internet 
survey response rates (Marcus et al. 2007). The length of a survey instrument is related to 
the response rate, and given the experimental research on response rates in e-surveys 
(e.g., Marcus et al. 2007); a 16% response rate would not be unexpected, based on the 
length of this survey (20-40 minutes).  
The survey addresed several domains, including the three that are the focus here—
volunteers’ personal characteristics, health behaviors, and community interactions. We 
summarized the volunteers’ responses to the survey questions about their personal 
characteristics and used descriptive statistics for these variables are to address RG1. We 
referenced the United States Department of Health and Human Services (2008) survey 
and United States Department of Health and Human Services (1994) survey in the 
construction of health behavior items to address RG 2.  
RG3 through RG5 were addressed through the use of correlation matrices. 
Multivariate analyses were not utilized in this study because of the small sample size. For 
RG 3, we correlated age, sex, income, previous disaster experience, and time spent in 
Haiti with 1) frequency of use of bug repellent, 2) frequency of use of sunscreen, 3) use 
of anti-malaria pills and 4) a risky behavior factor (Cronbach’s α = .59). This factor 
combines the volunteers’ self-reported drug use and consumption of moonshine while 
based in Haiti. 
To address RG 4, we addressed community interactions through questions about the 
frequency of interactions, quality of interactions, and barriers to relationships between 
volunteers and the host community. In addition, we analyzed the language barrier by 
running a paired samples t-test on Creole and French language skills before arrival and 
after departure in Haiti. RG 5 involves computing correlations between sex, age, 
volunteer income, previous disaster experience and time spent in Haiti and two dependent 
variables: 1) interaction frequency factor (Cronbach’s α = .57), which combines the 
frequency of the following interactions with the host population: conversing, playing with 
children, working with local volunteers or community members, and sharing a meal; and 
2) the volunteers’ perception of the quality of their relationship with the host community 
Nelan: Haiti’s Earthquake 
300 
as good or poor. In addition, the survey asked several open-ended questions, several 






Related to RG 1, Table 1A shows that, of those who answered the survey, 59% 
identified themselves as female, 59% were between the ages of 20-29, and 69% were 
single. The vast majority (72%) was from the US. One hundred percent of those who 
reported their education were high school graduates and above. Those who went to Haiti 
generally volunteered in their home communities (63%). However, when asked about 
their frequency of volunteering, nearly one-quarter reported volunteering less than once a 
month. Only 35% had previous disaster volunteer experience, and very few volunteers 
had direct experiences related to Haiti prior to arrival—only 5% reported prior travel 
there and only 7% had a personal connection to Haiti. 
Table 1B shows that, when asked about employment history before their volunteer 
service in Haiti, 81% reported being employed or a full-time student, with 63% of those 
working more than 30 paid hours per week. The largest percentage reported an annual 
household income of between $10,000 and $29,999. The majority of volunteers funded 
their own travel to Haiti, however 37% reported receiving financial assistance. For those 
respondents receiving financial assistance, it came primarily from family (64.5%) and 
friends (58%). 
 
Volunteer Health Behaviors 
 
Protective Measures. In addressing RG 2, Table 2 shows that, while volunteering in 
Haiti, 40% reported that they did not take anti-malaria pills, with concerns about the side 
effects being listed as the number one reason for not taking the medication. Fifty three 
percent reported bringing a prescription gastro-intestinal medicine with them from home, 
and 5% received gastro-intestinal antibiotics while in Haiti. Although 42% of the 
volunteers reported bringing a mask to use while removing rubble (which involves 
removing collapsed building materials and can result in the inhalation of concrete dust), 
only 33% of them bringing a mask and actually wearing it. 
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Table 1A. Volunteer Characteristics. 
Variable Percentage (N) 
Sex  
Female 59% (50) 
Male 41% (35) 
Age (in years)  
20-24 27% (23) 
25-29 32% (27) 
30-39 25% (21) 
40-65 15% (12) 
Education  
 rade 12 or GED 4% (3) 
Some College (or Technical School) 15% (13) 
 College Graduate 52%(44) 
Post-Graduate (e.g., MA, PhD, MD) 29% (25) 
Nationality  
United States 72% (61) 
United Kingdom 9% (8) 
Canada 12% (10) 
Australia 2% (2) 
Other 5% (4) 
Marital Status  
Single  69% (58) 
Cohabitating 11% (9) 
Married 16% (13) 
Divorced 2% (2) 
Other 2% (2) 
Volunteer in Home Community  
No 37% (31) 
Yes 63% (52)  
If yes, how often?  
Less than once a month 23% (12) 
Once a month 19% (10) 
Multiple times a month 29% (15) 
Once a week 17% (9) 
Multiple times a week 13% (7) 
Previous Disaster Experience  
No 65% (55) 
Yes 35% 
If yes, how many times?  
0 65% (55) 
1 18% (15) 
2 to 3 9% (8) 
4 to 5 5% (4) 
6+ 1% (1) 
Personal ties to Haiti before volunteering  
No 93% (78) 
Yes 7% (6) 
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Table 1B. Volunteer Employment Status and Income. 
Variable Percentage (N) 
Been in Haiti Before   
No 95% (80) 
Yes 5% (4) 
Employed Before Haiti  
No 19% (16) 
Yes (includes full-time students) 81% (67) 
If yes, hours worked (does not include students)  
       None 3% (2) 
       1 to 10 8% (5) 
       11 to 20 8% (5) 
       21 to 30 18% (12) 
       31 to 40 32% (22) 
       40+ 31% (21) 
Financial Assistance for Trip  
No 63% (52) 
Yes 37% (31) 
Volunteer Income  
        Less than $1,999/year 4% (3) 
        $2,000-4,999 4% (3) 
        $5,000-9,999 10% (8) 
        $10,000-19,999 20% (15) 
        $20,000-29,999 20% (15) 
        $30,000-39,999 7% (5) 
        $40,000-49,999 5% (4) 
        $50,000-59,999 5% (4) 
        $60,000-69,999 4% (3) 
        $70,000-79,999 7% (5) 
        $80,000-89,999 4% (3) 
        $90,000-99,999 1% (1) 
        $100,000-149,999 3% (2) 
        $150,000+ 8% (6) 
 
Another concern when traveling to Haiti is mosquito-borne illnesses, such as malaria 
and dengue. Only 1% of those surveyed reported that they never used a mosquito net or 
tent while in Haiti, and 85% always used either a net or tent. Twenty two percent of the 
sample “rarely” or “never” used bug repellent, but 41% always did. Because volunteers 
primarily worked outside, sun exposure was a health risk—18% of those surveyed 
reported “rarely” or “never” applying sunscreen at least two times daily, but 39% 
reported “always” doing so. 
In the correlation analysis (RG 3), Table 3 shows that females were more likely than 
males to use bug repellent more frequently (r = -.34) and to apply sunscreen more 
frequently (r = -.27). More international volunteer experience was associated with fewer 
protective behaviors. The longer volunteer were in Haiti, the less likely they were to 
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regularly apply sunscreen (r = -.34) and volunteers with previous disaster experience 
were less likely to take anti-malarial pills (r = -.27).  
 
Table 2. Volunteer Health Behaviors. 
Variable Metric Mean Median SD 
Anti-malaria pill 0=No, 1=Yes  .60 1  
Brought Cipro from home 0=No, 1=Yes  .53 1  
Prescribed Cipro in Haiti 0=No, 1=Yes  .05 0  
Used Cipro in Haiti 0=No, 1=Yes  .22 0  
Removed rubble 0=No, 1=Yes  .96 1  
Wore mask 1=Never - 5=Always 1.53 1  .86 
Mosquito Net/Tent 1=Never, 5=Always 4.75 5  .71 
Bug Repellent 1=Never, 5=Always 3.81 4 1.36 
Sunscreen (twice a day) 1=Never, 5=Always 3.67 4 1.35 
Often bitten by mosquitoes 1=Never, 5=Always 3.24 3 1.27 
Tobacco in Haiti 0=No, 1=Yes  .30 0  
How often smoked in Haiti 1=Once a month or less, 
5=Everyday 
4.36 5 1.25 
Cigarettes per day 1=Don’t Know, 1=1 cigarette, 
5=More than a pack a day 
3.00 3  
Increase in tobacco 1=Much less, 5=Much more 4.36 5  .86 
Alcohol in Haiti 0=No, 1=Yes  .87 1  .34 
How often drank alcohol in 
Haiti 
1=Once a month or less, 
5=Everyday 
2.76 2 1.27 
Drank moonshine 0=No, 1=Yes  .27 0  
Increase in alcohol 1=Much less, 5=Much more 2.96 3 1.21 
Marijuana in Haiti 0=No, 1=Yes  .14 0  
How often smoke marijuana 
in Haiti 
1=Once a month or less, 
5=Everyday 
2.25 2 1.29 
Increase in marijuana 1=Much less, 5=Much more 2.25 1.5 1.48 
Had sex 0=No, 1=Yes  .23 0  
No. of partners 1=1 to 2, 2=3 to 5, 3=6 to 8, 4=9 
or more 
1.11 1  .32 
Frequency with each partner 1=1 to 2 times, 2=3 to 5 times, 3= 
6 to 8 times, 4=9 or more times 
2.05 2 1.13 
Vaginal or anal sex without a 
condom 
0=Never, 5=All the time 1.71 1 1.71 
Oral sex without protection 0=Never, 5=All the time 2.17 1 2.14 
High risk of catching STI 
within volunteers 
 








High risk of catching STI 
with local community 
 









Risky Behaviors. Also related to RG2, Table 2 shows that 30% of the sample 
reported using tobacco products and of those, 84% reported an increase in their usage of 
tobacco products while in Haiti. Among those who reported drinking alcohol in Haiti 
(87%), 36% reported an increase in alcohol consumption compared to their use at home 
and  27% admitted to  consuming moonshine  during their  volunteer service. Meanwhile,  
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Table 3. Intercorrelation Among Variables 
  
Frequency of 



















Pearson r -.34** -.27* .03 -.04 -.11 -.10 -.21 
Sig. (2-tailed) .01 .01 .79 .72 .32 .36 .06 
Male 
N 85 85 85 85 84 85 76 
 
Pearson r 
.01 .01 .01 -.34** -.22* -.43** -.27* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .94 .90 .99 .01 .05 .00 .02 
 
Age 
N 84 84 84 84 83 84 75 
 
Pearson r 
-.11 .09 .05 -.25* -.22 -.15 -.30* 




N 77 77 77 77 77 77 71 
 
Pearson r 
.09 -.15 -.27* -.09 .15 .11 -.08 




experience N 85 85 85 85 84 85 76 
 
Pearson r 
-.08 -.34** -.15 .38** .32** .07 .20 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.50 .01 .18 .00 .01 .51 .09 
 
Length of 
time spent in 
Haiti 
N 81 81 82 83 80 83 72 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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the smallest increase in use was for marijuana consumption: only 14% of the sample 
admitted to using marijuana while in Haiti, and only 25% of those reported an increase in 
usage.  
Having unprotected sex was another risky behavior undertaken by volunteers in Haiti. 
Nearly one-quarter of the sample had sexual intercourse (anal, vaginal or oral) while in 
Haiti. Of those, 90% had 1-2 partners. The majority (42%) had on average 1-2 sexual 
encounters with each partner, 26% reported 3-5 encounters, 16% reported 6-8 encounters, 
and 16% had over 9 encounters with each partner. Within the 23% who had sex, 29% of 
those had anal or vaginal sex without using a condom. Similarly, of those having sex, 
37% reported having oral sex without the use of protection such as condoms or dental 
dams.  
When asked about their perceptions of risk, 51% of all those surveyed agreed that 
there was a high risk of catching sexually transmitted infections (STIs) if one engaged in 
sexual activity within another international volunteer. No respondents reported having a 
sexual relationship with someone from Leogane and 67% agreed that there was a high 
risk of contracting an STI if one did so. Based on correlation results (RG3), younger 
volunteers (r = -.34), volunteers with lower incomes (r = -.25) and volunteers that spent 
more time in Haiti (r = -.38) were more likely to consume moonshine and marijuana. 
Younger volunteers (r = -.22), volunteers that spent more time in Haiti (r = .32) and those 
with lower incomes (r = -.22) were more likely to have had sex in Haiti. 
Community Interactions. Related to RG4, Table 4 shows that 66% of respondents 
believed that there were obstacles in place that kept them from creating a strong 
relationship with the host community while they were in Haiti. These included language 
barriers (75%) and cultural barriers (21%). Other barriers related more closely the 
organization’s policies—segregation between international volunteers and host 
community (19%) and rules and restrictions for the volunteers (15%). It seemed as if 
volunteers worked to address the language barrier by gaining language skills while in 
Haiti; results of a paired sample t-test (table not shown) comparing Creole and French 
skills prior to arriving and after leaving found a significant increase between the two time 
periods (both p = .000). The biggest increase was found for Creole skills: although 81% 
spoke no Creole upon arrival, only 7% still spoke no Creole when they left. 
When asked to rate their relationship with the Haitian staff and volunteers within the 
organization, 84% rated their relationships “good” to “very good.” However, when rating 
their relationships with members of the host community, 57% answered “good,” and no 
one characterized their relationships as “very good.” Fifty one percent of the respondents 
reported spending less time with the local volunteers than other international volunteers. 
And, further highlighting the disconnection between international volunteers and local 
volunteers, only one person said s/he relied on the local volunteers to help him/her deal 
with stress; the highest percentage (78%) reported leaning on their fellow international 
volunteers. 
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In general, volunteers believed positive interactions with the host community were 
important for their mission. But, when asked if interaction between themselves and the 
host community was significant to their work as a volunteer, 37% said no. However, 
when asked if a strong relationship is between the volunteers and the host community in 
important to the success of the mission, 97% of the respondent agreed that it was 
important. In addressing RG 5, Table 4 shows that younger volunteers were more likely 
to frequently interact with the host community than older volunteers (r = -.43) and to 
evaluate their relationships with that community as of higher quality (r = -.27). Lower 
incomes were associated with evaluations of better quality relationships with the Haitian 
community (r = -.30). 
 
Table 4. Community Interactions. 
Variable Metric Mean Median SD 
Creole skills before 1=Not at all, 2=Know some words, 
3=Hold basic conversation, 
4=Fluent 
1.23 1  .55 
     
Creole skills after 1=Not at all, 2=Know some words, 
3=Hold basic conversation, 
4=Fluent 
2.19 2  .61 
French skills before 1=Not at all, 2=Know some words, 
3=Hold basic conversation, 
4=Fluent 
1.91 2 1.02 
French skills after 1=Not at all, 2=Know some words, 
3=Hold basic conversation, 
4=Fluent 
2.13 2  .95 
Relationship with Haitian 
volunteers and staff 
 







Relationship with Haitian 
community members 
 







Time spent with local 
volunteers compared to other 
international 
 








Conversed with Haitians 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 4.56 5  .85 
Played with Haitian children 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 3.63 4 1.26 
Worked with Haitians 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 4.63 5  .84 
Shared meal with Haitians 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 3.49 4 1.34 
Purchased food from Haitians 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 3.38 3 1.13 
Bought souvenirs 1=Never, 5=Multiple times a day 1.69 1  .94 






Interaction with locals not 
significant to volunteer work 
 








How often Haitians involved 
in work 
1=Never, 5=Always 3.62 4  .95 
 
  




Although few studies have examined international disaster volunteers, the discussion 
will compare findings from this study to the literature as relevant, and draw out their 
significance. We will also utilize responses from several open-ended questions asked in 





The volunteers were primarily young, unattached, female, highly educated, and from 
the US. They had volunteered before, be it in their home neighborhoods or previous 
disaster areas. The relatively young age of the Haiti disaster volunteers matched Wenger 
and James’ (1994) study of relief workers following the Mexico City earthquake in 1985. 
The physical nature of the work was likely associated with attracting this demographic. 
Removing rubble from collapsed buildings, demolition, and construction (i.e. schools, 
composting toilets) were listed as the top three activities by respondents. Like other 
volunteers (Plummer, et al. 2008; USDL 2010), these volunteers had high levels of 
education. Although one may have thought that volunteers would be affluent, given the 
cost of the trip to Haiti, the majority reported household incomes below $30,000 a year. 
Due to lower incomes, financial assistance was important.  
 
Volunteer Health Behaviors 
 
Protective Measures. The volunteers were well prepared in some areas but poorly 
prepared in others. Perhaps the most dangerous health risk that the volunteers faced was 
mosquito-borne illness. The majority of volunteers reported taking anti-malaria pills 
(61%), which was much higher than the percentage reported by Bhatta et al. (2009) 
among the volunteers of the VSO (18%). Side effects were a concern for the volunteers in 
Haiti, especially among the longer-term volunteers. We found that individuals who had 
been to previous disaster areas (and who were presumably well-traveled) were less likely 
to use anti-malaria pills. This is illustrated by a 19-year-old respondent, who was not on 
anti-malarial pills. She also slept without a mosquito net, believing that there was no 
point in taking anti-malaria pills based on her experiences living in Africa. 
In general though, women volunteers were more likely to engage in protective 
behaviors such as sunscreen and bug repellent. More frequent sunscreen usage among 
women could be explained by the higher societal expectation of women retaining their 
beauty, including skin health. Women, on a whole, are more likely to engage in 
protective behaviors for their health (Lonnquist, Weiss, and Larsen 1992). The volunteers 
in Haiti used bug repellent and sunscreen at lower levels than the health professional 
volunteers after Katrina (Swygard and Stafford 2009). Given the higher risk of mosquito-
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borne illnesses, the use of bug repellent should have been higher in Haiti than in New 
Orleans. However, those surveyed by Swygard and Stafford (2008) were health-care 
professionals, so it is not unexpected that the disaster volunteers in Haiti took fewer 
protective health behaviors. 
Based on the first author’s experiences, the NGO left the decision to engage in these 
protective behaviors up to the volunteers. During and prior to her time in Haiti, the NGO 
took no direct measures to educate the volunteer population about the importance of 
using bug repellent, sunscreen, masks for removing rubble or mosquito nets. Generally, 
any information about the importance of these items was disseminated between the 
volunteers themselves.  
Risky Behaviors. We found some evidence of volunteers engaging in risky behaviors 
(e.g., having unprotected sex, using drugs, increasing their use of tobacco and alcohol, 
and consuming moonshine) while volunteering in Haiti. Like Dahlgren et al. (2009), we 
found that longer duration of residence in Haiti correlated with having sex (as well as 
higher Risk Factor scores). Dahlgren et al. (2009) also found that the international aid 
workers justified their risky activities by citing the freedom associated with volunteer 
work and the difficulty of the environment around them. Survey respondents listed 
boredom and peer pressure as their reasons for an increase in their sexual activity, alcohol 
consumption, and drug use. Their listing of boredom helps to illustrate the social 
confinement of the volunteers on base and lack of engagement with the host community. 
It is therefore possible that more frequent, high quality interactions with the host 
community outside of a bar setting could reduce the volunteers’ risky behaviors.  
Our percentages for the volunteers having sex were similar to those reported for the 
aid workers from the ICRC (Dahlgren et al. 2009). To avoid assuming heterosexuality 
among the volunteers, we included a question about oral sex without protection (i.e. 
condoms and dental dams). The literature addressing the sexual behaviors of aid workers 
and volunteers had not yet addressed protective behaviors in relation to oral sex. Nearly 
40% of those having sex were doing so orally without protection, so inclusion of this 
behavior is essential for future work.  
Volunteers reported substantial alcohol consumption while in Haiti. The percentage 
reporting an increase in usage while volunteering was 2.6 times the increase in 
percentage that was reported by ICRC expatriates (Dahlgren et al 2009), but our study 
population was younger. Perhaps the most telling part of the volunteer drinking culture, 
which one respondent deemed a “disaster junkie culture” within the organization, was the 
proximity to a bar less than 100 feet from the base. There were nightly parties in the bar, 
dance-offs and an ample supply of beer and rum, and at times, moonshine. It was part of 
the volunteers’ routine—finish work and have a beer, then have dinner, go to the nightly 
meeting, take a bucket shower and head to the bar next door until the 10:00 pm curfew. 
although not everyone engaged in the alcohol consumption regularly, 87% drank in Haiti 
and it was embedded in the volunteer culture for this organization. Smoking more heavily 
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than at home was also common, and the percentage reporting this was 1.9 times greater 
than the percentage reporting it in Dahgren et al.’s (2009) study. Like drinking, smoking 
was part of the culture for the volunteers. Cigarettes were cheap, and the popular hangout 
area in the base was also the “smoking area.”  
Community Interactions. In general, volunteers did not report extensive interactions 
with the host community, nor did they report high quality relationships with the Haitians. 
Younger volunteers did report more frequent interactions with the host community. Many 
of these interactions occurred at the local bar, which was also frequented by young 
Haitians. Given the dramatic increase in alcohol consumption by volunteers already 
discussed, these findings suggest that the international volunteers and members of the 
host community need venues for interaction and stress release that are not limited to 
drinking alcohol together. 
While nearly every respondent believed that a strong relationship between members 
of the host community and international volunteers was important to the success of the 
relief effort, approximately one-third said that interactions with the host community were 
not significant to their work. Their inability to see a connection between their work and 
building relationships with the host community could be attributed to shyness, the 
language barriers, or the belief that they were not there long enough to make a lasting 
connection. It may also suggest that they believe that the organization should be 
responsible for helping them make a connection. This is supported by the results, as many 
volunteers felt that the organization’s policies created obstacles to their connecting with 
the host community. 
This disconnect may exist, in part because, as the first author observed during her 
service, the local volunteers were not given supervisory positions, or allowed to take the 
lead in work situations. This created a situation in which, whether purposefully or 
without intent, an elitist position was reinforced, as was highlighted by McBride et. al 
(2006). Although international volunteers were generally unskilled until they were taught 
a job in Haiti, they were given the role of teachers and supervisors for the unpaid Haitian 
volunteers (and other international volunteers). This exemplifies the ‘us and them’ 
dichotomy that was mentioned in previous literature (Raymond and Hall 2008, Simpson 
2004). Based on the first-author’s observations, there were many times that members of 
the host community had more work experience in areas where international volunteers 
struggled, such as with masonry. However, the international volunteers still held the 
leadship positions, which negatively impacted personal relationships between 
international and local volunteers. 
Language barriers were the most commonly reported obstacle for the international 
volunteers to forming relationships with the host community. Although there was a 
significant improvement in both Creole and French skills among the volunteers, they did 
not become fluent. Language barriers inhibit volunteers from truly being able to meet the 
needs of the host community (Cohn and Wood 1985). International volunteers in Haiti 
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were only able to interact with what Cohn and Wood (1985) called the “westernized elite 
population”, as they were limited in their ability to communicate with the average Haitian 




In sum, we found that the majority of the volunteers engaged in protective behaviors 
with regards to their health. We also found that longer residence is Haiti was associated 
with risky behavior. Unfortunately, the volunteers reported barriers to creating quality 
relationships with the host community, some of which related to the organization’s 
policies. They also recognized a disconnect between themselves and members of the host 
community, despite believing that strong relationships were important to the success of 
the relief effort. 
There were several limitations to this study, the first of which was the time gap 
between the disaster and the data collection. Future research may benefit from collecting 
data from volunteers closer to the disaster. Second, the incidence of risky behavior may 
have been underestimated in this study. Volunteers that engaged in risky behaviors while 
in Haiti may have been less likely to participate in a 20 to 40 minute online survey and be 
less likely to discover the survey link, which was located in an e-newsletter they may 
have been less likely to open and read. Therefore, there may have been a higher incidence 
of risky behaviors than reported here, especially when referencing the first author’s own 
experiences as a volunteer. During the time when the first author was deployed as a 
volunteer in Haiti, she observed daily cases of drinking and sexual behavior within the 
volunteer living space. Third, the data collection approach was not ideal in terms of 
survey research protocol (e.g., Dillman 2008), but was all the organization would permit. 
To review, the survey was emailed to former volunteers of an US-based NGO through 
their volunteer newsletter. Due to spam filters and individuals not opening the newsletter, 
volunteers may not have received the link, and therefore did not have the opportunity to 
participate in the survey. This is a limitation of emailing an online survey through a 
newsletter but the NGO would not permit us to send the survey link in a separate email. 
This also means we cannot calculate an exact response rate for the survey.  
Fourth, we cannot determine if the sample is biased, as the NGO did not respond to 
multiple requests for demographic information on their volunteers. Given this, we cannot 
determine if our sample over- or under-represents certain segments of the volunteer 
population with this NGO and if there is sampling bias due to the low estimated response 
rate. This makes it difficult to ascertain the validity of the study. However, given the 
dearth of information on international disaster volunteers, we feel the information 
presented in this paper is still valuable, in spite of these data collection limitations. 
This study was not representative of the entire international disaster volunteer 
community in Haiti and did not include the point of view of the Haitian volunteers, as it 
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only was emailed out to the former international volunteers of one NGO. We do not 
know how representative this NGO is of others responding to the earthquake. Additional 
organizations based in Haiti may not have engaged in the same behaviors as the 
volunteers for this organization. The NGO in this study was a secular organization, as 
opposed to a faith-based organization. Given this, there were few policies in place for the 
volunteers addressing the moral behaviors and actions that we focus on in this study (e.g., 
sex and drinking). We believe that the findings might be different among volunteers with 
the many faith-based organizations operating in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake.  
Future research could be comparative, done both through multiple organizations 
responding to the same disaster (e.g., secular and faith-based), or through this 
organization in other disaster areas. The number of volunteers responding to the survey 
was low, which limited our ability to conduct multivariate statistical analyses. Future 
researchers should strive to collaborate with organizations that will permit them to 
contact possible participants directly.  
The practical implications of this study include the importance of NGOs focusing on 
policies that promote the well-being of their volunteers. For example, given that 
volunteers engage in sexual behaviors while abroad, the organizations hosting them must 
recognize this and deal with it openly. The organization under study provided condoms, 
but they refrained from discussing sexual health. During the first-author’s month in Haiti, 
the only time this was addressed by the staff was during a meeting, because the hospital 
was being “overrun” with volunteers complaining of urinary tract infections and 
requesting emergency contraception.  
Disaster relief efforts overall will benefit if NGOs focus on creating tighter bonds 
between the affected population and international volunteers, as this will help to reduce 
power differentials and improve the quality of their working relationship. In more recent 
months, the NGO under study led a push to empower the host community by integrating 
some residents into supervisory positions. As Raymond and Hall (2008) pointed out, it is 
important to integrate local staff and community members with the international 
volunteers. Due to concerns for health and safety, the emphasis on drinking as the main 
way to bring together the affected community and the international volunteers should be 
reduced. This NGO recently began a project to build a soccer field in Leogane and 
participate in a game with residents. Continuing games among the volunteer population 
and the host community, not necessarily playing against each other, but with each other, 
would likely assist in building stronger relationships. More projects like this will likely 
create a stronger connection between international volunteers and the host community. It 
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Emergency managers face a variety of planning challenges, especially because the needs 
of any community are heterogeneous. One illustration of these planning challenges is the 
historical neglect of community members with disabilities or other functional needs. The 
salience of including residents with disabilities and other functional needs gained 
momentum in the Post-Katrina environment. Within this context, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency developed the Functional Need Support Services (FNSS) approach 
to disaster evacuation shelter management. In this paper, we assess the FNSS model and 
identify several key challenges that can be expected in the development and 
implementation of this approach based on a social construction approach to 
understanding policy making. These challenges can be thought to be generally relevant 
to most new programmatic initiatives, but as we show in this case, are particularly 
applicable to community-wide hosting of evacuees. Interviews with key stakeholders with 
experience in evacuation hosting reveal deep seated social constructions of residents 
with functional needs that may constrain the possible impact of the FNSS guidance. 
 








In February 2011, a federal judge found that the City and County of Los Angeles had 
made insufficient efforts in accommodating people with functional needs in its 
emergency management planning processes.1 The class action law suit targeted the city’s 
emergency plan and its limited attention to issues of accommodation in transportation, 
sheltering, and other relevant services. Judge Consuelo Marshall offered a summary 
judgment that the existing plans’ neglect of residents with functional needs represented a 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The plaintiffs in the 
case argued that such neglect placed residents with functional needs at greater risk as well 
as a state of “fear, apprehension, and unease because they believe they have a right to be, 
but are not, included in the City’s emergency preparedness program” (Communities 
Actively Living Independent and Free, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 2011). This 
neglect, the plaintiffs argued, constituted discrimination on the basis of disability. 
This judgment was not a surprise. The City’s Department of Disability (LA-DoD) had 
previously reported that the emergency plan was “seriously out of compliance” 
(Communities Actively Living Independent and Free, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 
2011) with the ADA and local ordinances requiring accommodation of residents with 
disabilities. The LA-DoD recommended that the City immediately conduct a sweeping 
assessment of its emergency plan in relation to residents with functional needs including: 
(a) an assessment of all facilities used in the plan including shelters, warming centers, 
etc.; (b) increase coordination with the American Red Cross (ARC) on issues related to 
disability; and (c) an assessment of warning and notification systems. 
Although the City of Los Angeles conducted an assessment of shelter sites, it failed to 
address the LA-DOD’s other recommendations. The City’ response was that the record 
did not indicate a policy of active discrimination. The defendant city said that it “has not 
taken any action which disproportionately burdens people with disabilities” 
(Communities Actively Living Independent and Free, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 
2011, 19). This, the City had concluded, proved that it has not excluded people with 
functional needs by reason of those very needs from the emergency plans. But the judge 
in the case accepted the plaintiff’s claims of neglect and found in their favor. Moreover, 
the judge found the evidence sufficiently convincing to offer summary judgment on the 
matter. 
The significance of the case lies in a reality that the City of Los Angeles was not 
unique in being deficient in accommodating residents with functional needs. In fact, it is 
not unfair to consider Los Angeles as operating within the bounds of common practice.  
Thus, the case underscores that such common practices are insufficient.  
At the same time, it is also important to recognize that with this recent legal decision, 
many other cities, counties, and states are currently developing plans to better protect the 
residents with functional needs and watching what legal standards emerge to define 
  
Robinson et al.: Disabled Populations 
317 
reasonable accommodation. Given the challenges of accommodating residents with 
functional needs in emergency management, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has sought to provide guidance and direction to state and local 
government and other key actors involved in disaster response, recovery, and general 
relief services. An example is FEMA’s Functional Needs Services System (FNSS) for 
evacuation hosting. 
Because of the significance of this federal effort we consider three key questions. 
First, how is the FNSS approach designed and how will it affect emergency management 
practice? Second, how can we understand the social construction of the concept of 
“functional needs” and how is it relevant to policy and practice of emergency 
management? Third, what do the attitudinal dispositions of emergency management 
professional suggest as to the relative ease or difficulty of implementing the core 
principles of the FNSS approach? 
To answer these questions, we (a) review the major, recent developments in the 
accommodation of residents with functional needs in general population shelters, and (b) 
examine specific challenges to the approach related to evacuation hosting. Following this 
review, we discuss the social construction of disability and the forces contributing to the 
historical exclusion of people with disabilities.  
Although most research has focused on the preparedness and disaster recovery for 
and of individuals with disabilities (e.g., Bricout and Baker 2010a; Bricout and Baker 
2010b; Peek and Stough 2010; Spence, Lachlan, Burke, and Seeger 2007), this study 
examines the attitudes of emergency managers towards populations with functional needs 
and the implications of these attitudes for the FNSS approach. In doing so, we focus on 
the incorporation of non-traditional participants in emergency planning (Robinson and 
Gerber 2007). We draw upon original interviews with shelter managers from multiple 
communities across the country to support the applicability of the social construction of 
disability to emergency management. The article concludes with a discussion of the 
likely impact of the FEMA guidance in the presence of the exclusionary social forces 
identified earlier. 
 
The Functional Needs Approach and Disaster Management 
 
Responding to calls to increase attention to persons with disabilities, FEMA recently 
clarified and improved its guidance to emergency managers through the adoption of a 
new model: Functional Need Support Service (FEMA 2010). This approach seems 
specific to the management of shelters; but the basic model provides a view of what 
integration practices can and should look like more generally. For example, the guidance 
documents include specific guidelines for the design of accessible restrooms along with 
general information on consulting organizations that specialize in advocacy for residents 
with functional needs. Further, the approach is also a bellwether of inclusion strategies 
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for a variety of other social service areas. That is, there is nothing inherent to a 
“functional needs” approach to shelter management that limits its application to matters 
of to shelter management or, even, emergency management as a whole. Rather, social 
service administration from a variety of domains may see in the FNSS an example of 
what an inclusiveness strategy may look like. 
In this section, we describe the FNSS approach and the guidance it directs to shelter 
managers. We start by laying out the guiding principles of the FNSS approach to provide 
context and then elucidate values that motivate the strategy. We follow this with deeper 
investigation of two components of the FNSS guidance document—stakeholder 
consultation and special services. 
 
Guiding Legal and Operational Principles 
 
The FNSS guidance starts with a strong legal disclaimer. After a brief introduction, 
FEMA devotes the second paragraph to all of the functions the document does not serve. 
The document is not intended to stake a new claim to authority over shelter management 
(a task generally delegated to state and local levels of government) or to create new legal 
obligations. The FNSS approach is intended to provide support for existing obligations 
rather than imply new ones. In light of the recent court decision discussed above, this is 
an important qualifier. However, announcing a set of practices—even if said to be 
consistent with existing legal obligations—creates an implicit standard for 
accommodating residents with functional needs. This nuance makes the document 
extremely important for any emergency management official with responsibilities related 
to sheltering; ignoring the guidance may place one’s preparedness below an appropriate 
performance level. To the extent that such common management practices could shape 
legal definitions of reasonable expectations for the accommodation of functional needs, 
emergency management officials must pay close attention to such formal guidance. 
Furthermore, these common expectations reflect closely on FEMA’s general policy and 
the accommodation of residents with functional needs. 
The legal environment for emergency management is complicated, particularly as 
related to the accommodation of residents with functional needs. The Stafford Act and 
the more recent Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act  provide a set of legal 
principles that guide emergency management—including shelter management. The 
general principle is one of non-discrimination—but there is a tremendous amount of 
ambiguity. To clarify this general principle, the FEMA guidance document provides 
more specific operative principles (FEMA 2010, 10-11). These are self-determination; no 
“one-size-fits-all” approach; equal opportunity; inclusion; integration; physical access; 
equal access; effective communication; program modification; and no charge. 
Based on the belief that the each person with a disability is most capable of defining 
his or her own needs, the approach calls for active, specific accommodation. Shelters are 
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required to make themselves accommodating places for people with disabilities rather 
than segregating these people into separate locations. Shelter planners are required to take 
all reasonable steps to ensure this accessibility. In practice, the process of mainstreaming 
people with disabilities is blurry—as our review of reports from the field will illustrate in 
a later section. 
The series of operational principles listed above enunciates some of the dimensions of 
accommodation. Most obviously, shelters must allow access to the physical location. 
However, access to the physical location is not enough. The guidance emphasizes the 
need for accommodation of functional needs within the shelter including communication 
and all of the diverse services that the shelter provides. It is in this diversity that the 
FNSS approach stands out compared to previous approaches. 
Following vague or general pronouncements of inclusiveness and accommodation, 
the FNSS approach provides a strategy for emergency managers to better understand the 
overall diversity of functional needs present in their populations. The focus on the 
functional needs associated with disabilities directs attention to the specific action and 
accommodations required to achieve inclusion. This also provides a heuristic device to 
categorize needs to simplify their diversity. Focusing on functional needs transforms 
characterizations of disabilities into actionable descriptions. Within the FNSS approach, 
one may focus on how sensory limitations affect a broad range of emergency 
management issues. For instance, how will alert systems notify people with various 
sensory limitations? How will people with cognitive limitations interpret the 
notifications? Rather than asking emergency managers to understand the wide variety of 
conditions related to a variety of impairments, the FNSS focuses attention on meeting 
classes of functional needs, each of which results from a variety of specific conditions. 
In the next sections, we will discuss two specific elements of the FNSS to illustrate 
the guidance offered within the document. These examples are taken as illustrations and 
do not represent the entirety of the FNSS guidance document. These examples, though, 
are each inherently important while also providing a sense of what the FNSS calls upon 




The FNSS guidance notes that the expertise required to prepare properly for the 
integration of residents with functional needs seldom resides within offices of emergency 
management. Generally speaking, prior inattention to issues related to residents with 
functional needs has left emergency management offices without a long-standing history 
of comprehensive planning. As a result, a major resource, or perhaps the best information 
likely available in many communities, lies within the community itself—advocacy 
groups, service providers, and those other community government units serving residents 
with functional needs represent an effective starting point for informing planning efforts. 
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Tapping into this expertise requires a broad view of potential partners. For instance, 
government agencies primarily responsible for clients with functional needs are an 
important partner in the process of writing inclusive emergency plans. However, 
stakeholder partnerships go beyond peer governmental agencies. Key partners within any 
community include specific service provider organizations from the nonprofit sector 
(e.g., Centers for Independent Living), as well as service provider organizations from the 
for-profit sector (e.g. various health and congregate care facilities). 
A single organization rarely possesses the expertise to include residents with needs as 
diverse as sensory differences and residents with mobility differences. For example, 
organizations serving residents with mental health functional needs have frequently little 
interaction with organizations serving residents with mobility differences. Emergency 
managers on the other hand need to seek out all relevant organizations and bring them 
into the planning process. The guidance document provides some examples and resources 
for identifying and integrating these organizations within one’s community. Although 
vague, FEMA (2010, p. 16) provides general recommendations to coordinate with 
individuals requiring support services, agencies and organizations that provide those 
services and organizations that advocate for the rights of individuals requiring FNSS. 
Further, the recommendations also suggest specific attention to, and indicate practices 
for, managing issues related to durable medical equipment, consumable medical supplies, 
and communication providers. The recommendation also includes a specific example of 
well-developed functional need guidance (from New Hampshire) to illustrate the 




Possibly the greatest assistance the FNSS provides is its application to the specific 
domain of shelter management. Although some communities across the U.S. have made a 
transition to greater inclusiveness in planning efforts related to emergencies and hazard 
mitigation—a process the FNSS intends to accelerate—shelter management remains a 
complex undertaking and thus a challenge for effective performance. Indeed, the list of 
tasks associated with transitioning to a fully accessible shelter is extensive. The FNSS 
approach helps to simplify the complex task of including shelter residents by focusing 
attention on specific functional needs. This division of the complex environment of 
conditions into clusters of functional needs helps systematize efforts. 
Consider the example of mobility-related disabilities. Mobility disabilities can take a 
variety of forms. One must consider access and mobility issues within a shelter for those 
in wheelchairs, those with walkers, or those requiring only the assistance of a cane. Each 
of these disabilities presents specific challenges, but grouping them together as mobility 
limitations aids in planning and the process of inclusion. 
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The boundaries between these functional categories are blurry. A person with sensory 
differences (e.g., blindness) might also have mobility differences or their blindness may 
limit their ability to navigate the shelter. In fact, specific conditions may lead to a variety 
of considerations in accommodating an individual’s needs in a shelter setting. Thus, 
blindness has implications for mobility considerations within a mass shelter environment, 
to mention just one example. 
Within the context of shelter management, the guidance brings attention to issues that 
are easy to neglect when focused exclusively on abled populations within general 
population shelters. Although mobility and sensory differences might be generally 
familiar issues, a broader range of specific challenges to shelter design and management 
speak to the complexity of effective performance in sheltering all members of a 
community. The not-so-obvious list of these considerations includes dietary needs, 
service animals, communication, bathing and toileting needs, quiet areas, mental health 
services, medical and dental services, medication, and transportation services. 
Within each of these areas of functional support, the guidance provides information 
on standards and resources available. Consider the example of bathing and toileting 
needs. In this section, the focus is on creating accessible bathing and toileting facilities 
for people with functional needs. Specific information is offered on issues ranging from 
where to find Red Cross requirements on accessible and compliant toilet rooms to 
specific logistics related to bathroom stalls. Although the guidance document does not 
itself provide detailed recommendation such as full compliance requirements for bathing 
facilities, it provides extensive references to direct shelter managers towards available 
supporting information. The guidance is designed to assist shelter and emergency 
managers to understand the nature of a FNSS system and spotlight relevant available 
information. 
 
Social Construction and Policy Decision Making 
 
The changes in policy guidance for addressing the interests of shelter residents with 
functional needs represent a serious and substantive policy effort. But as was stated in the 
introduction, a critical question to ask is: how can we understand the potential impact of 
the FNSS approach? One means of addressing this question is to recognize the 
underlying causes of historic marginalization. Indeed, the social construction theory of 
public policy-making provides some reason to believe that changes in policy guidance are 
unlikely to penetrate deep enough into administrative processes that have created and 
supported the historical neglect of persons with functional needs. 
Social construction theories emphasize how specific policies, from both legislation 
and the choice of policy tools to the implementation process, are the product of the 
characteristics attributed to the target populations (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997). 
Schneider and Ingram focused on two dimensions distinguishing different target 
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population characterizations: First, target populations vary in terms of their perceived 
political power. For example: owners and executives of large finance firms, as affluent 
actors with access to political officials, are politically powerful. In contrast, homeless 
people have little (or more likely) no meaningful access to political power. Second, target 
populations vary in their perceived level of deservingness of public support. The public 
(and policy makers) consider military veterans to be deserving of public support. Drug 
addicts, on the contrary, are frequently considered to be undeserving of public support. 
The conjunction of these two dimensions creates four categories of target 
populations: (1) Strong and deserving target populations are considered advantaged; (2) 
Strong but undeserving target populations are contenders; (3) Weak but undeserving 
target populations are deviants and (4) Weak but deserving target populations are 
dependents (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997). 
Each different type of target population creates a different environment for policy 
formulation and implementation. The case of deviant target populations is easy to 
consider. Imposing costs or using punitive policy tools on members of this population is 
likely to be popular with most of the public. Proposing a crackdown on drug abusers or 
sex offenders, for example, is likely to be popular with the public because these groups 
are unlikely to mobilize political influence. Such a target population is a “political 
opportunity” for policymakers (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 114). Using similar policy 
tools or implementation strategies to regulate the behavior of advantaged target 
populations, such as financial managers, is politically “risky”. 
The political incentives evoked by target population characteristics provide the 
context for policy development and policy implementation. This fundamental role for the 
social construction of target population influences the treatment of members of these 
groups throughout the policy process—including the treatment of residents with 
functional needs in their implementation of emergency management policies and the 
inclusion (or exclusion) from emergency planning operations. Anticipating the impact of 
the FNSS strategy for emergency management requires a clear understanding the social 
construction of residents with functional needs. 
Scholars of disability policy have long considered our dialogue about disability in 
society to be limited (Oliver 1986). Traditional approaches to discussing functional needs 
have focused on “personal tragedy” rather than on social context (Oliver 1986: 6)). This 
approach ignores the extent to which the isolation of people with functional needs from 
social life is not predetermined by biology. Instead, this isolation is also a product of 
social institutions. This critical understanding of functional needs requires a shift from an 
exclusively medical understanding of functional needs to one that embraces their social 
nature. 
The medical view that social restrictions of disabled people are a consequence of 
physical dysfunctions was overturned by a radical move that argued people with 
impairments were disabled by a social system which erected barriers to their 
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participation. Disability was not an outcome of bodily pathology, but of social 
organization: it was socially produced by systematic patterns of exclusion that were—
quite literally—built into the social fabric. The built environment, for example, was built 
for non-disabled people and the norms of construction are such that those with 
impairments may, and often do, find themselves excluded from a whole range of social 
spaces that non-disabled people that for granted (Hughes and Paterson 1997). 
Research into the ADA of 1990 has identified the social constructions of disability as 
a key influence on the reaction to functional needs accommodation in the workplace 
(Harlan and Robert 1998). The law requires that employers make “reasonable 
accommodations” to allow people with functional needs to work within their 
organizations. The reactions of employers to this mandate reveal how our society defines 
and attributes characteristics to people with functional needs. Most notably, interview 
research into employer attitudes towards disabled employees documents resistance to 
ADA’s implementation (Harlan and Robert 1998). 
This research literature supports the argument that social constructions of people with 
functional needs as a target population for legislation influences policy making and 
implementation. In the Schneider and Ingram (1997) framework, people with functional 
needs most closely fit into the dependent category. However, there are important 
limitations. Although the research indicates that people with functional needs possess 
relatively low levels of political power, the issues of deservingness is somewhat 
complicated. By and large, the population is considered deserving of public assistance but 
the use of regulatory authority to support integration through the ADA reveals that there 
are limits to this sense of deservingness. While deserving of some minimum level of 
support, there is greater resistance to more thorough forms of integration within the 
“reasonable accommodation” requirement. This resistance takes the form of passivity of 
implementation and growing resentment toward disabled people for the extra effort 
required to accommodate them. 
Studies of ADA implementation suggest that these deeply held characterizations of 
disabled people may limit the influence that the FNSS approach to emergency planning 
will have (e.g. Harlan and Robert 1998). Schneider and Ingram anticipated this neglect 
and unstable protection from discrimination when they suggest that “dependent” 
populations are easy to ignore. The issues of dependent populations are likely to remain 
low on the political and administration agenda. When there is action, it is likely to quite 
limited, exclusionary (requiring extensive documentation of eligibility), and 
particularistic. This makes it easy for policymakers, be they legislators or executive 
officials, to announce grandiose plans to support dependent populations and then ignore 
or refuse to fund actual service provision. 
The influence of these social constructions is likely to be all the more acute in an 
emergency management context. Emergency management, including emergency 
planning and emergency response, faces the combination of limited resources and 
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unlimited demand that Lipsky identifies as defining street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky 
1980). These conditions lead to triage and queuing behaviors which suggests the 
likelihood of continued marginalization of people with functional needs. Emergencies are 
likely to magnify these processes as decision-makers tend to fall back on their habits 
and/or long-held perceptions and sense of normality—including what a “normal” resident 
needs (Weick 1993). When the environment is unreliable, one is likely to fall back on 
simplifications of one’s situation when one has to act—a response that is not unique to 
emergencies or disasters. This act of making sense of a catastrophic situation reinforces 
the considerations one thinks of as normal, typical, and habitual. Time pressures are only 
likely to reinforce the process of falling back on habit and simplistic constructions of 
one’s normal situation. All of these pressures underscore the real and significant 
challenges the FNSS approach faces in its goal of improving assistance to community 
residents with functional needs. 
 
Accounts of Functional Needs Accommodation in Disaster Situations 
 
Social construction processes are relevant to the implementation of a broad range of 
policies related to functional needs and underpin an examination of whether perceptions 
and attitudes of public personnel reinforce the basic claims of social construction 
process—either in positive or negative directions. FEMA’s FNSS guidance serves as a 
case study of an agency whose primary responsibility is not limited to those with 
functional needs—even though its function involves serving these residents. Shelter 
management has become a particular test case for how FEMA will integrate concerns 
related to functional needs into emergency planning. In this regard, the FNSS guidance 
for shelter management provides a view into the potential trajectory for a broad range of 
functional needs integration strategies within and beyond FEMA. 
Over the past two years, we have completed interviews of 23 emergency management 
officials in six communities focusing specifically on the subject of evacuation ingress and 
hosting. The interviews took place in four communities along the Gulf Coast (Lakeland, 
FL; Shreveport, LA; Birmingham, AL; College Station, TX) as well as Riverside, CA 
and Tulsa, OK—all of which had recent experience in hosting evacuees. Each site visit 
included semi-structured interviews (Weiss 1995) of local government officials and 
nonprofit organizations involved in emergency management and evacuation hosting. 
Interviews averaged between 45 minutes and 2 hours involving multiple research team 
members.2 Interviews were recorded and transcribed to ensure accuracy beyond the 
research team’s interview notes.3 
As part of these semi-structured interviews, we devoted time to issues related to 
functional needs ingress and sheltering. These interviews revealed perspectives similar to 
those expected from the social construction theory of policy development and 
implementation. Despite careful case selection of interview respondents, the data do not 
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permit inference to the proportion of emergency management officials in the population 
with similar views. Instead, these interviews revealed the existence of various opinions 
consistent with social construction theories of policy implementation. We leave 
investigation of proportions and frequencies of these views to future research designs 
better suited for such questions. In matters of the inclusion of disabled people in 
emergency planning, we find evidence of social construction emerging in two areas: (1) 
the distinctiveness of disabled populations and (2) the expense and demand for inclusion. 
 
The Distinctiveness of Disabled Populations 
 
The most noticeable pattern among emergency management professionals was the 
compartmentalization of people with functional needs—especially as defined by presence 
of a disability. The formal requirements of evacuation sheltering accentuated this 
compartmentalization by creating special shelters for evacuees with specific medical 
needs.4 The justification for such specialized shelters makes sense: evacuees with some 
medical needs may require access to specific medical technologies or assistance. It would 
be difficult to accommodate these needs within a general population shelter. Simply put, 
these evacuees require much more assistance services than is available within general 
population shelters. 
The difficulty in implementing this strategy is presence of a tremendous grey area in 
distinguishing between medical needs and non-medical disabilities. This ambiguity is 
particularly the case with chronic illnesses such as diabetes and conditions requiring 
dialysis. The guiding principles of the FNSS include “equal opportunity,” “equal access,” 
and “integration.” These principles work at cross-purposes to the strategy of establishing 
separate medical special needs shelters. The result is a strategy that segregates medical 
special needs while mainstreaming people with functional needs. In addressing this 
issues, the FNSS guidance document only says that there is no “one-size-fits all” 
solution. 
Several clear patterns emerged from the interviews. The contradiction between 
integration of functional needs and differentiation of medical needs frustrates many 
emergency management professionals as well as advocates (and self-advocates) of 
disabled people. Shelter managers are asked to integrate people with functional needs to 
the maximum possible extent while those with specific needs (medical special needs) 
require direct accommodation in specially managed facilities. These medical special 
needs shelters involve strict regulation including limitations of who can accompany an 
evacuee requiring assistance. This policy, which is necessitated by the dramatically 
limited space available within the medical-special needs shelters, commonly leads to 
dividing families between separate sheltering facilities. 
The dilemmas associated with these sorts of management practices accentuate the 
distinctiveness of people with functional needs. Shelter managers must screen people to 
determine whether to send them to medical special-needs shelters. Those who are 
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included in mainstream shelters must be accommodated (within the mandate of there 
being no “one-size-fits-all” approach) based on their specific functional needs. As a 
result, emergency managers and related personnel must know a great deal about the 
nature of functional needs as well as accommodative technologies and strategies. 
Within this environment of contradictions and tensions, emergency management 
professionals consistently reported being overwhelmed by, and under-informed about, the 
needs of people with functional needs. Some interview subjects asserted that they cannot 
keep up with the various functional needs and associated accommodations relevant to 
their work. What becomes clear in these statements is that the accommodation of people 
with functional needs is considered an additional responsibility distinguished from 
accommodating “normal” residents and evacuees. This distinction between the service of 
the “normal” and the “other” residents and evacuees amplifies existing or prior 
marginalization of the disabled and other functional needs populations. 
 
The Expense and Demand for Inclusion 
 
An explicitly acknowledged view held by some of the interviewees was that 
accommodation of people with functional needs is not simply an administrative burden 
but also represents a significant financial burden. A general theme within the interviews 
was that increased accommodation of functional needs in general population shelters is 
associated with an increased cost burden on local communities managing those shelters. 
This view can be summarized as stating an opportunity cost concern; local authorities 
report being resource constrained so additional obligations reduce their ability to meet 
other key functions. 
At one level, this reaction to the expense of functional needs accommodation seems 
to indicate the marginal position of people with functional needs within emergency 
preparedness processes. Just as many emergency managers distinguished the 
accommodation of people with functional needs from the accommodation of the needs of 
“normal” residents, the expense of accommodating the functional needs is seen as an 
additional burden rather than a part of the core mission of managing community needs 
during emergencies and disasters. Instead, some emergency management professionals 
interviewed see accommodating functional needs as an additional (and novel) 
requirement imposed on them during already lean and demanding times. This adds to the 
cost generally associated with bringing in new partners to emergency planning processes 
(cf. Robinson 2011). 
It is important to note that only a small number of interview subjects gave a sense that 
calls for inclusion of disabled people are overly demanding. Those that did, however, 
gave subtle indication that accommodating functional needs might not be considered a 
core function. Instead, a fair characterization of the view stated by several interview 
subjects is that accommodation is seen as an admirable goal and a legitimate use of slack 
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resources—but that it remains an add-on obligation rather than a routine element of 
preparedness for the whole community. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The social construction theory of policy development (particularly, in this case, as 
applied to implementation) indicates the challenges associated with anticipating a 
positive impact for the FNSS strategy. The forces that have historically led to the 
marginalization of people with functional needs are still present and cannot be altered 
dramatically simply through the issuance of policy guidance. Longstanding 
preconceptions of people with functional needs as aberrant (as opposed to “normal”) and 
the perception that these demands on local government for integration and 
accommodation are excessively costly are fundamental challenges to meaningful 
integration and accommodation. 
This is not to say that the FNSS is not an admirable step forward. Recognizing the 
presence of a range of functional needs as a core feature of a community—not as a 
tertiary consideration—is an important part of the process of changing deeply seated 
social constructions. This process of change will be slow but has to begin somewhere. 
Raising awareness of functional needs is a vital first step toward initiating positive 
change. 
The second contribution of the FNSS guidance is the strong set of recommendations 
(and tools) for the more direct involvement in shelter management of service provider 
and advocacy organizations serving the interests of people with functional needs. One 
view of any policy guidance document such as the FNSS is that its impact is almost 
destined to be limited. Guidance documents such as the FNSS tend to be static and 
limited in scope (in this case, confined to issues of shelter management) and, as such, 
may easily find its way to a shelf to be neglected. However, integrating organizations that 
serve residents with functional needs may build a voice for people with functional needs 
into the process itself. This presents the opportunity to start a long-term process of 
integration and inclusion. In the end, the pressure must come from within each 
community and be present within each emergency management network if it is to be 
effective at inducing inclusion. A guidance document from a federal agency, particularly 
one that takes great pains to make clear that the document should not be interpreted as 
creating new responsibilities, will have very little effect in displacing the complex of 
social forces that have created and perpetuated exclusion. Only by building 
countervailing forces for inclusion is there likely to be any change. The tools within the 
FNSS to assist in the integration of disability service organizations may serve to do just 
this. 
Engagement can take on many forms but should be a priority for emergency 
managers. It will be through the slow process of engagement and mutual education that 
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attitudes related to residents’ functional needs will change. This will involve engaging 
organization not traditionally associated with emergency management (Robinson and 
Gerber 2007) but need not be disruptive. Engagement and inclusion can be selective and 
limited at first. Partners with experience providing services to residents with functional 
needs do not need to be involved in every meeting at first. Inclusion can emerge slowly, 
starting with limited (low opportunity cost) communication and meetings before moving 
to (higher opportunity cost) formalized relationships (cf. Robinson and Gaddis 2012). 
However, FEMA directives such as the FNSS guidance document cannot replace these 
engagement and inclusion activities. 
It is important to note that the development of a strategy for including people with 
functional needs is not unique to emergency management and FEMA. Although medical 
and health care organizations have long faced difficulties related to providing access to 
persons with functional needs, many social service organizations are only recently 
starting to come to grips with this demand. The FNSS guidance provides a view into one 
policy domain’s attempt to grapple with these issues, but may provide a preview of what 
similar approaches can or should look like in domains as diverse as education, 
transportation, housing, or nutritional support. In the end, all service areas will have to 
face this issue. Only time will tell the extent to which other areas adopt an approach 




1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency no longer uses the term “special 
needs” in part because it was too broad and lacked descriptive utility. As a 
result, the term “functional needs” is used as a means of greater descriptive 
precision; accordingly we use that term throughout this paper. 
2. The interviews were on the subject of evacuation hosting generally. Within 
the semi- structured protocol there were specific questions related to the 
organization of and experience with sheltering of people with functional 
needs. 
3. We read the interview transcripts and reviewed interview notes to collect 
references to functional needs and related terms/concepts. The comments came 
disproportionately from the questions directed at issues related to functional 
needs – but not exclusively so. It is important to note that a majority of the 
interviews took place before the FNSS report was released and responses were 
not unduly influenced by the existence of a FEMA guidance document on the 
issue. 
4. There are, in fact, a variety of specially designated shelters but we will use 
the simple distinction between medical special needs and general 
population shelters to motivate this discussion. 
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Only the most politically naïve would assume that capital, whether financial or social, 
is always a force for good. Be that as it may, Aldrich’s solid case for taking a second look 
at the role of social capital in disaster recovery is a useful contribution to the still-sparse 
recovery literature. 
The book opens with a couple of introductory chapters laying out the thesis that social 
capital can both help and hinder recovery, depending on who controls it, thus social 
capital is “Janus-faced”. As is the case with financial capital, the haves benefit while the 
have-nots are potentially harmed by its absence. This harm is especially evident in cases 
of marginalized segments of the population, such as lower-ranking castes in India or less-
organized neighborhoods in the US. 
Aldrich divides social capital into “bonding”, “bridging” and “linking” types, which 
are analogous to the earlier distinction between horizontal (peer-to-peer) and vertical 
(rank-to-rank) linkages, although most of the book focuses on bonding and linking 
versions of social capital. It should be noted that the phrases “social capital” and “social 
networks” are used nearly interchangeably in this book, a usage some readers may not 
approve.  
The heart of the book is the four analytic chapters, comprising four mixed method 
recovery case studies—Tokyo’s 1923 earthquake, Kobe’s 1995 earthquake, the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami (focusing on Tamil Nadu, India), and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
In the Tokyo case, the indicators of social capital are voter turnout and number of 
political gatherings per year, and the dependent variable is population growth rate. 
Aldrich shows that the neighborhoods with the highest values for the social capital 
variables had higher population growth rates after the disaster. The well-known attacks 
on ethnic Koreans are described as an illustration of the dangers to “out-groups” of high 
levels of bonding social capital, especially when bonding capital is high among the 
majority and bridging (group-to-group) capital is low or absent. 
The Kobe case also uses population growth as the dependent variable, whereas social 
capital is measured by the number of new non-profit organizations formed per capita in 
each ward. Again the importance of social capital is confirmed, as this independent 
variable outperformed all the others (percentage of the population affected, welfare-





The Indian Ocean chapter is the longest and most involved, using several data sets 
gathered from various districts in Tamil Nadu state. The dependent variable is the amount 
of relief per family in rupees. A wide range of demographic control variables and 
indicators of socioeconomic status are used. Linking social capital is indicated by source 
of family relief aid (government, NGOs, or both) and family contact with government 
agencies. Bonding capital is indicated by the number of funerals attended in the three 
months before the disaster and the amount of money given at weddings in the same 
period. Both bonding and linking social capital had significant effects on the amount of 
relief families received. However, other variables such as caste and marital status also 
had strong effects, which Aldrich views as underlining the potential social capital has for 
making traditional out-groups suffer disproportionate levels of exclusion from recovery 
assistance—an illustration of social capital’s Janus-face. 
The final case is New Orleans after Katrina. The indicator of recovery here is the 
number of trailer sites and number of trailers per neighborhood, with trailers and trailer 
parks defined as “public bads” that “impose focused costs on local communities but 
provide diffuse benefits to cities and regions as a whole” (p. 136). Social capital in this 
case has a single indicator, voter turnout. Voter turnout had a strong negative effect on 
the siting of both trailer parks and individual trailers in neighborhoods. 
Problems with the book include the minor (incorrect citation of the Indian scholar 
Swaroop Reddy as Reddy Swaroop on page ix) to the more important ones such as the 
use of a single indicator for a complex concept (social capital) in a case where other 
indicators, some of them used in other chapters of the book, are available (Chapter 6). It 
was also bothersome to have to look up the statistical tables in the back of the book, 
because the author thought that it is easier for readers to understand graphs of simulations 
involving two variables. This may be useful for some readers, but I found it annoying.  
There are other, perhaps more serious objections (does the use of cases from three 
nations really allow cultural explanations to be altogether dismissed?) but in the main the 
book is a valuable contribution to the literature, and useful for classes, especially at the 
graduate level. The case studies are more involved than the short descriptions given here 
indicate, and scholars of disaster will find a great deal of material for debate and 













This book focuses on how and why disaster-related activities do and do not yield 
diplomatic gains, looking mainly at disaster-related activities affecting diplomacy rather 
than the reverse (Kelman 2006a). It is an area of study that has emerged from the 
umbrella scholarship of disaster research in the 2000s. It has since then not only gained 
momentum within its mother field but also stirred interest across a wide range of 
disciplines including geography, political science, and international affairs. Furthermore, 
the increasing academic attention for disaster diplomacy has been spurred by a few high-
profile cases that recently made the media headlines. These include the drought spanning 
the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the early 2000s, the 2004 tsunami and its alleged 
impact on conflicts and peace processes in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 and its effects on US relationships with “enemy” countries. 
Ilan Kelman has been the main proponent of the disaster diplomacy research. This 
book summarises more than ten years of research and careful documentation of events, 
processes, and diplomatic outcomes that were, until the publication of this book, 
compiled only in isolated papers and on the disaster diplomacy website: 
www.disasterdiplomacy.org. This book is therefore a welcome academic synthesis of the 
state of our knowledge on how disasters affect peace and conflicts. It is meant to be both 
a reference volume for academic libraries and a document dedicated to help policy 
makers and practitioners in making science-informed decisions when dealing with 
disasters in a conflict-torn region. 
The book is small (174 pages inclusive of references), easy to read, and 
straightforward in its argument. It includes 12 short sections that flow well and in a 
logical manner. It thus caters well to a non-academic audience while still capturing the 
attention of the scholarly readership by the rigour and thoroughness of the 
argumentation—Ilan Kelman’s trademark. The bibliography is rich and stems from an 
array of fields and subfields of research, although the author acknowledges a definite bias 
towards the “disaster” side of the topic at the relative detriment of its “diplomacy” 
counterpart. 
The disaster diplomacy framework as presented in this book also neglects the broad 
field humanitarian studies, which would have provided interesting additional insights and 
theoretical framing. Many authors (e.g., de Waal 1997; Cuny 1999) have indeed 
addressed how long-term aid and short-term relief operations in time of famines or armed 
conflicts may exacerbate tensions or support peace. The Do No Harm approach suggested 
by Anderson (1999) may in fact very well constitute a proto-disaster diplomacy 
framework for policy makers and practitioners, which would deserve attention because it 
similarly draws upon a good range of case studies and empirical materials. 
Still, this small book stands out by the comprehensiveness with which it addresses the 




set of empirical data. These include a significant range of case studies from all over the 
globe, which are all discussed in specific subsections. These examples cover a wide range 
of disaster diplomacy—international, intra-state, para-diplomacy, and environmental 
diplomacy. Some readers may regret that these case studies are not detailed but this lack 
of detail is the price to pay for a small and concise book that will likely speak to 
practitioners and policy makers who may not have the same appetite for details as 
academics. 
In fact, the empirical materials supplied in this book provide ample evidence that the 
potential for disasters to foster peace should not be overestimated, nor it should be 
neglected. Kelman shows that disasters and post-disaster recovery offer a range of 
pathways for diplomacy but these are actually rarely pursued in the long term. Short-term 
gains in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, during relief operations, are indeed often 
overcome by long-lasting and structural social, economic, and political issues 
underpinning the conflict. In addition, when positive outcomes such as those following 
the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia have been observed, these are as much associated to pre-
disaster negotiations as to the disaster itself. Disasters therefore serve as catalysts for 
diplomacy rather than key factors for initiating peace talks. In that sense, the present book 
debunks a myth often put forward by the media. 
Disaster Diplomacy is not limited to the foregoing argument, which has, in fact, 
already been discussed in a series of papers by Kelman and others (e.g., Kelman and 
Koukis 2000; Kelman 2006a, b; Kelman and Conrich 2011). It advances the debate 
around disaster diplomacy by making concrete recommendations for policy and practice. 
Four key lessons that have already or may be taken into account for enhancing both 
disaster and aid policies and diplomacy are suggested. Those straightforward lessons 
include “be ready for assistance offers from enemies”, “all diplomacy tracks can be 
useful”, “disaster diplomacy operates at many levels” and “lessons should be 
implemented, not forgotten”. Kelman provides an insightful discussion for each of these 
lessons through concrete examples of existing policies, as in the case of New Zealand. 
Here, though, reference to, and maybe integration of, Anderson’s Do No Harm approach 
would have provided further practical insights for policy makers and practitioners 
providing aid in conflict-torn areas. 
The book closes with a critical assessment of its limitations and those of the whole 
disaster diplomacy framework. Kelman notably confronts early criticisms raised by Yim 
et al. (2009, p. 291)—the lack of operational definition for disaster diplomacy, the 
difficulties in assessing success and failure, the absence of recommendations for policy, 
and training programme for practitioners. He suggests ways for overcoming some of 
these limitations, such as the use of quantitative approaches, while reflecting upon the 
actual shortcomings of the disaster diplomacy framework, especially its operational 
validity. In fact, the closing section of the book provides a clear and appealing agenda for 
further research to fill in these gaps in knowledge and practice. It particularly invites 
scholars of different disciplines as well as practitioners to engage in further research to 
overcome three main gaps: 1) to understand people’s motivations and decision making in 
cases of disaster diplomacy, 2) to make disaster diplomacy actually work, and 3) expand 
academic knowledge beyond the field of disaster studies. 
In summary, Disaster Diplomacy is a concise but excellent and stimulating book that 




within the field of disaster studies. Its format and scope further makes it relevant and 
helpful for policy makers and practitioners of disaster risk reduction, disaster 
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Interested in what others are doing in the hazards 
and disasters community? Join the crowd. 
 
The Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder plays a vital 
role in reducing the risks posed by natural, technological, and human-induced 
hazards. For almost thirty years the Hazards Center has served as a national 
and international clearinghouse of knowledge concerning the social science and 
policy aspects of hazards and we continue to advocate sustainability, 
interdisciplinary partnerships, and an all-hazards approach to the management of 
extreme events. Our basic goal is to strengthen communication among 
researchers, practitioners, policy makers, and other concerned individuals, and 
we focus on the collection and sharing of research and experience related to 
disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The Center publishes 
a wide variety of publications, often freely available on our Web site, ranging from 
works-in-progress to peer-reviewed studies, with the intent of reaching as wide 
an audience as possible. These publications include the Natural Hazards 
Observer, Disaster Research (e-newsletter), the Natural Hazards Review (in 
cooperation with the American Society of Civil Engineers), full-length research 
studies (monographs), working papers, and special publications such as Beyond 
September 11: An Account of Post-Disaster Research. Information about 
these publications as well as other Hazards Center projects, such as the Disaster 
Grads listserv for students interested in hazards and disasters, our extensive 
library and its online searchable database HazLit, and the Quick Response 
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